On Tue, May 3, 2022 at 9:40 PM smitra <smi...@zonnet.nl> wrote:

> On 28-04-2022 02:14, Brent Meeker wrote:
> > On 4/27/2022 2:00 PM, smitra wrote:
> >
> >>> If you agree, and are prepared,
> >>> with me, to throw out Everett, then we agree, and there is nothing
> >>>
> >>> more to be argued about (at least, until you present some
> >>> different complete theory).
> >> I'm open to the idea that QM itself may only be an approximation to
> >> a more fundamental theory. The arguments in favor of no collapse are
> >> strong arguments but you then do get this issue with probability
> >> that you have discussed here. The disagreement with you about this
> >> is that I  don't see it as a fatal inconsistency that would prove
> >> the MWI to be wrong. Probabilities for the different branches do not
> >> have to be equal. But that doesn't mean that this looks to be a
> >> rather unnatural feature of the theory. This suggests that a more
> >> fundamental theory exists from which one could derive quantum
> >> mechanics with its formalism involving amplitudes and the Born rule
> >> as an approximation.
> >
> > If there are probabilities attached to the branches, then Gleason's
> > theorem shows that the probabilities must satisfy the Born rule.  So I
> > don't seen any inconsistency in simply saying they are probabilities
> > of measurement results,  that's Copenhagen.  But if they are
> > probabilities of results that implies that some things happen and
> > others don't...other wise what does "probability" mean and what use is
> > it as an empirical concept?  That brings back the original problem of
> > CI, where and how is this happening defined?
> >
> If there are 3 copies of an observer and 2 experience outcome A and 1
> experiences outcome B then the probability of the observer experiencing
> outcome B is 1/3. Here we should note that the personal identity of an
> observer is determined by all the information in the brain and is
> therefore different from the different outcomes. So, we always have
> (slightly) different observers observing different things, which is not
> all that different from starting with 3 different people of whom 2
> experience outcome A and 1 experiences outcome B.

That's just branch counting, which is known not to work.


You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 

Reply via email to