Hal wrote, >If you really want any user to do this, is changing umad permissions >sufficient ? This is less of a security hole than setuid but does open >things up for malicious users.
>-- Hal I wanted to avoid doing this as it would allow some malicious user to just open /dev/umad and send random mads and cause big problems with the fabric. I was thinking that if the applications like perfquery are "trusted" to not allow someone to do anything malicious, then having them run as setuid root would not open a security hole ? sudo sounds like if would allow them to run any command as root ID, which I think is a larger security hole than just setting the one or few trusted applications to setuid root. But then, I am not a security expert so I may not know all of the possible issues with setting a command to setuid root. woody _______________________________________________ ewg mailing list [email protected] http://lists.openfabrics.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/ewg
