> On 14 Mar 2020, at 12:22, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Saturday, March 14, 2020 at 5:23:53 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 12 Mar 2020, at 14:07, Lawrence Crowell <[email protected] >> <javascript:>> wrote: >> >> On Wednesday, March 11, 2020 at 11:21:55 PM UTC-5, [email protected] >> <http://aol.com/> wrote: >> You're ignoring quantum and photonic computing??!! >> >> >> No, quantum computing does not even map NP problems into P. I does not get >> around incompleteness results of Turing and Goedel. > > That’s right. In fact super-hyper-machine does not escape incompleteness and > can even be super-hyper-incomplete.Using the infinite to escape Gödel > incompleteness does not work, or becomes trivial. > > I will consider admitting the infinite in the ontology the day I got an > infinite salary :) > > Even the induction axioms are not allowed in the ontology, despite being the > main axiom about what is an observer. > > Quantum computing (and I guess photonic computing) does not violate the > Church-Turing thesis. David Deustch saw this clearly already in its main > quantum computability paper. > > Bruno > > > > > https://www.nbcnews.com/mach/science/weirdest-idea-quantum-physics-catching-there-may-be-endless-worlds-ncna1068706 > > > “It's absolutely possible that there are multiple worlds where you made > different decisions. We're just obeying the laws of physics,” says Sean > Carroll, a theoretical physicist at the California Institute of Technology > and the author of a new book on many worlds titled "Something Deeply Hidden." > Just how many versions of you might there be? “We don't know whether the > number of worlds is finite or infinite, but it's certainly a very large > number," Carroll says. "There’s no way it’s, like, five.”
Yes, Mechanism enforces this. I have semi-rigorous evidence that for the illusion of matter we might need even very large cardinals. But they belong to the phenomenology. (Assuming mechanism) there are zero worlds, but from inside, there might be a cardinal of Laver of consistent histories, as far as I know. > > Renowned theorist Roger Penrose of Oxford University dismisses the idea as > “reductio ad absurdum”: physics reduced to absurdity. On the other hand, > Penrose’s former collaborator, the late Stephen Hawking, described the many > worlds interpretation as “self-evidently true.” > > Coming at the critique from a different angle, Oxford's Roger Penrose argues > that the whole idea of many worlds is flawed, because it’s based on an overly > simplistic version of quantum mechanics that doesn’t account for gravity. > “The rules must change when gravity is involved,” he says. We can always speculate about a new theory. Penrose speculates also that Mechanism is false, and its use of Gödel’s theorem is invalid. Gödel’s theorem does not show that we are not machine, it shows only that if we are machine we cannot know which one, and indeed that is intuitively true, and is the base of the reduction of physics to a statistic on all computation. > > In a more complete quantum theory, Penrose argues, gravity helps anchor > reality and blurry events will have only one allowable outcome. He points to > a potentially decisive experiment now being carried out at the University of > California, Santa Barbara, and Leiden University in the Netherlands that's > designed to directly observe how an object transforms from many possible > locations to a single, fixed reality. > > Carroll is unmoved by these alternative explanations, which he considers > overly complicated and unsupported by data. Carroll is right on this, with respect to mechanism. He remains physicalist thought and apparently unaware of the (computationalist) mind-body problem. That is just a tradition since 1500 years. > The notion of multiple yous can be unnerving, he concedes. But to him the > underlying concept of many worlds is “crisp, clear, beautiful, simple and > pure.” > > If he's right, he's not the only Sean Carroll who feels that way. If two identical brain/computer do exactly the same 3p activity at the right substitution level, would you say that there is two people? If yes, then indeed, there are an infinity of Sean Carroll feeling that way. If no, then we have to define “Sean Carroll” by the quotient of the computational histories/states for a first person non-distinguishability relations, and the number will be finite. Bruno > > @philipthrift > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/d637f2d3-0199-465e-8327-5374006276f1%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/d637f2d3-0199-465e-8327-5374006276f1%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/3E2CAC80-C6A6-437A-847D-D22AB5DBB90B%40ulb.ac.be.
