The following book was recommended by Margeret, and judging from
the review it does seem quite interesting. Anybody who knows this
author?
At 15:41 -0400 7/17/04, Margeret Heath wrote:
(a MUST read if one is interested in blending evol theory with Extended Mind to explain human cognition. Which I am. :- )
Thought in a Hostile
World
The Evolution of Human Cognition
by Kim Sterelny
Blackwell Publishers, 2003
Review by Maura Pilotti, Ph.D. on Dec 1st 2003
Some might argue that we already know all we need to know about human evolution. After all, works conjuring up intriguing pictures of human evolution have been accumulating on bookshelves in a seemingly boundless flood of catchy titles and creative accounts for quite some time. But Thought in a Hostile World: The Evolution of Human Cognition by Kim Sterelny is different. It is an engaging, yet provocative, book that examines current theories of human cognitive architecture and functioning through the eyes of original speculations about the evolution of the human species.
As it would be expected by a book within the functionalist/evolutionary tradition, its organizing principle is that cognition, as we know it, is the outcome of an evolutionary process guided by environmental demands. Yet, the book promotes some thought-provoking speculations about human uniqueness, the relationship between folk psychology and scientific theories of human cognition, and proposes an alternative account of modular views of human cognition. Altogether, Sterelny develops an interesting and original narrative around a plausible account of the evolution of human cognition and its current state, even though this account does not necessarily translate into easily testable postulates. For instance, he proposes that human uniqueness is based on three factors linked to evolutionary selection: cooperation, human niche construction (discussed above), and plasticity. He argues that although none of these factors alone makes us unique, together they account for the evolution of human cognition and for its current state as a rather unique entity compared to that of other species.
Notwithstanding testability, one of the most thought-provoking proposals by Sterelny is that human evolution has been marked by the active role that human beings have exhibited in structuring the social, physical, and epistemic environments of their distant past, which can account for most of the resilience and rapidity of their offspring's acquisition of mainly human-specific skills. Thus, human beings are not only responsible for molding the demands that these environments have placed on them, but also for devising environments in which the skills that make them most human can be easily acquired and transmitted to other generations, thereby considerably reducing the role that popular nativist conceptions of cognitive development attribute to genetic endowment. In this vein, Sterelny argues against the notion that human cognition is massively modular (i.e., composed of functionally encapsulated, autonomous, domain-specific, innately structured computational mechanisms). He also proposes that human cognition is largely self-engineered, even though he does not deny its dependency on dual inheritance systems, those based on genes and those relying on information-sharing devices.
The book is not for neophytes to scientific conceptions of human cognition, but for scholars who are interested in critically examining these conceptions as portrayed by functionalist, evolutionary, and nativist traditions, and those eager to debate the innovative ideas that are bound to emerge from exploring the contradictions, limitations, or mere weaknesses of the epistemic breath of such traditions. The book is a powerful critical tool of analysis for evolutionary psychology, a field criticized for attributing cognitive adaptations to innate mechanisms that are merely supported by niche construction and for ignoring adaptations to variability itself. Similarly, it can serve as a tool of analysis for behavioral ecology, a field also criticized for underestimating the role of niche construction and non-genetic inheritance. A must-read book for any scholar of cognition and, most of all, for evolutionary psychologists.
The Evolution of Human Cognition
by Kim Sterelny
Blackwell Publishers, 2003
Review by Maura Pilotti, Ph.D. on Dec 1st 2003
Some might argue that we already know all we need to know about human evolution. After all, works conjuring up intriguing pictures of human evolution have been accumulating on bookshelves in a seemingly boundless flood of catchy titles and creative accounts for quite some time. But Thought in a Hostile World: The Evolution of Human Cognition by Kim Sterelny is different. It is an engaging, yet provocative, book that examines current theories of human cognitive architecture and functioning through the eyes of original speculations about the evolution of the human species.
As it would be expected by a book within the functionalist/evolutionary tradition, its organizing principle is that cognition, as we know it, is the outcome of an evolutionary process guided by environmental demands. Yet, the book promotes some thought-provoking speculations about human uniqueness, the relationship between folk psychology and scientific theories of human cognition, and proposes an alternative account of modular views of human cognition. Altogether, Sterelny develops an interesting and original narrative around a plausible account of the evolution of human cognition and its current state, even though this account does not necessarily translate into easily testable postulates. For instance, he proposes that human uniqueness is based on three factors linked to evolutionary selection: cooperation, human niche construction (discussed above), and plasticity. He argues that although none of these factors alone makes us unique, together they account for the evolution of human cognition and for its current state as a rather unique entity compared to that of other species.
Notwithstanding testability, one of the most thought-provoking proposals by Sterelny is that human evolution has been marked by the active role that human beings have exhibited in structuring the social, physical, and epistemic environments of their distant past, which can account for most of the resilience and rapidity of their offspring's acquisition of mainly human-specific skills. Thus, human beings are not only responsible for molding the demands that these environments have placed on them, but also for devising environments in which the skills that make them most human can be easily acquired and transmitted to other generations, thereby considerably reducing the role that popular nativist conceptions of cognitive development attribute to genetic endowment. In this vein, Sterelny argues against the notion that human cognition is massively modular (i.e., composed of functionally encapsulated, autonomous, domain-specific, innately structured computational mechanisms). He also proposes that human cognition is largely self-engineered, even though he does not deny its dependency on dual inheritance systems, those based on genes and those relying on information-sharing devices.
The book is not for neophytes to scientific conceptions of human cognition, but for scholars who are interested in critically examining these conceptions as portrayed by functionalist, evolutionary, and nativist traditions, and those eager to debate the innovative ideas that are bound to emerge from exploring the contradictions, limitations, or mere weaknesses of the epistemic breath of such traditions. The book is a powerful critical tool of analysis for evolutionary psychology, a field criticized for attributing cognitive adaptations to innate mechanisms that are merely supported by niche construction and for ignoring adaptations to variability itself. Similarly, it can serve as a tool of analysis for behavioral ecology, a field also criticized for underestimating the role of niche construction and non-genetic inheritance. A must-read book for any scholar of cognition and, most of all, for evolutionary psychologists.
� 2003 Maura Pilotti
Maura Pilotti, Ph.D., Department of Psychology, Dowling College, New York.
--
Francis Heylighen
Center "Leo Apostel"
Free University of Brussels
http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/HEYL.html
Francis Heylighen
Center "Leo Apostel"
Free University of Brussels
http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/HEYL.html
