On 9/8/2020 10:51 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 14:56, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com <mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote:On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 2:49 PM Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com <mailto:stath...@gmail.com>> wrote: On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 12:35, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com <mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote: On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 12:32 PM Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com <mailto:stath...@gmail.com>> wrote: On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 11:53, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com <mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote: On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 11:39 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everything-list@googlegroups.com <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote: On 9/8/2020 6:14 PM, smitra wrote: > On 09-09-2020 02:16, Bruce Kellett wrote: >> I don't find that answer convincing, because of the implicit dualist >> assumption. A perfectly reasonable answer to the question asked the >> night before duplication is: "I won't be in a room tomorrow morning, >> because when I am duplicated with 100 continuers, I cease to exist and >> each of the continuers becomes a new, separate person. This is because >> there is a tie among the continuers, with no closest continuer. In >> that situation, the original ceases, and the continuers are separate >> persons." >> >> Now you might not like this answer, but it is perfectly coherent and >> rational. It has the great advantage that it avoids the stench of >> dualism that hangs over your theory. >> >> Bruce >> > > The tie will be broken by small random fluctuations in the physical > states of the copies. Dualism would imply that one and only one of the duplicates has your soul and is "you". I see no problem is just saying they are Bruce Kellet-1, Bruce Kellet-2,... Bruce Kellet-100. They all remember the bet, and assuming their stake is duplicated too, they each either get $100 or lose $25. The existence of more than one Bruce Kellet certainly creates problems in law and language. But law and language are invented to deal with reality, not define it. You are right about what dualism implies. So if you ask the question of the person the night before duplication, it has no answer unless you assume dualism. I think you are right about multiple BKs: BK1, BK2,... and so on. These are different persons who share some memories with the BK of the night before. Closest continuer theory works well in these duplication scenarios, despite the fact that people on this list seem averse to that theory for some undefined reason. You could say that any suggestion that one of the BK's is a continuation of the original, even when there is only one BK extant at any time, implies dualism. Not on the closest continuer theory. If there is a tie, there is no unique closest continuer. If there is only one continuer, he is necessarily the closest. Dualism is not required. But why should the closest continuer be a continuation of the person rather than the next-closest continuer, unless the soul has a preference for it? Be a dualist if you want to. But the closest continuer theory is a convention designed to resolve questions of personal identity in cases of personal duplication, absent a "soul". Arbitrary random selections are not as satisfactory.I'm not a dualist. I think there is no metaphysical basis for continuity of identity, it is just a psychological construct.
Realistically (sort of) in the duplication of Bruce there will be millions of errors in each copy. There would be no point in trying to make them any more accurate. That would certainly be good enough to fool his closest friends and family. So at the molecular level there will certainly be a unique closest continuer. But I can't see that it makes any difference. That's just as arbitrary as denominating the first one to open his door the REAL Bruce.
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