If (Indexical, Digital) Mechanism is assumed, the laws of physics are not 
necessarily Turing emulable, and a part of physics is necessarily not 
Turing emulable. The reason is that the domain of indeterminacy bear on a 
non computable subset of computations (in arithmetic). 

It is important to realise that Mechanism (roughly "I am a machine") is 
inconsistent with the idea that the physical universe, and any "reality", 
like a model of arithmetic, are non computer emulable reality. The 
computable is only a very tiny part of the arithmetical truth.

Given that all computations are realised in arithmetic, the physical 
reality is a non computable statistics on those (infinitely many) 
computations going through our state. I have derived the many-world 
interpretation of arithmetic before realising that physicists were already 
there. Only later I got the (shadow of) the quantum logical formalism. I 
don't think that something like gravitation is globally Turing emulable, 
but I am not sure. 

Bruno

On Saturday, July 3, 2021 at 2:13:15 PM UTC+2 Tomas Pales wrote:

> On Saturday, July 3, 2021 at 1:55:59 PM UTC+2 Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>> With Mechanism the physical laws remains persistent because they are the 
>> same for all universal machine, and they come from the unique statistics on 
>> all computations (in arithmetic, in lambda calculus, in any Turing 
>> universal theory or system).
>>
>
> Can't there be a machine that computes gravitational interaction with 
> gravitational constant 6.674 x 10 to the -11 up until some time t and then 
> continues the computation with gravitational constant 5 x 10 to the -11, or 
> just halts? That would be an instability or cessation of gravitational law.
>
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to [email protected].
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7635743c-eda0-4e74-aed5-139bafaad6cen%40googlegroups.com.

Reply via email to