> On 8 Jun 2020, at 15:56, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: > > Alan Grayson aka Mr.Carl Sagan co-author wrote: > > > you seem to deliberately ignore the fact that in physics we use idealized > > cases to reach important insights. > > Far from ignoring it for years I've been trying to convince Bruno that > mathematical approximations help us understand physical phenomena but > simulations are always simpler than the real physical thing; therefore > physics is not an approximation of mathematics but mathematics is an > approximation of physics.
That follows easily from Aristotle metaphysical postulate that there is some physical reality “out there”. That’s OK when doing physics, and that is OK when studying Aristotle Metaphysics, but you cannot equate physics and metaphysics without further explanation, when doing metaphysics with the scientific attitude and/or method. Note that when just doing physics, you might need all sort of hypotheses, but you don’t need to do any special hypothesis in metaphysics. > So physics is more fundamental than mathematics. Assuming Aristotle metaphysics/theology. But there has never been evidences for this. Just 1500 years of banishing, the pagan philosophers, if not burning them as heretic. > I mean... if a mathematical model of what the path of a hurricane will do > does not conform to what it actually does we don't say the physical hurricane > made an error, we say the computer model made an error. That’s reasonable. But when the question is “what is a hurricane?” is studied, the question is no more that simple, and the answer will depends on your metaphysical hypothesis. With mechanism, we have only “computer models”, and the physical is no more identifiable with any “computer model”, as it is an emerging first person plural experience arising from a non computable statistics on all computation, and nobody knows what that can give, except by pointing the finger to “that” (the realm of our experiences) when we assume mechanism. One of the difficulty here is that we are programmed at the start to anticipate some reality, instinctively, and we have to anticipate that what we see is real, but we don’t have to anticipate that what we see is fundamentally real. That’s how science begun: by doubting in metaphysics (Plato). Bruno > > John K Clark > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv2SLJY30BwsQRHqPJ5RQvfLZnpQA4QUecxMQzzTx55_Ww%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv2SLJY30BwsQRHqPJ5RQvfLZnpQA4QUecxMQzzTx55_Ww%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/246D806D-4E84-4FA5-A820-11A8D8BA2017%40ulb.ac.be.
