Thanks Xeno. Good chart! (It didn't come out in the web client at first, but now I have it).
I think I find myself without a paddle somewhere due South of Nagel. I need a tow to a saner position. SOS. (Some hope! At least half of the folks on the list aren't likely to bother, as apparently I have no S to S). --- In [email protected], "Xenophaneros Anartaxius" <anartaxius@...> wrote: > > >--- In [email protected], "Robin Carlsen" <maskedzebra@> > wrote: > > > > MIND AND COSMOS: WHY THE MATERIALIST NEO-DARWINIAN CONCEPTION OF > NATURE IS ALMOST CERTAINLY FALSE by Thomas Nagel > > > As a result of Robin's current fascination with Thomas Nagel ('Jason > does not have a proper or objective measure of his own knowledge when > placed against one of the world's greatest philosophers--whose *The View > from Nowhere* is considered by some philosophers to be the most > significant work of philosophy since World War II.'), I thought I would > post a diagram by Francisco Varela, a biologist, neuroscientist and > philosopher. Varela's diagram below, shows the various philosophers that > are promoting theories of consciousness on an axis of four basic types > of theories, according to how Varela interprets their various stands on > the issue. I am not arguing for or against a particular explanation > here. I have culled definitions for the four kinds of expanatory > theories that Varela used in case anyone is not familiar with them. I > circled Varela and Nagel on the diagram. As this diagram was made in the > mid-1990s, it is probably not fully up to date, and the positions of the > authors of various theories on the diagram may have drifted a bit since > then. > > [Theories of Consciousness by Francisco Varela] > > Phenomenology is the study of structures of consciousness as experienced > from the first-person point of view. The central structure of an > experience is its intentionality, its being directed toward something, > as it is an experience of or about some object. In its most basic form, > phenomenology attempts to create conditions for the objective study of > topics usually regarded as subjective: consciousness and the content of > conscious experiences. > > Functionalism is the idea that what makes something a mental state of a > particular type does not depend on its internal constitution, but rather > on the way it functions, or the role it plays, in the system of which it > is a part, that mental states are constituted solely by their functional > role, that they they are causal relations to other mental states, > sensory inputs, and behavioural outputs. Functionalism is a theoretical > level between the physical implementation and behavioural output. > > Reductionism concerns the relations between different scientific > domains. The basic question of reduction is whether the properties, > concepts, explanations, or methods from one scientific domain can be > deduced from or explained by the properties, concepts, explanations, or > methods from another domain of science. In a practical sense this means > a complex system is just the sum of its parts, and can be reduced to > accounts of its individual constituents. For example, can chemistry be > explained by quantum mechanics, or biology by chemistry and thence, by > quantum mechanics? > > Mysterianism is a position proposing that the hard problem of > consciousness cannot be resolved by us, that we are cognitively closed > to its solution. The unresolvable problem is how to explain the > existence of qualia. (Qualia are the ways things seem to us, for > example, the taste of cilantro - some people love it and some people > hate it.) >
