On 5/23/2020 1:42 AM, Jason Resch wrote:


On Friday, May 22, 2020, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everything-list@googlegroups.com <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:



    On 5/22/2020 1:48 PM, Jason Resch wrote:


    On Fri, May 22, 2020 at 3:27 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything
    List <everything-list@googlegroups.com
    <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:



        On 8/4/2019 10:44 AM, Jason Resch wrote:


        On Friday, August 2, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything
        List <everything-list@googlegroups.com
        <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:



            On 8/2/2019 1:06 PM, Jason Resch wrote:


            On Fri, Aug 2, 2019 at 1:40 PM 'Brent Meeker' via
            Everything List <everything-list@googlegroups.com
            <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:



                On 8/2/2019 11:03 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
                > It is like Saibal Mitra said, the person he was
                when he was 3 is
                > dead.  Too much information was added to his
                brain.  If his 3 year old
                > self were suddenly replaced with his much older
                self, you would
                > conclude the 3 year old was destroyed, but when
                gradual changes are
                > made, day by day, common-sense and convention
                maintains that the
                > 3-year-old was not destroyed, and still lives.
                This is the
                > inconsistency of continuity theories.

                On the contrary I'd say it illustrates the
                consistency of causal
                continuity theories.


            Your close friend walks into a black  box, and emerges
            1 hour later.

            In case A, he was destroyed in a discontinuous way, and
            a new version of that person was formed having the mind
            of your friend as it might have been 1 hour later.
            In case B, he sat around for an hour before emerging.

            You later meet up with the entity who emerges from this
            black box for coffee.

            From your point of view, neither case A nor B is
            physically distinguishable.  Yet under your casual
            continuity theory, your friend has either died or
            survived entering the black box.  You have no way of
            knowing if the entity you are having coffee with is
            your friend or not.  Is this a legitimate and
            consistent way of looking at the world?

            Did the black box take A's information in order to copy
            him, or did it make a copy accidentally.


        Would that change the result?

        Holevo's theorem says it's impossible to copy A's state.


    It's a thought experiment. Do you think the quantum state is
    relevant? One typically doesn't track of the quantum state of
    their friend's atoms and use that information as part of their
    recognition process.




            Incidentally, my not knowing the difference between two
            things is not very good evidence that they are the same.


        That there's no physical experiment, even in principle, that
        could differentiate the two cases, I take as evidence that
        notions of identity holding there to be a difference are
        illusory.

        But you haven't postulated a case in which it is impossible
        to differentiate the two cases.  It's not clear what degree
        of differentiation is relevant.


    If Holebo's theorem remains fundamental problems, then let's move
    everything into virtual reality, and repeat the experiment.

    In one case your friend's mind file is deleted and restored from
    a backup, and in another he continued without interruption. Do
    not the same conclusions I suggest follow?

    So you're postulating that your friend has been duplicated but in
    a way that you have no way of knowing.  And then you ask, "Is this
    a legitimate and consistent way of looking at the world?"  I guess
    I don't understand the question.  If you have no way of knowing,
    then you don't know...ex hypothesi.


    Brnet


My point is that identity is an intrinsic property of what something is now. The history of the of the constituent particles have no affect on the behaviors or operation of those particles. To say the history is relevant to identity is to add an arbitrary extrinsic property which can be of no physical relevance.

This is a direct consequence of QM, you can't distinguish two electrons, from each other.

But they still have locations and histories, c.f. Griffiths consistent histories interpretation of QM or Feynmann's path integral QM.  When electrons make spots on the film in an EPR experiment the electron that made this spot is not identical with the electron that made that spot in the sense of being the same electron.  And in any case I don't see how the sameness of particles implies the sameness of  complex structures made of particles, i.e. persons.

Brent


I reach the opposite conclusion of Davidson in his swampman thought experiment: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swampman

Jason


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