On Sat, May 23, 2020 at 1:35 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < [email protected]> wrote:
> > > On 5/23/2020 1:42 AM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > On Friday, May 22, 2020, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> >> >> On 5/22/2020 1:48 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> >> >> On Fri, May 22, 2020 at 3:27 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On 8/4/2019 10:44 AM, Jason Resch wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Friday, August 2, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >>> [email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 8/2/2019 1:06 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Fri, Aug 2, 2019 at 1:40 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >>>> [email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 8/2/2019 11:03 AM, Jason Resch wrote: >>>>> > It is like Saibal Mitra said, the person he was when he was 3 is >>>>> > dead. Too much information was added to his brain. If his 3 year >>>>> old >>>>> > self were suddenly replaced with his much older self, you would >>>>> > conclude the 3 year old was destroyed, but when gradual changes are >>>>> > made, day by day, common-sense and convention maintains that the >>>>> > 3-year-old was not destroyed, and still lives. This is the >>>>> > inconsistency of continuity theories. >>>>> >>>>> On the contrary I'd say it illustrates the consistency of causal >>>>> continuity theories. >>>>> >>>>> >>>> Your close friend walks into a black box, and emerges 1 hour later. >>>> >>>> In case A, he was destroyed in a discontinuous way, and a new version >>>> of that person was formed having the mind of your friend as it might have >>>> been 1 hour later. >>>> In case B, he sat around for an hour before emerging. >>>> >>>> You later meet up with the entity who emerges from this black box for >>>> coffee. >>>> >>>> From your point of view, neither case A nor B is physically >>>> distinguishable. Yet under your casual continuity theory, your friend has >>>> either died or survived entering the black box. You have no way of knowing >>>> if the entity you are having coffee with is your friend or not. Is this a >>>> legitimate and consistent way of looking at the world? >>>> >>>> >>>> Did the black box take A's information in order to copy him, or did it >>>> make a copy accidentally. >>>> >>> >>> Would that change the result? >>> >>> >>> Holevo's theorem says it's impossible to copy A's state. >>> >> >> It's a thought experiment. Do you think the quantum state is relevant? >> One typically doesn't track of the quantum state of their friend's atoms >> and use that information as part of their recognition process. >> >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Incidentally, my not knowing the difference between two things is not >>>> very good evidence that they are the same. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> That there's no physical experiment, even in principle, that could >>> differentiate the two cases, I take as evidence that notions of identity >>> holding there to be a difference are illusory. >>> >>> >>> But you haven't postulated a case in which it is impossible to >>> differentiate the two cases. It's not clear what degree of differentiation >>> is relevant. >>> >> >> If Holebo's theorem remains fundamental problems, then let's move >> everything into virtual reality, and repeat the experiment. >> >> In one case your friend's mind file is deleted and restored from a >> backup, and in another he continued without interruption. Do not the same >> conclusions I suggest follow? >> >> >> So you're postulating that your friend has been duplicated but in a way >> that you have no way of knowing. And then you ask, "Is this a legitimate >> and consistent way of looking at the world?" I guess I don't understand >> the question. If you have no way of knowing, then you don't know...ex >> hypothesi. >> >> >> Brnet >> > > My point is that identity is an intrinsic property of what something is > now. The history of the of the constituent particles have no affect on the > behaviors or operation of those particles. To say the history is relevant > to identity is to add an arbitrary extrinsic property which can be of no > physical relevance. > > This is a direct consequence of QM, you can't distinguish two electrons, > from each other. > > > But they still have locations and histories, c.f. Griffiths consistent > histories interpretation of QM or Feynmann's path integral QM. When > electrons make spots on the film in an EPR experiment the electron that > made this spot is not identical with the electron that made that spot in > the sense of being the same electron. > > And in any case I don't see how the sameness of particles implies the > sameness of complex structures made of particles, i.e. persons. > > > The indistinguishability of two electrons, means there's no detectable difference between Person A assembled from *this* pile of atoms, and Person B (of a same structure to Person A) made from *that* pile of atoms. The history of the atoms is of no importance to their function. 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