Hi, Garrett.
Can you tell me from were are you getting this technical information
on the Seagate Momentus FDE.2?
Thanks!
On Mar 1, 2008, at 11:30 AM, Andreas W. Kuhn wrote:
Garrett,
I think there are many that feel like you. There could theoretically
be
any number of future possibilities to lift temporary data from DRAM.
Like it has been said in previous comments, the best way preventing
lifting of sensitive temporary data from DRAM is simply to try and
circumvent storing sensitive data in DRAM
The Seagate MOMENTUS FDE.2 approach is a simple one:
Keep the encryption key in a safe partition of the hard drive and do
not
make it available for the system to see.
The Seagate MOMENTUS FDE.2 does just that. It works as follows:
User must authenticate themselves directly to the drive using a
password
before the drive will unlock and allow the normal OS to boot. This
does not
use either the BIOS or the OS to perform the authentication.
The Seagate MOMENTUS FDE.2 drive supports more secure authentication
approach where the authentication to the drive is done using an
alternate
pre-boot OS held in a protected area of the drive, and also support
new ATA
security commands for Trusted Send and Trusted Receive to protect
the password.
If the authentication is successful, as determined by the Seagate
MOMENTUS FDE.2
drive, then the drive is unlocked and the system is allowed to boot
normally.
With this solution, not only is the authentication done before any
foreign software
is allowed to load, the encryption keys are never exposed outside
the protected
hardware of the drive itself, including the user area of the drive
or in the OS, which
is what these attacks are exploiting.
A solution for the stand-by mode on the Seagate MOMENTUS FDE.2 is
apparently
imminent. This will make it the only solution available that will
support both,
secure "hibernation" and secure "stand-by" mode.
Garrett wrote:
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ In fact, I think hardware-based encryption (like the Momentus
drive) is the way to go in the long
+ haul (hardware+software attacks are typically more difficult than
software-only attacks).
+
+ Just a bit frustrated that I can't sleep as easy at night knowing
that the "theoretical" RAM analysis
+ technique will (soon?) be used by more than a group of researchers
at Princeton, realistically.
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