On 4/27/2022 2:00 PM, smitra wrote:
If you agree, and are prepared,
with me, to throw out Everett, then we agree, and there is nothing
more to be argued about (at least, until you present some different
complete theory).
I'm open to the idea that QM itself may only be an approximation to a
more fundamental theory. The arguments in favor of no collapse are
strong arguments but you then do get this issue with probability that
you have discussed here. The disagreement with you about this is that
I don't see it as a fatal inconsistency that would prove the MWI to
be wrong. Probabilities for the different branches do not have to be
equal. But that doesn't mean that this looks to be a rather unnatural
feature of the theory. This suggests that a more fundamental theory
exists from which one could derive quantum mechanics with its
formalism involving amplitudes and the Born rule as an approximation.
If there are probabilities attached to the branches, then Gleason's
theorem shows that the probabilities must satisfy the Born rule. So I
don't seen any inconsistency in simply saying they are probabilities of
measurement results, that's Copenhagen. But if they are probabilities
of results that implies that some things happen and others don't...other
wise what does "probability" mean and what use is it as an empirical
concept? That brings back the original problem of CI, where and how is
this happening defined?
Brent
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7954277d-8375-0340-a5f7-b42d7d514fdb%40gmail.com.
