In a message dated 4/18/2007 10:08:17 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time,  
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:

 
 
 
_http://www.quantumchttp://www.quahttp://www.quanthttp://www.quanthttp://www_ 
(http://www.quantumcconsciousness.org/presentations/whatisconsciousness.html) 

The  Problem of Consciousness

Conventional explanations portray  consciousness as an emergent
property of classical computer-like activities  in the brain's neural
networks. The prevailing views among scientists in  this camp are that
1) patterns of neural network activities correlate with  mental states,
2) synchronous network oscillations in thalamus and cerebral  cortex
temporally bind information, and 3) consciousness emerges as a  novel
property of computational complexity among neurons.

However,  these approaches appear to fall short in fully explaining
certain enigmatic  features of consciousness, such as:

* The nature of subjective  experience, or 'qualia'- our 'inner
life' (Chalmers' "hard problem");
*  Binding of spatially distributed brain activities into unitary
objects in  vision, and a coherent sense of self, or 'oneness';
* Transition from  pre-conscious processes to consciousness itself;
* Non-computability, or  the notion that consciousness involves a
factor which is neither random,  nor algorithmic, and that
consciousness cannot be simulated (Penrose, 1989,  1994, 1997);
* Free will; and,
* Subjective time flow.

Brain  imaging technologies demonstrate anatomical location of
activities which  appear to correlate with consciousness, but which may
not be directly  responsible for consciousness.

Figure 1. PET scan image of brain  showing visual and auditory
recognition (from S Petersen, Neuroimaging  Laboratory, Washington
University, St. Louis. Also see J.A. Hobson  "Consciousness,U
Scientific American Library, 1999, p.  65).

Figure 2. ElectrophysiologicaFigure 2. Electrophysiologica<WBR>

How do neural firings lead to thoughts and feelings? The  conventional
(a.k.a. functionalist, reductionist, materialist,  physicalist,
computationalist) approach argues that neurons and their  chemical
synapses are the fundamental units of information in the brain,  and
that conscious experience emerges when a critical level of  complexity
is reached in the brain's neural networks.

The basic idea  is that the mind is a computer functioning in the brain
(brain = mind =  computer). However in fitting the brain to a
computational view, such  explanations omit incompatible
neurophysiological details:

*  Widespread apparent randomness at all levels of neural processes
(is it  really noise, or underlying levels of complexity?)(
* Glial cells  (which account for some 80% of brain);
* Dendritic-dendritic  processing;
* Electrotonic gap junctions;
*  Cytoplasmic/*  Cytoplasmic/<WBR>cytosk
* Living state (the brain is  alive!)

A further difficulty is the absence of testable hypotheses  in
emergence theory. No threshold or rationale is specified;  rather,
consciousness "just happens".

Finally, the complexity of  individual neurons and synapses is not
accounted for in such arguments.  Since many forms of motile
single-celled organisms lacking neurons or  synapses are able to swim,
find food, learn, and multiply through the use  of their internal
cytoskeleton, can they be considered more advanced than  neurons? 

more... 
> Sounds like you need to spend more time in silence or get a job.  Better 
yet use your dome pass more often since you think your such a dedicated  Sidha. 
Lsoma.


 


 



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