On 12/24/2024 9:06 PM, PGC wrote:
You see what I'm getting at. It’s true that from a purely outcome-based perspective—either a problem is solved, or it isn’t—it can seem irrelevant whether an AI is “really” reasoning or simply following patterns. This I'll gladly concede to John's argument. If Einstein’s “real reasoning” and an AI’s “simulated reasoning” both yield a correct solution, the difference might appear purely philosophical. However, when we look at how that solution is derived—whether there’s a coherent, reusable framework or just a brute-force pattern assembly within a large but narrowly defined training distribution—we begin to see distinctions that matter.
I think that LLM thinking is not like reasoning.  It reminds me of my grandfather who was a cattleman in Texas.  I used to go to auction with him where he would buy calves to raise and where he would auction off one's he had raised.  He could do calculations of what to pay, gain and loss, expected prices, cost of feed all in his head almost instantly.  But he couldn't explain how he did it.  He could do it pencil and paper and explain that; but not how he did it in his head.  So although the arithmetic would be of the same kind he couldn't figure insurance rates and payouts, or medical expenses, or home construction costs in his head.  The difference with LLM's is they have absorbed so many examples on every subject, as my grandfather had of auctioning cattle, that the LLM's don't have reasoning, they have finely developed intuition, and they have it about every subject.  Humans don't have the capacity to develop that level of intuition about more that one or two subjects; beyond that they have to rely on slow, formal reasoning.

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to [email protected].
To view this discussion visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/24410f0f-8e75-4c00-a7cd-4da4fda42564%40gmail.com.

Reply via email to