On Mon, 22 Feb 2016 03:58:38 +0100, Ralf Mardorf wrote:
>On Sun, 21 Feb 2016 21:22:02 +0100, Stig Roar Wangberg wrote:
>>I only encrypt to people I trust IF the message requires it.
>
>Here we face another issue. If you don't always encrypt messages, then
>a judge could assume that the encrypted email are related to a crime.
>In some countries, IIRC e.g. Great Britain, people can be forced by law
>to decrypt data, if they don't do it, they get arrested. In Germany we
>have a strong data protection, AFAIK you can't be forced to decrypt
>data. Btw. by accident I lost some unimportant keys, so I can't decrypt
>some unimportant data, but this could become an issue in countries,
>that are allowed to force you, to decrypt data. However, some nations
>even use torture. "IF the message requires it" is a strange statement.
>Actually all mail, perhaps excepted of postcards, are liable to
>inviolability of the mail. If you like to turn the spotlight on you,
>then encrypt just a few messages, so police and others know at least
>dates, when you might be involved in crimes or whatsoever they are
>interested in. IOW by decrypting messages that "require" decryption and
^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^
encrypting encryption
:D
>at the same time not encrypting other messages, you already provide
>useful data to those who are interested in it. The content of the
>message might be unimportant to them, the only information they need
>is, that at a given date you corresponded by encrypted emails. Now you
>could argue, that in addition you're using anonymous mailing, mixminion
>or similar. Since TOR was mentioned I'll quote from the FAQs:
>
>"So I'm totally anonymous if I use Tor?
>No.
>[snip]"
>
>"What attacks remain against onion routing?
>As mentioned above, it is possible for an observer who can view both
>you and either the destination website or your Tor exit node to
>correlate timings of your traffic as it enters the Tor network and also
>as it exits. Tor does not defend against such a threat model.
>
>[snip]
>
>Furthermore, since Tor reuses circuits for multiple TCP connections, it
>is possible to associate non anonymous and anonymous traffic at a given
>exit node, so be careful about what applications you run concurrently
>over Tor. Perhaps even run separate Tor clients for these
>applications."
>- https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en
>
>IOW e.g. even if you run Ardour, a digital audio workstation that
>phones home and it phones home, while you are using TOR browser, a lot
>of the security provided by TOR could be null and void.
>
>Regards,
>Ralf
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