> On 21 Jul 2020, at 10:13, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v18/n08/galen-strawson/the-sense-of-the-self > <https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v18/n08/galen-strawson/the-sense-of-the-self> > : > ... > Human beings, then, can have a vivid sense [though] of the self without > having any sense of it as something that has either personality or long-term > continuity. Does this improve the prospects for the claim that a sense of the > self could be an accurate representation of something that actually exists – > even if materialism is true? I think it does, although the full argument > would require a careful statement of what it is to be a true materialist, > further inquiry into the notion of a thing, and a challenge to the > problematic distinction between things and processes. Perhaps the best > account of the existence of the self is one that may be given by certain > Buddhists. It allows that the self exists, at any given moment, while > retaining all the essential Buddhist criticisms of the idea of the self. It > gives no reassurance to those who believe in the soul, but it doesn’t leave > us with nothing. It stops short of the view defended by many analytic > philosophers, according to which the self is a myth insofar as it is thought > to be different from the human being considered as a whole. It leaves us with > what we have, at any given time – a self that is materially respectable, > distinctively mental, and as real as a stone.
That makes sense with materialism if the soul is made into an actual infinite. That makes sense with Mechanism, if we abandon the idea that we have ontologically existing bodies. In that case the selves comes from a unique consciousness which bifurcate by scission, and fuse by amnesia. The machine have a 3p-self, which is their body representation, and they have 1p-self (and of many different types) obeying to the laws of extensional and intensional (modal) self-reference, which is a chapter of mathematical logic/thepretical computer science. Bruno > --- Galen Strawson > > @philipthrift > > > On Tuesday, July 21, 2020 at 12:18:50 AM UTC-5 Brent wrote: > http://existentialcomics.com/comic/351 > <http://existentialcomics.com/comic/351> > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6724346e-992d-4ee2-b665-8322d2a8a3e5n%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6724346e-992d-4ee2-b665-8322d2a8a3e5n%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/40A887F0-711D-426F-99BC-EA3C28E2EBF3%40ulb.ac.be.
