If Iran went nuclear...
Wednesday October 5 2005 08:43 IST
by K Subrahmanyam
Some in India may raise the question why Iran should not go nuclear as Pakistan has done. Would its consequences be worse than in the case of Pakistan? After all, Iran is the only country which was attacked by weapons of mass destruction (poison gas) during the 1981-88 war and the entire international community sat on its hands without condemning Saddam Hussein. Iran also happens to be the only Shia country (till a Shia Iraq emerges) surrounded by Sunni countries on both sides. Shia-Sunni hostility goes back to the martyrdom of Imam Hussein 12 centuries ago. Saudi Arabia has already got long range Chinese missiles acquired in the mid-80s and Iran had reason to fear that Pakistani nuclear warheads could be mated with Saudi missiles and pose a threat to it. In the last few years, Pakistan itself had acquired long range missiles from North Korea and China. There has been speculation that A.Q. Khans proliferation included a fourth country
believed to be an Arab one. Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have been considered among the possibilities.
Therefore Iran could make a plausible case for nuclear weapons on the basis of security. It does not do so but protests strongly its fuel cycle programme is solely intended for peaceful purposes. The question then arises, in that case why did it not proceed on it openly, after notifying the IAEA? Iran persisted in its clandestine uranium enrichment efforts for 16 long years before they were discovered due to the disclosures of a defector. Therefore the Iranian assertions do not generate much credibility elsewhere in the world. The recent IAEA resolution of September 24 had only Venezuela voting against it, 34 out of 35 governors of the IAEA board either voted for the resolution or abstained.
What would be the consequences of Iran going nuclear? There are fears that Iran may follow the Pakistani example. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto called the bomb the Islamic bomb and collected money for the programme from various Arab states. A.Q. Khan, in his confessional statement, said that he carried out only his Islamic obligation when proliferating to Iran and Libya. The newly elected Iranian President, Mohammad Ahmedinejad, during his visit to Turkey, talked of Iran making available enrichment technology to other Islamic countries.
Therefore there are two kinds of concerns among the international community arising out of Irans acquisition of nuclear weapons. The first is that Iran may become an Islamic proliferator. Second is that nuclear weapon acquisition by Shia Iran will unleash a Sunni Arab backlash, particularly from Saudi Arabia. A nuclear Iran, if it ever manages to become one, will have a totally destabilising effect over West Asia. Already the US worries about the effect of a second Shia state emerging in Iraq and the impact of Iran on that state. Eastern Saudi Arabia, where the oil fields are located, and many of the Gulf States have a majority Shia population, although they all have Sunni rulers. The Sunni rulers of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states have kept a tight control over resentful Shia populations. They have depended upon the Gulf Cooperation Council and the US military presence in the Gulf area to keep the Shia populations under control. A resource poor, nuclear Pakistan could only challenge the American and Western powers through jihadi terrorism. It would be a different story in the case of a nuclear Iran which is resource rich, especially in terms of hydrocarbons. Therefore the US and Middle East rulers have real concerns about the authority and influence which the Ayatollahs from Tehran could exercise over the entire Gulf area. Whether this is a real or imaginary fear, it is hard to tell. During Saddam Husseins war on Iran, even the Shias of Iran fought loyally on Saddam Husseins side and the Shias in the Gulf states did not stage any uprising not even when Saddam Hussein brutally suppressed the Shias in Southern Iraq.
The Americans and westerners have not overlooked the fact that Pakistan was able to Talibanise Afghanistan, provide sanctuary for the Al-Qaida and carry on a campaign of terror in Kashmir only when it acquired a nuclear shield. At least in American and western memories, Irans image as a state sponsoring terrorism goes back to 1979. Memories of Hizbullah and hostage taking in Lebanon strongly influence the Western perceptions. Israelis are confident that while the Pakistani bomb could be amenable to US influence and control, they have mortal fear of Iranian nuclear capability. Perhaps, as highlighted by recent Pakistani attempts to woo Israel, the Israelis may feel justified in entertaining greater fears about Iran than of Pakistan.
There would also be fears that a nuclear Iran, with its expanded influence over Shia Gulf states, might exercise increased control over the Gulf oil even as the role of the Gulf oil in the energy security of major nations becomes more crucial. A nuclear Iran would be considered as being more capable of influencing the Islamic Central Asian republics. In a sense, Iran is the centre of gravity of a vaster oil resource base than Saudi Arabia has so far been.
Iranian nuclear weapons, besides stoking Saudi Arabian proliferation reaction and an Israeli strategic countervailing response, may bring Tehran into conflict with Islamabad. The anti-Shia sectarianism in Pakistan is notorious, with Shias being mowed down frequently at prayer meetings in mosques. On Afghanistan, there is Iran-Pakistan rivalry. Pakistan would lose much of its utility for the US and the West if a nuclear armed Iran were to dominate the Gulf.
This analysis will be valid only if Iran were to become nuclear. After 16 years of Pakistani assistance, Iran is reported to have produced uranium with 1.52 per cent enrichment. A.Q. Khan, in his confessional statement, revealed that Zia-ul-Haq, while permitting him to deal with Iran, instructed him to be cautious. The IAEA report would appear to indicate that Iran has spent a lot of time and effort for very limited results. If the US and IAEA were to insist on getting the evidence of A.Q. Khan, the level of expertise Iran has been able to build in regard to enrichment can be easily determined. The US appears to be less concerned about Irans present nuclear capability than about subduing it politically. Otherwise it is difficult to explain their casual approach to getting A.Q. Khans testimony before the IAEA.
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