> On 6 Feb 2021, at 19:10, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote:
> [Philip Benjamin] > > > how and why or where do their “consciousness” (or life arise)? > > > What the hell? The hell is … with Mechanism. It is a fact that for any computational states there are infinitely many computations (in arithmetic, or in any model of any Turing-complete theory) going through the state. It is a fact that no universal machine can distinguish being emulated by a machine *in* a model of arithmetic or by a machine in any other Turing complete “reality”, so, although we can associate consciousness to a machine, the machine itself would require some magic information to decide the type of reality emulating it. So we can associate a conscious person to a machine, but a person cannot associate his/her consciousness to one machine, or to one particular computation, but only to an infinity of them, which shows that the arithmetical reality (the standard model of any theory of arithmetic) brings already an internal “many-worlds” or “many-histories” interpretation of arithmetic. To get right the Mechanist solution of the mind-body problem, the physical aspect of nature must be recovered as part of that many-histories structure, and the math confirms this, both in terms of intuitive “many-histories” and with the quantum logic in the mathematical formalism described them. To put it in another way, the mind-brain identity thesis does not work with Mechanism (with the Indexical Digital Mechanism I illustrate here). Indeed, we can observe matter only because “we” belong to infinity of histories. An history is just a computation (a sequence like phi_i(j)^s, with s = 0, 1, 2, … “seen from inside”. To define “seen from inside”, we can use the definition of the greeks, refuted by Socrates “wrongly”, as we can show by using incompleteness (as I do in my long papers on this subject, not always citing Socrates, though). We need this because all experimental confirmations rely on the first person experience of the person-subject doing the experience. Mechanism explains where the quantum comes from: it constrains physics into a “many-histories” statistical structure. It is a first person plural structure, and this is obtained by having a rich core which is linear and highly symmetrical. In a sense, Mechanism justifies the existence of a sort of “primary matter”, and why it has a weird mathematical structures, quite non boolean, and quantum one. And then incompleteness makes possible to explain why the qualia appears, as necessary non justifiable, but still experienceable, information measurement/measure. Recently, I got evidence that ZF + (a certain large cardinal exists) proves the existence and unicity of that measure, and that it is a Lebesgue integral, not exactly on the true sigma_1 sentences (which are the natural representation of halting computations) but on the union of them *in* all real oracle. Real in the sense of real numbers, not the metaphysical sense. Penrose got the Nobel Prize in Physics, and he certainly deserved it, but he did not understood Gödel’s incompleteness theorem (GI). The natural correction of Penrose-Lucas argument is that GI does not show that we are not machine, but it shows that IF we are (reasonable) machine, we cannot know (assert, believe) which machine we are, nor which computations (among an infinity) supports us. Then with the mechanist assumption (including CT), the observable are the invariant in the sum of all relative computations, and the “measure 1” is structured by the mode []p & <>t. You can read “<>t” by "there is a consistent continuation”. Consciousness is “easy”, because it is given by the true belief in some Reality/Model, encompassing one self, and its non definability is inherited by the fact that no (reasonable) machine can define its own truth predicate, or its own semantic, which is related to 1) Tarski theorem (in mathematical logic, also found by Gödel) and 2) other results by Thomason, Benaceraff, … and by … any arithmetically sound universal machine. Consciousness is first person trivial (basically <>t (v t), but third person non justifiable, and we have to take it into account (like with []p & <>t) to get right the relation between the first person singular and the first person plural. What the hell? Hmm… you can see consciousness as the little grain of dust which prevents the physical science to be the fundamental science. The fundamental science is more like the science of the dreams of the universal machines/numbers, the sharable one, and the non sharable one, but still partially accessible, through music, art, plants, sports, ... Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/2FC9E5AC-E6D9-46F4-A775-2FCFC7777193%40ulb.ac.be.
