On Wed, 23 Dec 2020 at 10:58, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Dec 23, 2020 at 10:45 AM Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> On Wed, 23 Dec 2020 at 09:15, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >>> On Wed, Dec 23, 2020 at 9:07 AM Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> On Wed, 23 Dec 2020 at 09:02, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On Wed, Dec 23, 2020 at 8:32 AM Stathis Papaioannou < >>>>> stath...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On Tue, 22 Dec 2020 at 21:31, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> On Tue, Dec 22, 2020 at 9:19 PM Stathis Papaioannou < >>>>>>> stath...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> All the copies could be conscious or all could be zombies; none are >>>>>>>> privileged. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> What difference does that make? One has to be privileged in some way >>>>>>> if there is to be a probability different from zero. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Why did you say it was dualist if it doesn't make a difference that >>>>>> it isn't dualist? >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> It makes no difference if all copies are conscious, or if all are >>>>> zombies -- you are still making a dualist assumption. >>>>> >>>>> The probability calculated where there are multiple copies is the >>>>>> probability that one randomly sampled copy will see a particular >>>>>> outcome. I >>>>>> am one randomly sampled copy. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> And that is precisely the dualist assumption that is intrinsic in all >>>>> self-location (indexical) arguments. I think Brent has understood this >>>>> when >>>>> he says "That seems to imply dualism. All the bodies exist, but your soul >>>>> only goes with one." >>>>> >>>> >>>> I could say that my soul is duplicated and I want to know the >>>> probability that I am one randomly sampled soul. I could say that the >>>> carrots are duplicated and I want to know the probability that I get a >>>> particular randomly sampled carrot. I don't have a problem with it; you do, >>>> and there seems to be no way around it. >>>> >>> >>> >>> Think of it like this: take a randomly shuffled deck of cards and hand >>> one card from the deck to each of 52 people. The probability that one of >>> the people will get the 3-of-Spades is one. The probability that 'You' will >>> get the 3-of-Spades in a fair shuffle is 1/52. The difference is that you >>> have identified yourself in advance. The dualist assumption is equivalent. >>> >> >> Let's say you are copied 10^100 times. One copy will end up in a place >> where they use euros and the rest will end up in a place where they use >> dollars. Do you put euros or dollars in your wallet before duplication? >> > > > Let's say I wait and see! and go to the money exchange if necessary. You > are posing a different problem, one in which the number of copies on a > particular branch is increased. That is incompatible with MWI and Everett > with non-degenerate eigenvalues. > > You don't avoid the dualist implications of self-selection by increasing > the number of copies: the example with 52 cards says everything that is > necessary. > >From what I understand of your position, you would claim that the 1 in 10^100 copy will screw up the very concept of probability. If that extra copy did not exist, you would take dollars, because you will certainly need dollars; but with the extra copy you would just throw up your hands and say you don't know what to do, because it is certain you will need dollars and euros. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypXKQiAuhicuU4Wu-3j7_D0djZdWxiafaj%2B_b9%2BmtFj4bw%40mail.gmail.com.
