Oh no Grandpa Xeno - this is so retarded, that "rich inner life" disappears in Unity.
This really nails it - you are one of the most dangerous, delusional posters on FFL. Right now even Curtis's dishonesty and Barry's stunted- ness is looking real beautiful, honest and authentic to me now. No you fucking retard, you delusional mother fucker - the world, the objective reality looks real magical, mystical, beautiful,pristine, innocent in Unity, green looks more greener, a richer green, red looks more redder, a richer red - even an ugly woman looks beautiful. At least you got one thing right - that it is a transitional state but it will drive you wild, insane with its beauty. Xeno - OMG - you and Adyashanti are so stuck in your head with your pseudo-Eastern, Buddhist concepts, Buddha has to be most retarded so-called enlightened guy and Buddhism one of the most retarded religions, even Islam looks charming to me compared to Buddhism. God - get a life Xeno, start your own Free Man series like Barry, talk about love, relationships, your frustrations at stupid drivers on the road- something to show you are an alive, authentic person. On Fri, May 31, 2013 at 12:03 PM, Xenophaneros Anartaxius < anartax...@yahoo.com> wrote: > ** > > > CHALMERS: > 'It is undeniable that some organisms are subjects > of experience. But the question of how it is that > these systems are subjects of experience is perplexing. > Why is it that when our cognitive systems engage in > visual and auditory information-processing, we have > visual or auditory experience: the quality of deep > blue, the sensation of middle C?... It is widely > agreed that experience arises from a physical basis, > but we have no good explanation of why and how it > so arises. Why should physical processing give rise > to a rich inner life at all?' > ----- > > ----- > WIKIPEDIA COMMENT: > 'Chalmers argues that a "rich inner life" is not logically reducible to > the functional properties of physical processes. He states that > consciousness must be described using nonphysical means. This description > involves a fundamental ingredient capable of clarifying phenomena that have > not been explained using physical means. Use of this fundamental property, > Chalmers argues, is necessary to explain certain functions of the world, > much like other fundamental features, such as mass and time, explain > significant principles in nature.' > ----- > > What struck me about this paragraph in the wikipedia.org is I recalled a > lecture by Adyashanti I attended in New York some time in the past couple > of years. He was talking about pointers to various states of consciousness, > and that each level in the progression of enlightenment becomes more > difficult to point out to someone. For example what we call CC in the TM > movement is pretty easy to point to because there is a strong contrast > between relative and absolute, there is stuff going on outside, and inside > is unbounded awareness. But unity is more difficult because there is no > contrast. Then he said the 'inner life disappears', it just goes silent. > And this is essentially impossible to point to, that is to describe and > tell someone what the markers of the experience are. I am experiencing this > somewhat, though the progression is hardly complete, but it is very > definite as an experience. > > Now if we suppose this is what happens, and the 'rich inner life' of > experience goes by the wayside, what does this mean in terms of the hard > problem? I take it that experience, consciousness, and the 'qualia' are not > a cause-effect relationship, that they are integral and rise together, they > are never separate realms where one predicates the other in time or level. > In other words, the bifurcation we make about consciousness and the world > only experientially exists in those states of experience the movement > describes as being between Sleeping, Dreaming, Waking and Brahman > Consciousness. Meaning these are transitional states (TC, CC, GC, UC) which > eventually die away in succession as various levels of mental illusion are > stripped away, and then you end up where you began, but with the caveat > that you are wiser in that you no longer or searching for something that is > not there (metaphysical worlds and an individual soul or self). In other > words 'Sleeping, Dreaming, Waking' = 'Brahman Consciousness'; the mandala > is completely traversed. > > This is Guru Dev's doll of salt vanishing in the ocean, and Buddha's > no-self: there is no self, no inner 'person' or even inner consciousness. > There is 'consciousness' (as we all feel we are conscious), but it has no > location or existence apart from anything as a separate something, so even > saying there is something called consciousness might be misleading. It is > not owned by anything. So are qualia the *rope and the snake delusion*, or > are they real in some way? In the early stages of meditation, what we call > consciousness is definitely an inner kind of experience. > > I do not have that experience any more. Does this mean I am just crazy? It > is actually really interesting. It is definitely not disassociation, > something some meditators feel after they start TM for a while. It is kind > of like a homecoming that never really had to happen. Even before I was a > meditator, there was this strange feeling that everywhere I went was the > same place. Now this sense is very dominant but it no longer feels like it > is happening to anything, it is just happening. > > This makes it seem more like Dennett's argument, but I have always had > some difficulty trying to grasp what Dennett is trying to say, perhaps > because Dennett has no sense of what spiritual practice is about; it is > totally unreal for him the kind of things people on this forum have engaged > in in the past, and some now also presently. > > Dennett claims is that qualia do not (and cannot) exist. 'Dennett's main > argument is that the various properties attributed to qualia by > philosophersâ€"qualia are supposed to be incorrigible, ineffable, private, > directly accessible and so on â€" are incompatible, so the notion of qualia > is incoherent. The non-existence of qualia would mean that there is no hard > problem of consciousness, and "philosophical zombies", which are supposed > to act like a human in every way while somehow lacking qualia, cannot > exist. Dennett claims that our brains hold only a few salient details about > the world, and that this is the only reason we are able to function at all. > Thus, we don't store elaborate pictures in short-term memory, as this is > not necessary and would consume valuable computing power. Rather, we log > what has changed and assume the rest has stayed the same, with the result > that we miss some details, as demonstrated in various experiments and > illusions.' Dennett says we are 'p-zombies', that is, we are zombies like > humans with consciousness, but without the added consciousness. > > By this I take it he means that consciousness as some added feature in the > material world is a mistaken conception. If I understand his view, then it > is impossible to discover there is such a thing as consciousness > objectively. Subjectively, it is an illusion created by the mind's > interpretation of experience. This idea does have some similarity with the > Indian idea that the world is illusion, though it takes a point of view > that *seems* diametrically opposite from spiritual systems in that it only > allows materialism. This really does not make much difference to me, but I > am sure the idea is abhorrent to many people involved in spiritual > exercises directed toward 'enlightenment'. > > I take the statement 'the world is illusion' to mean the world that the > mind represents verbally, representationally, is illusory, that is our > mental understanding of the world is what is out of whack. The world is > illusion, only Brahman is real, the world is Brahman. No escape. The > subjective aspect, as understood in our minds, and the objective aspect as > understood in our minds merge imperceptibly in experience, and the mind no > longer can find a way to justify their separation, their separate > identities. > > >
