Marc Haber wrote:
> > That helped, but we needed to bastardise the site's security policy to > be allowed to put an "unprotected" system in front of the Firewall. It > would have been easier (and saved at least two person-days in meetings > alone) if the transparent proxy would have better catered for a > not-too-uncommon error condition. > <rant> These are proprietary closed systems. Don't expect too much RFC compliance from this kind of thing. It is marketed system, as long as people are buying it with closed eyes, they won't change it and advertise that everything is working as expected. Nowadays, unfortunately, people brand secure your email (or whatever) with our device, our performance is overkill, we are reknowned in all the world, some big companies are using our appliances (wether these companies paid them or have been offered them is irrelevant). They are not even fit for a particular purpose as long as they can keep bad reputation low and marketing high. Computing has now been sold to the masses and mainly to ignorant people (thanks microsoft), and, as with every market, ignorant people are an easy target. Take challenge/response antispam systems, they are a plague, however people find them elegant because they seem to work and people don't know why they are a plague or how they work. </rant>
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