In an article in the NY Times magazine today
about the growing role that neuroscience is
playing in law, Stephen J. Morse, professor
of law and psychiatry at the University of 
Pennsylvania, is quoted as saying:

"I'm a thoroughgoing materialist, who believes
that all mental and behavioral activity is the
causal product of physical events in the brain."

Fair enough.  But he's also quoted as follows: 

"Suppose neuroscience could reveal that reason
actually plays no role in determining human
behavior....Suppose I could show you that your
intentions and your reasons for your actions
are post hoc rationalizations that somehow
your brain generates to explain to you what
your brain has already done" without your
conscious participation.

Who is the "you" to whom the brain is
purportedly offering this explaination?

Who is the "you" who is not consciously
participating in what the brain generates?

Don't Morse's references to this mysterious
"you" constitute an implicit recognition
that there's *more* to mind than brain,
contradicting his "thoroughgoing
materialist" self-characterization?

Maybe he was just speaking imprecisely to
make a point.  And "without your conscious
participation" is the article writer's
contribution, possibly a clumsy paraphrase
of something Morse went on to say to clarify
the quoted statement.

But I'm intrigued.  I've seen this sort of
apparent contradiction from materialists
before, as if some part of them *knew* there
was a "you" that isn't encompassed by brain
but had simply excluded it from their
theorizing, only to let it slip out in
unguarded moments.


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