--- In [email protected], "authfriend" <authfriend@...> wrote: > --- In [email protected], "PaliGap" <compost1uk@> wrote: > > --- In [email protected], "authfriend" > > <authfriend@> wrote:
> > > Interesting, yes, but I think it misses the point. The > > > first comment on that post does a good job explaining > > > the real point, but Feser's response to it completely > > > misses it again! > > > > Well at first I thought "no, it's commenter Ingx24 that has > > mised the point". Then "hang on, maybe not". That's because > > there do seem to be two closely related issues: > > > > * The existence of "mental" stuff (the itch sensation > > experienced by Judy) - "qualia" > > * The existence of things that can *have* qualia (Judy) > > > > Whether this is a good distinction, I don't know. But I think > > Feser is primarily focused on the first issue in his blog > > post, whereas "Ingx24" is interested in the second. > > It's an important distinction qua distinction, but Feser > explicitly identifies the "hard problem" as a function > of Cartesian dualism, whereas Chalmers--who coined the > term--is interested in the more fundamental issue of, > as you put it, "the existence of things that can *have* > qualia"--the phenomenon of seeming. > > > Having said that, I wonder if Ingx24 just set Feser going by > > putting it in these terms: "Why should physical processing > > give rise to a rich inner life at all? It seems objectively > > unreasonable that it should, and yet it does." > > > > That seems to be about the first issue. And in putting it like > > this he/she wears her Cartesianism on her sleeve. She seems to > > be saying that we *know* that the self, the person, > > consciousness *is* "physical processing", thereby signing up > > 100% to the materialist side of the Cartesian dualism. Feser > > (I assume) would not grant that assumption. > > > > > To put it another way, the question isn't why things-- > > > including mental experience--seem to us the way they do, > > > but *why should there be such a thing as "seeming"* in > > > the first place? > > > > Feser or no Feser, that particular itch just won't go away. I > > think Feser's route would involve navigating through a very > > tangled thicket of Aristotelean ideas of 'matter', 'form' and > > 'substance'. Oh, Lordie! > > http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-metaphysics/ > > Yeah, never mind! > > > > So much philosophical discussion of consciousness takes > > > "seeming" for granted, when it's the very thing that > > > requires explanation. > > > > Indeed. > > If you don't *start* with that, it "seems" to me you're > never going to get there from anywhere else. But does > the fact that what you're looking *for* is what you're > looking *with*, as it were, leave you in an ouroboric > circle that you can't break out of? The world is illusion; only Brahman is real; the world is Brahman. There is a circularity that the intellect cannot get out of; if true, the problem cannot be resolved by thinking about it. If we suppose there is a kind of experience that resolves the matter (e.g., enlightenment) it would not be possible to explain that experience in a way that ultimately made sense. > > > > > > --- In [email protected], "PaliGap" > > <compost1uk@> wrote: > > > > > > > > This is an interesting blog post IMO: > > > > http://edwardfeser.blogspot.co.uk/2013/03/nagel-and-his- > > critics-part-viii.html > > > > > > > > Or http://goo.gl/QulfS > > > > > > > > How much of our existential anguish can be laid at the feet > > > > of Monsieur R. Descartes? > > > > > > > > "From the concrete material objects of everyday life, > > Descartes > > > > and the moderns who have followed him derived two > > abstractions > > > > (as I discussed in an earlier post). First, they > > abstracted out > > > > those features that could be captured in exclusively > > quantitative > > > > terms, reified this abstraction, and called that reified > > abstraction > > > > "matter," or "the physical," or that which is > > "objective." Second, > > > > they abstracted those qualitative features that would not > > fit the > > > > first, quantitative picture, reified that abstraction, and > > called > > > > it "the mental," or that which is "subjective." Once this > > move > > > > was made, there was never in principle going to be a way > > to get > > > > mind and matter together again, since they were in effect > > defined > > > > by contrast with one another." > > > > > > > > > >
