Hubert Dreyfus (FAAAS; Past President, American Philosophical Association, 
Western Division) directed Denise Denniston's Ph.D. thesis on Heidegger at 
Berkeley.

jim_flanegin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:           --- In 
[email protected], "sparaig" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> --- In [email protected], "jim_flanegin" <jflanegi@> 
wrote:
> >
> > --- In [email protected], TurquoiseB <no_reply@> 
> > wrote:
> > >
> > > --- In [email protected], "sparaig" <sparaig@> 
wrote:
> > > >
> > > > --- In [email protected], TurquoiseB <no_reply@> 
> > wrote:
> [...]
> > > > > You *start* to act a certain
> > > > > way, get an instantaneous "readout" that you're going
> > > > > the "wrong" way by realizing that your state of atten-
> > > > > tion is lowering, and thus you correct your path and
> > > > > go a different way. The whole process is that fast;
> > > > > you can make such decisions in microseconds.
   
  What is Moral Maturity? A Phenomenological Account of the Development of 
Ethical Expertise
  Hubert L. Dreyfus
   
    
...A Phenomenology of Skill Acquisition 
  Stage 1: Novice 
              Normally, the instruction process begins with the instructor 
decomposing the task environment into context-free features which the beginner 
can recognize without benefit of experience. The beginner is then given rules 
for determining actions on the basis of these features, like a computer 
following a program. 
              The student automobile driver learns to recognize such 
interpretation-free features as speed (indicated by his speedometer). Timing of 
gear shifts is specified in terms of speed. 
              The novice chess player learns a numerical value for each type of 
piece regardless of its position, and the rule: "Always exchange if the total 
value of pieces captured exceeds the value of pieces lost." But such rigid 
rules often fail to work. A loaded car stalls on a hill; a beginner in chess 
falls for every sacrifice. 
   
  Stage 2: Advanced beginner 
              As the novice gains experience actually coping with real 
situations, he begins to note, or an instructor points out, perspicuous 
examples of meaningful additional components of the situation. After seeing a 
sufficient number of examples, the student learns to recognize them. 
Instructional maxims now can refer to these new situational aspects. We use the 
terms maxims and aspects here to differentiate this form of instruction from 
the first, where strict rules were given as to how to respond to context-free 
features. Since maxims are phrased in terms of aspects they already presuppose 
experience in the skill domain. 
              The advanced beginner driver uses (situational) engine sounds as 
well as (non-situational) speed.  He learns the maxim: shift up when the motor 
sounds like it is racing and down when it sounds like it is straining. No 
number of words can take the place of a few choice examples of racing and 
straining sounds. 
              Similarly, with experience, the chess student begins to recognize 
such situational aspects of positions as a weakened king's side or a strong 
pawn structure, despite the lack of precise definitional rules. He is then 
given maxims to follow, such as attack a weakened king's side. 
   
  Stage 3: Competence 
              With increasing experience, the number of features and aspects to 
be taken into account becomes overwhelming. To cope with this information 
explosion, the performer learns to adopt a hierarchical view of 
decision-making. By first choosing a plan, goal or perspective which organizes 
the situation and by then examining only the small set of features and aspects 
that he has learned are relevant given that plan, the performer can simplify 
and improve his performance. 
              A competent driver leaving the freeway on a curved off-ramp may, 
after taking into account speed, surface condition, criticality of time, etc., 
decide he is going too fast. He then has to decide whether to let up on the 
accelerator, remove his foot altogether, or step on the brake. He is relieved 
when he gets through the curve without mishap and shaken if he begins to go 
into a skid. 
              The class A chess player, here classed as competent, may decide 
after studying a position that his opponent has weakened his king's defenses so 
that an attack against the king is a viable goal. If the attack is chosen, 
features involving weaknesses in his own position created by the attack are 
ignored as are losses of pieces inessential to the attack. Removing pieces 
defending the enemy king becomes salient. Successful plans induce euphoria and 
mistakes are felt in the pit of the stomach. 
              In both of these cases, we find a common pattern: detached 
planning, conscious assessment of elements that are salient with respect to the 
plan, and analytical rule-guided choice of action, followed by an emotionally 
involved experience of the outcome. The experience is emotional because 
choosing a plan, goal or perspective is no simple matter for the competent 
performer. Nobody gives him any rules for how to choose a perspective, so he 
has to make up various rules which he then adopts or discards in various 
situations depending on how they work out. This procedure is frustrating, 
however, since each rule works on some occasions and fails on others, and no 
set of objective features and aspects correlates strongly with these successes 
and failures. Nonetheless the choice is unavoidable. Familiar situations begin 
to be accompanied by emotions such as hope, fear, etc., but the competent 
performer strives to suppress these feelings during his detached choice of
 perspective. 
              One of us, Stuart, knows all too well what it is to think like a 
competent chess player, as he is stuck at that level. He recalls: 
  I was always good at mathematics and took up chess as an outlet for that 
analytic talent. At college, where I captained the chess team, my players were 
mostly mathematicians and mostly, like me, at the competent level. At this 
point, a few of my teammates who were not mathematicians began to play fast 
chess at the rate of five or ten minutes a game, and also eagerly to play over 
the great games of the grandmasters. I resisted. Fast chess was no fun for me, 
because it didn't give me time to figure out what to do. I found grandmaster 
games inscrutable, and since the record of the game seldom if ever gave 
principles explaining the moves, I felt there was nothing I could learn from 
the games. Some of my teammates, who through fast chess and game studying 
acquired a great deal of concrete experience, have gone on to become masters. 
   
  Stage 4: Proficiency 
              As soon as the competent performer stops reflecting on 
problematic situations as a detached observer, and stops looking for principles 
to guide his actions, the gripping, holistic experiences from the competent 
stage become the basis of the next advance in skill. Having experienced many 
emotion-laden situations, chosen plans in each, and having obtained vivid, 
emotional demonstrations of the adequacy or inadequacy of the plan, the 
performer involved in the world of the skill "notices," or "is struck by" a 
certain plan, goal or perspective. No longer is the spell of involvement broken 
by detached conscious planning. 
              Since there are generally far fewer "ways of seeing" than "ways 
of acting," after understanding without conscious effort what is going on, the 
proficient performer will still have to think about what to do. During this 
thinking, elements that present themselves as salient are assessed and combined 
by rule and maxim to produce decisions. 
              On the basis of prior experience, a proficient driver fearfully 
approaching a curve on a rainy day may sense that he is traveling too fast. 
Then, on the basis of such salient  elements as visibility, angle of road bank, 
criticalness of time, etc., he decides whether to let up on the gas, take his 
foot off the gas or to step on the brake.  (These factors were used by the 
competent driver to decide that he is speeding.) 
              The proficient chess player, who is classed a master, can 
discriminate a large repertoire of types of positions. Experiencing a situation 
as a field of conflicting forces and seeing almost immediately the sense of a 
position, he sets about calculating the move that best achieves his goal. He 
may, for example, know that he should attack, but he must deliberate about how 
best to do so. 
   
  Stage 5: Expertise 
              The proficient performer, immersed in the world of skillful 
activity, sees what needs to be done, but must decide how to do it. With enough 
experience with a variety of situations, all seen from the same perspective but 
requiring different tactical decisions, the proficient performer seems 
gradually to decompose this class of situations into subclasses, each of which 
share the same decision, single action, or tactic. This allows an immediate 
intuitive response to each situation. 
              The expert driver, generally without any attention, not only 
knows by feel and familiarity when an action such as slowing down is required; 
he knows how to perform the action without calculating and comparing 
alternatives. He shifts gears when appropriate with no awareness of his acts. 
On the off ramp his foot simply lifts off the accelerator. What must be done, 
simply is done. 
              The expert chess player, classed as an international master or 
grandmaster, in most situations experiences a compelling sense of the issue and 
the best move. Excellent chess players can play at the rate of 5-10 seconds a 
move and even faster without any serious degradation in performance. At this 
speed they must depend almost entirely on intuition and hardly at all on 
analysis and comparison of alternatives. We recently performed an experiment in 
which an international master, Julio Kaplan, was required rapidly to add 
numbers presented to him audibly at the rate of about one number per second, 
while at the same time playing five-second-a-move chess against a slightly 
weaker, but master level, player. Even with his analytical mind completely 
occupied by adding numbers, Kaplan more than held his own against the master in 
a series of games. Deprived of the time necessary to solve problems or 
construct plans, Kaplan still produced fluid and strategic play. 
              It seems that beginners make judgments using strict rules and 
features, but that with talent and a great deal of involved experience the 
beginner develops into an expert who sees intuitively what to do without 
applying rules and making judgments at all. The intellectualist tradition has 
given an accurate description of the beginner and of the expert facing an 
unfamiliar situation, but normally an expert does not deliberate. He does not 
reason. He does not even act deliberately. He simply spontaneously does what 
has normally worked and, naturally, it normally works. 
              We are all experts at many tasks and our everyday coping skills 
function smoothly and transparently so as to free us to be aware of other 
aspects of our lives where we are not so skillful. That is why philosophers 
(with the exception of Aristotle) overlooked them for 2500 years, until 
pragmatism and existential phenomenology came along...


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