> > --- "Jason" <jedi_spock@> wrote: > > > > > > Xeno, a lot of Religionists and Spiritualists have > > misconceptions about Darwin. > > > > If you study evolution carefully, you will realise there is > > a perfect balance between determinism and randomness. It's > > not entirely deterministic and it's not entirely random > > either. > > > > There is a certain broad set of laws in evolution and within > > those laws some randomness plays a part. > > > > Religionists and Spiritualists confuse Darwin with > > metaphysics and mystisism. They think Darwin tries to > > replace it completely. Darwin as a theory only explains the > > mechanisms how life evolved and adapted. It states nothing > > about God or Consciousness. > > > > --- "salyavin808" <fintlewoodlewix@...> wrote: > > You hope. What it states is that god is uneccessary. Consciousness > evolved like everything else. All life on this planet is descended > from one cell, a hybrid between two types of bacteria - which is all > there was for billions of years - there would be no complexity or > consciousness without that one chance event. That is as hard a fact as you'll > find, religious types can sit around dreaming otherwise till the cows come > home. >
It might indirectly state that a personal god is unnecessary. But it dosen't say anything about the impersonal spinoza type God. Darwin's theory is not about god, it about evolution of life, just like Newton's theory of gravity is only about gravity and not about god. Evolution has a certain broad set of laws and that does indicate a certain impersonal intelligence or programming. >From that POV it's not reductionist as Robin claims. > > > > --- "Xenophaneros Anartaxius" <anartaxius@> wrote: > > > > > > > > > Robin, I just threw that review up there, and here you are with an essay. > > > The only thing I have read of Nagel's was that essay "What is it Like to > > > be a Bat?", and that was some 5 or 6 years ago. Philosophers disagree, so > > > whenever they write something, especially a major work, you can be sure > > > someone among their peers is going to disagree. For example, If you > > > recommend something and extol the author, you can be sure someone will > > > think something is rotten in the state of Denmark. > > > > > > I think there is a realisation growing among scientists that scientific > > > theories are what are called 'effective theories'. For example QED, > > > quantum electro dynamics, is such a theory. It provides a workable > > > explanation for certain phenomena at a certain resolution, but cannot > > > explain anything beyond that level. QED cannot explain the behaviour > > > observed when protons are smashed together at high velocity, and so > > > another theory, QCD, quantum chromodynamics takes over. Stephen Hawking > > > wrote recently that we may never be able to make a theory of everything, > > > but rather we will have a patchwork of effective theories which, as it > > > were, overlay each other at the edges, each covering a certain aspect of > > > reality to a certain depth. > > > > > > A good example of an effective theory is the sun rises in the morning. It > > > is workable within a certain realm of experience, but breaks down when > > > one discovers the Earth is not flat, and has motions not covered by the > > > flat Earth theory, but if you take a walk in the early morning, the sun > > > rises is a perfectly satisfactory explanation. > > > > > > Darwin's theory, and its revisions provides an explanation for the > > > morphology of living systems and the appearance of order and complexity > > > in such systems. It does not deal with consciousness at all, although > > > some scientist tinker with the idea of applying it to that. > > > > > > > > > --- "Robin Carlsen" <maskedzebra@> wrote: > > > > > > > > Dear Xeno, > > > > > > > > You are a sweet guy--but you should, as I have done, read the whole > > > > book yourself. The reviews cited here I have read--even before I got > > > > the book from Amazon. I can assure you that when I compare the content > > > > of the book to the reviews, the book tacitly explains the necessary > > > > appearance of such reviews and even anticipates these reviews. The > > > > reviews are determined by a profound reaction to the power of Nagel's > > > > thesis. > > > > > > > > Now get what I am saying here, Xeno: IF YOU READ THE BOOK ON YOUR OWN > > > > you then can make an assessment of the validity of these reviews. The > > > > reviews, to repeat, confirm the truth of Nagel's critique of "a > > > > particular naturalistic *Weltanschauung* that postulates a hierarchical > > > > relation among the subjects of [biology, chemistry, and physics] and > > > > the completeness in principle of an explanation of everything in the > > > > universe through their unification". > > > > > > > > The passages I have quoted from the book stand on their own--The > > > > reviews are not necessary in order to assess the truth of what Nagel > > > > has said (as contained in my post). There is a very simple idea here, > > > > Xeno: to what extent does the standard view of evolution possess the > > > > intuitive explanatory power and complexity to account for our > > > > experience of what it means to be alive? Up until Nagel's book any > > > > concerted opposition to Darwin and materialism came from theism--and > > > > therefore could be dismissed on those grounds. But I am asking you just > > > > to do this, Xeno: Read the passages I have selected from *Mind and > > > > Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is > > > > Almost Certainly False*, and then tell me what Nagel is saying which is > > > > 1. False 2. Irrelevant 3. insignificant 4. Familiar. > > > > > > > > No one in my lifetime has been able with the clarity and strength of > > > > his intellect--and character--challenge the Darwinian idea of existence > > > > and the appearance of human beings from a strictly common sense point > > > > of view. Darwin's theory of evolution has never made sense to me--I > > > > mean in terms of explaining why I am a me, you are a you. But there has > > > > never been any way of contesting the evolutionary view as being a > > > > sufficient explanation for consciousness, cognition, and value. Nagel > > > > has laid out a case (and these excerpts give you some idea of the > > > > boldness and justice of his thinking) which was guaranteed to provoke > > > > the reviews cited by A.C. Lee--reviews which--since I have read the > > > > book--are motivated by a metaphysical fear inside the first person > > > > ontology of these philosophers (although that of course is a Robin > > > > inference). I find the reviews entirely unconvincing and beside the > > > > point. They do not suggest to me these philosophers have taken on the > > > > essential idea of Nagel's book. The reviews are the defensive and > > > > distracting reviews I predicted once I heard about the book. > > > > > > > > I challenge you, Xeno, since you are a bit of a compulsive killjoy, to > > > > analyze any of the statements I have presented here in my post--and > > > > tell me where they fail to challenge you right where you do not wish to > > > > be challenged--assuming you are an apologist for the orthodoxy that > > > > Nagel is confronting in his beautifully honest book. > > > > > > > > Give it a go, Xeno. I would really like that. But better than this: > > > > read the book. Then we can really talk about something interesting. > > > > > > > > Robin > > > > > > > > > > > > --- "Xenophaneros Anartaxius" <anartaxius@> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > By A.C. Lee > > > > > > > > > > The distinguished philosopher Thomas Nagel has spent much of his > > > > > career defending an antireductionist view of mind. His new book, > > > > > "Mind and Cosmos," extends this skepticism to much of contemporary > > > > > scientific inquiry, including evolutionary biology, and calls for a > > > > > new scientific revolution based on teleological principles. It's a > > > > > proposal that has, unsurprisingly, been quite controversial. > > > > > > > > > > At The Nation, Brian Leiter and Michael Weisberg object to Nagel's > > > > > prescription on two main fronts. First, they think most philosophers > > > > > and practicing scientists would reject "reductionism" as Nagel > > > > > formulates it, and thus see this line of attack as "quixtotic." Nagel > > > > > questions the current scientific picture because it defies "common > > > > > sense;" they counter by simply pointing out that much of what has > > > > > been proven by science, from Copernicus on, in fact does. Leiter and > > > > > Weisberg do see a more substantial challenge in Nagel's skepticism > > > > > about evolutionary explanations for our ability to discern truth in > > > > > ethics, logic and math. But they counter that moral realism is not > > > > > the only philosophical plausible ethical position, and, in the case > > > > > of the self-evident truths of logic and math, that even if > > > > > evolutionary arguments for the validity of reason risk circularity, > > > > > we can at least point to the successes of the empirical sciences as a > > > > > sign that we are on the right track. Finally, they think Nagel's > > > > > insistence "that explanation and prediction are symmetrical" is an > > > > > outdated one, and that his description of what a new, > > > > > teleologically-oriented science would look like is insufficiently > > > > > clear. > > > > > > > > > > At The Boston Review, Elliot Sober echoes many of the same > > > > > criticisms, but drills down further on a few in particular. He also > > > > > thinks there is no reason to require symmetry between explanation and > > > > > prediction. For Sobel, "something can be both remarkable and > > > > > improbable." As for teleology, Sober has no problem understanding > > > > > certain phenomena this way, as long as there are "causal > > > > > underpinnings" for a given teleological statement. But Nagel's > > > > > position, as Sober understands it, entails "teleological explanations > > > > > that are both true and causally inexplicable," a class for which > > > > > neither Sober, nor Nagel, apparently, can offer any examples. (In a > > > > > strangely concessive coda, Sober does admit that his "reactions may > > > > > be mired in presuppositions," and that history may prove Nagel to be > > > > > "a prophet whom naysayers such as me were unable to recognize.") > > > > > > > > > > Alva Noë is not quite as quick to dismiss Nagel. He generally agrees > > > > > with the need to "resist Nagel's call for a radically new conception > > > > > of fundamental reality," but argues in a post at 13.7 Cosmos and > > > > > Culture that Nagel's challenge requires a more robust response. Noë > > > > > points to one alternative he thinks neither Nagel or his critics give > > > > > enough credence to, namely, that to dispel the "cognitive illusion" > > > > > that we can't adequately explain life and consciousness, we only need > > > > > to abandon the idea that these phenomena are "somehow spiritual." Yet > > > > > this would be merely to dissolve the problems, and Noë welcomes > > > > > Nagel's book as a challenge to go further. > > > > > > > > > > One World Is Enough: Few philosophers describe themselves as > > > > > "materialists" these days. The contemporary understanding of gravity > > > > > as not a strictly material entity, for instance, have made > > > > > "physicalist" a more common description. The Brigham Young University > > > > > philosophy professor James Faulconer, in a short primer on Mormon > > > > > metaphysics at Patheos, explains why Mormons, at least, remain > > > > > materialists. Joseph Smith claimed, according to Faulconer, that > > > > > "everything is material even if there is material that we presently > > > > > cannot see or understand." That "everything" includes God the Father, > > > > > even if he is morally perfect, immortal, and otherwise so different > > > > > from humans in degree as to be practically inscrutable. Faulconer > > > > > thinks this materialism cashes out in at least two ways. First, he > > > > > sees it as explaining why Utah "produces a disproportionate number of > > > > > scientists," and why his own university supports scientific inquiry > > > > > so enthusiastically. Second he thinks it might account for the Mormon > > > > > interest in and enthusiasm for business. Without a belief in another > > > > > "spiritual" world, Mormons can view practicing business in this world > > > > > as another way of faithfully practicing their religion. Indeed, > > > > > Faulconer hopes that precisely because Mormons are materialists, that > > > > > they inhabit the only world that exists, they may be more responsible > > > > > stewards of it. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > --- "Robin Carlsen" <maskedzebra@> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > MIND AND COSMOS: WHY THE MATERIALIST NEO-DARWINIAN CONCEPTION OF > > > > > > NATURE IS ALMOST CERTAINLY FALSE by Thomas Nagel > > > > > > > > > > > > The argument from the failure of psychophysical reductionism is a > > > > > > philosophical one, but I believe there are independent empirical > > > > > > reasons to be skeptical about the truth of reductionism in biology. > > > > > > Physico-chemical reductionism in biology is the orthodox view, and > > > > > > any resistance to it is regarded as not only scientifically but > > > > > > politically incorrect. But for a long time I have found the > > > > > > materialist account of how we and our fellow organisms came to > > > > > > exist hard to believe, including the standard version of how the > > > > > > evolutionary process works. The more details we learn about the > > > > > > chemical basis of life and the intricacy of the genetic code, the > > > > > > more unbelievable the standard historical account becomes . . . it > > > > > > seems to me that, as it is usually presented, the current orthodoxy > > > > > > about the cosmic order is the product of governing assumptions that > > > > > > are unsupported, and that it flies in the face of common sense. > > > > > > > > > > > > I would like to defend the untutored reaction of incredulity to the > > > > > > reductionist neo-Darwinian account of the origin and evolution of > > > > > > life. It is prima facie highly implausible that life as we know it > > > > > > is the result of a sequence of physical accidents together with the > > > > > > mechanism of natural selection. We are expected to abandon this > > > > > > naive response, not in favor of a fully worked out > > > > > > physical/chemical explanation but in favor of an alternative that > > > > > > is really a schema for explanation, supported by some examples. > > > > > > What is lacking, to my knowledge, is a credible argument that the > > > > > > story has a nonnegligible probability of being true. There are two > > > > > > questions. First, given what is known about the chemical basis of > > > > > > biology and genetics, what is the likelihood that self-reproducing > > > > > > life forms should have come into existence spontaneously on the > > > > > > earth, solely through the operation of the laws of physics and > > > > > > chemistry? The second question is about the sources of variation in > > > > > > the evolutionary process that was set into motion once life began: > > > > > > In the available geological time since the first life forms > > > > > > appeared on the earth, what is the likelihood that, as a result of > > > > > > physical accident, a sequence of viable genetic mutations should > > > > > > have occurred that was sufficient to permit natural selection to > > > > > > produce the organisms that actually exist? > > > > > > > > > > > > . . . the questions concern highly specific events over a long > > > > > > historical period in the distant past, the available evidence is > > > > > > very indirect, and general assumptions have to play an important > > > > > > part. My skepticism is not based on religious belief, or on a > > > > > > belief in any definite alternative. It is just a belief that the > > > > > > available scientific evidence, in spite of the consensus of > > > > > > scientific opinion, does not in this matter rationally require us > > > > > > to subordinate the incredulity of common sense. This is especially > > > > > > true with regard to the origin of life. > > > > > > > > > > > > The world is an astonishing place, and the idea that we have in our > > > > > > possession the basic tools needed to understand it is no more > > > > > > credible now than it was in Aristotle's day. That it has produced > > > > > > you, and me, and the rest of us is the most astonishing thing about > > > > > > it. . . . I realize that such doubts will strike many people as > > > > > > outrageous, but that is because almost everyone in our secular > > > > > > culture has been browbeaten into regarding the reductive research > > > > > > program as sacrosanct, on the ground that anything else would not > > > > > > be science. > > > > > > > > > > > > . . . certain things are so remarkable that they have to be > > > > > > explained as non-accidental if we are to pretend to a real > > > > > > understanding of the world . . . > > > > > > > > > > > > As I have said, doubts about the reductionist account of life go > > > > > > against the dogmatic scientific consensus, but that consensus faces > > > > > > problems of probability that I believe are not taken seriously > > > > > > enough, both with respect to the evolution of life forms through > > > > > > accidental mutation and natural selection and with respect to the > > > > > > formation from dead matter of physical systems capable of such > > > > > > evolution. > > > > > > > > > > > > . . . It is no longer legitimate simply to imagine a sequence of > > > > > > gradually evolving phenotypes, as if their appearance through > > > > > > mutations in the DNA were un-problematic--as Richard Dawkins does > > > > > > for the evolution of the eye. With regard to the origin of life, > > > > > > the problem is much harder, since the option of natural selection > > > > > > as an explanation is not available, And the coming into existence > > > > > > of the genetic code--an arbitrary mapping of nucleotide sequences > > > > > > into amino acids, together with mechanisms that can read the code > > > > > > and carry out its instructions--seems particularly resistant to > > > > > > being revealed as probable given physical laws alone. > > > > > > > > > > > > . . . Whatever one may think about the possibility of a designer, > > > > > > the prevailing doctrine--that the appearance of life from dead > > > > > > matter and its evolution through accidental and natural selection > > > > > > to its present forms has involved nothing but the operation of > > > > > > physical law--cannot be regarded as unassailable. It is an > > > > > > assumption governing the scientific project rather than a > > > > > > well-confirmed scientific hypothesis. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
