> On 3 Mar 2020, at 18:42, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 3/3/2020 3:32 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 2 Mar 2020, at 14:02, Alan Grayson <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Saturday, February 29, 2020 at 3:57:58 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> On 28 Feb 2020, at 23:03, Alan Grayson <[email protected] <javascript:>> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Among the infinite possibilities for the gravitational force, why, in the >>>> context of your theory, do we live in the world that apparently obeys the >>>> one consistent with Newton and Einstein? TIA, AG >>> >>> I will answer this tomorrow. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> I might have missed it. Please answer the above question here, keeping in >>> mind that the gravity formula in our world must have zero probability, >>> given the infinity of hypothetical equations. TIA, AG >> >> I suggest we do this little step by little step. OK? It might help others >> too. >> >> The 0th step is the definition I gave of Mechanism (aka Indexical Digital >> Mechanism). It is, as I think you have understood, the assumption that the >> brain/body works like a digital, or digitalisable machine, and that we can >> survive, at some relevant level of description, with an artificial digital >> body/brain. At this stage, the artificial brain is still physically >> implemented. >> >> That is what I will call step 0. You are not asked if you personally believe >> or not, in this. It is my basic assumption, from which, by reasoning, I will >> explain what you ask. >> >> More precisely, Mechanism is >> >> 1) the Church Turing thesis (but this is used only in step seven, so don’t >> worry too much about it, before we get there). It is needed to obtain the >> purely mathematical definition of digital machine. Note that the >> Church-Turing thesis requires elementary arithmetic to make sense. I hope >> that you have no problem with 2+2=4, nor with deriving from "2+2=4" that "it >> exists a number x such that x + 2 = 4", OK? >> >> 2) it exists a level of description of my body such that I can survive with >> a digital artificial brain/body. I will just say brain, but if someone claim >> that the neural network in the belly plays a key role in his consciousness, >> the “artificial brain” will have to emulate that neural net too. The thought >> experiments are simpler when assuming a high level of description (like the >> neuronal level), but in step seven, this suppelemtary hypothesis will be >> discharged. The consequences will not depend on the choice of the >> substitution level. The brain might be the entire cluster of galaxies around >> us, described by superstring theory, with 10^34 decimals, and the reasoning >> will still go through, even if the shout experiment becomes unfeasible. > > But this is wrong. First, when you suggest that you can survive with a > digital artificial brain/body everyone understands you are thinking of > something like a robot, which exists within an environment. The environment > is essential for you survival...not just physically so that the robot can > function, but also for the informational flow to and from your artificial > brain. A brain with no input/output cannot function (except maybe as a > mathematician. :-) )
If the environment plays a role, then by definition, it is part of the brain (the portion of the physical reality that you need to emulate to keep your consciousness on. A universal machine cannot distinguish an “environment” from another universal machine, except by looking below its substitution level, in which case the “environment” is what emerge, relatively, from all computations. > > Second, you attempt to anticipate this criticism by saying you can include > the whole galaxy, or even the universe, in your robotic emulation. ? > But then later you renege on this ? > and claim that you've shown physics to be derivative rather than necessary. I am sorry but I do not understand. It is the burden of those who believe in or assume the necessity of a primary physical reality to explain what it is, and how such a reality manages to prevent a digital being from accessing a continuation among the infinity of continuations which supports him in the arithmetical or any Turing complete reality (assumed in all theories of physics). Your argument seems only to criticise Mechanism, not the fact that Mechanism makes the mind-body problem into a reduction of physics to a statistics on computations (seen from the 1p (plural) pov)). If the physical environment plays a role which would be non Turing emulable, *and* non first person statistically recoverable, then Mechanism is simply false, and that would conclude my point by a reductio ad absurdum. Bruno > > Brent > >> >> Any question up to here? >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/11a3ce89-b59c-4c87-9b4d-1e60627b3ee2%40googlegroups.com >>> >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/11a3ce89-b59c-4c87-9b4d-1e60627b3ee2%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/407A03D5-EC15-4D2C-A538-E8D316BEE1FE%40ulb.ac.be >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/407A03D5-EC15-4D2C-A538-E8D316BEE1FE%40ulb.ac.be?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/0275b9b3-debd-dd5d-fd5e-81509d2d423c%40verizon.net > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/0275b9b3-debd-dd5d-fd5e-81509d2d423c%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/59ED2B19-96F4-4D18-B606-A834EF5B1245%40ulb.ac.be.
