On Wed, May 24, 2023 at 11:12 AM Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > > On 5/23/2023 10:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > On Wed, May 24, 2023, 1:15 AM Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> >> >> On Wed, 24 May 2023 at 04:03, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, May 23, 2023 at 7:15 AM Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Tue, 23 May 2023 at 21:09, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> As I see this thread, Terren and Stathis are both talking past each >>>>> other. Please either of you correct me if i am wrong, but in an effort to >>>>> clarify and perhaps resolve this situation: >>>>> >>>>> I believe Stathis is saying the functional substitution having the >>>>> same fine-grained causal organization *would* have the same phenomenology, >>>>> the same experience, and the same qualia as the brain with the same >>>>> fine-grained causal organization. >>>>> >>>>> Therefore, there is no disagreement between your positions with >>>>> regards to symbols groundings, mappings, etc. >>>>> >>>>> When you both discuss the problem of symbology, or bits, etc. I >>>>> believe this is partly responsible for why you are both talking past each >>>>> other, because there are many levels involved in brains (and computational >>>>> systems). I believe you were discussing completely different levels in the >>>>> hierarchical organization. >>>>> >>>>> There are high-level parts of minds, such as ideas, thoughts, >>>>> feelings, quale, etc. and there are low-level, be they neurons, >>>>> neurotransmitters, atoms, quantum fields, and laws of physics as in human >>>>> brains, or circuits, logic gates, bits, and instructions as in computers. >>>>> >>>>> I think when Terren mentions a "symbol for the smell of grandmother's >>>>> kitchen" (GMK) the trouble is we are crossing a myriad of levels. The >>>>> quale >>>>> or idea or memory of the smell of GMK is a very high-level feature of a >>>>> mind. When Terren asks for or discusses a symbol for it, a complete >>>>> answer/description for it can only be supplied in terms of a vast amount >>>>> of >>>>> information concerning low level structures, be they patterns of neuron >>>>> firings, or patterns of bits being processed. When we consider things down >>>>> at this low level, however, we lose all context for what the meaning, >>>>> idea, >>>>> and quale are or where or how they come in. We cannot see or find the idea >>>>> of GMK in any neuron, no more than we can see or find it in any neuron. >>>>> >>>>> Of course then it should seem deeply mysterious, if not impossible, >>>>> how we get "it" (GMK or otherwise) from "bit", but to me, this is no >>>>> greater a leap from how we get "it" from a bunch of cells squirting ions >>>>> back and forth. Trying to understand a smartphone by looking at the flows >>>>> of electrons is a similar kind of problem, it would seem just as difficult >>>>> or impossible to explain and understand the high-level features and >>>>> complexity out of the low-level simplicity. >>>>> >>>>> This is why it's crucial to bear in mind and explicitly discuss the >>>>> level one is operation on when one discusses symbols, substrates, or >>>>> quale. >>>>> In summary, I think a chief reason you have been talking past each other >>>>> is >>>>> because you are each operating on different assumed levels. >>>>> >>>>> Please correct me if you believe I am mistaken and know I only offer >>>>> my perspective in the hope it might help the conversation. >>>>> >>>> >>>> I think you’ve captured my position. But in addition I think >>>> replicating the fine-grained causal organisation is not necessary in order >>>> to replicate higher level phenomena such as GMK. By extension of Chalmers’ >>>> substitution experiment, >>>> >>> >>> Note that Chalmers's argument is based on assuming the functional >>> substitution occurs at a certain level of fine-grained-ness. If you lose >>> this step, and look at only the top-most input-output of the mind as black >>> box, then you can no longer distinguish a rock from a dreaming person, nor >>> a calculator computing 2+3 and a human computing 2+3, and one also runs >>> into the Blockhead "lookup table" argument against functionalism. >>> >> >> Yes, those are perhaps problems with functionalism. But a major point in >> Chalmers' argument is that if qualia were substrate-specific (hence, >> functionalism false) it would be possible to make a partial zombie or an >> entity whose consciousness and behaviour diverged from the point the >> substitution was made. And this argument works not just by replacing the >> neurons with silicon chips, but by replacing any part of the human with >> anything that reproduces the interactions with the remaining parts. >> > > > How deeply do you have to go when you consider or define those "other > parts" though? That seems to be a critical but unstated assumption, and > something that depends on how finely grained you consider the > relevant/important parts of a brain to be. > > For reference, this is what Chalmers says: > > > "In this paper I defend this view. Specifically, I defend a principle of > organizational invariance, holding that experience is invariant across > systems with the same fine-grained functional organization. More precisely, > the principle states that given any system that has conscious experiences, > then any system that has the same functional organization at a fine enough > grain will have qualitatively identical conscious experiences. A full > specification of a system's fine-grained functional organization will fully > determine any conscious experiences that arise." > https://consc.net/papers/qualia.html > > But this is literally false, unless one also specify that the system > exists within, or includes, what one refers to as "its environment". > Experience begins with perception and perception implies things to perceive. > True, I would bet Chalmers was implicitly assuming the same sensory input was provided from the environment. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUjNHy2e9w9LOZ1MXSNqjm4sdmeLt%3DpdzwoyX-LPBqhbyA%40mail.gmail.com.
