Hello,

Mandrake 6 has the imap-4.5-5mdk package. 

Also, imap is not installed by default. And even if you install the imap
package, pop2 is commented out in /etc/inetd.conf.

Jean-Michel Dault
[EMAIL PROTECTED]


On Wed, 26 May 1999, James J. Capone wrote:

> Date: Wed, 26 May 1999 17:01:40 -0400
> From: "James J. Capone" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> To: "'[EMAIL PROTECTED]'" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: [expert] FW: Remote vulnerability in pop2d
> 
> 
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Chris Evans [SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
> Sent: Wednesday, May 26, 1999 3:37 PM
> To:   [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject:      Remote vulnerability in pop2d
> 
> Hi
> 
> Firstly, sorry if any details are hazy - this is from memory (it's two
> months since I last looked at this). This bug concerns the pop-2 daemon,
> which is a part of the Washington University imap package.
> 
> I've been waiting for a CERT advisory, but one doesn't seem to be
> forthcoming. Two and a half months is a long time. Also, the problem has
> been fixed for a long time. I'm posting because
> 
> a) A fixed full release is available, so people should know about it
> b) The flaw is fairly basic and easy to spot, so active exploitation could
> well be happening
> 
> Quick details
> =============
> 
> Compromise possible:  remote users can get a shell as user "nobody"
> If:                   runing pop-2d v4.4 or earlier
> 
> Fixed version:        imap-4.5, available now.
> 
> 
> Not vulnerable
> ==============
> RedHat-6.0 isn't vulnerable because imap-4.5 was shipped.
> 
> Vulnerable
> ==========
> 
> Anyone who shipped the pop-2 component of imap-4.4 or earlier, including
> earlier RedHat releases
> 
> 
> Details of flaw
> ===============
> 
> pop-2 and pop-3 support the concept of an "anonymous proxy" whereby remote
> users can connect and open an imap mailbox on _any server they have a
> valid account on_. An attacker connects to the vulnerable pop-2 port and
> connects it to an imap server under their control. Once logged on, issuing
> a "FOLD" command with a long arg will cause an overflow of a stack based
> buffer.
> 
> The arg to FOLD must be somewhere around 1000 bytes - not much bigger, not
> much smaller. Look at the source.
> 
> Additional
> ==========
> 
> I think the concept of "anonymous proxy" is just fundamentally insecure.
> It opens up a large code path for remote usrs to explore, i.e. the
> protocol parsing of imap, etc.
> 
> The author of imap very responsibly includes a compile time flag to
> disable this in 4.5.
> 
> Better still, RedHat-6.0 ships with the proxy disabled.
> 
> 
> Cheers
> Chris
> 

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