I'm sorry, I somehow missed this email earlier (and it's taken me a few tries to get subscribed to the mailing list).

If you're interested in Host-Proof Hosting, we recently published a (simplistic) primer on our blog here: http://passpack.wordpress.com/2008/03/10/host-proof-hosting/

In a nutshell - the pass phrase should never be sent to the server, and all data should be encrypted on the client before ever going over the wire.

On certified Host-Proof Hosting... I don't think that exists actually. It's only been since late 2006 that the pattern was made practical (though theorized much earlier). There are very few companies that have begun to use it yet. That said - can you think of any companies that you would trust to implement such a certification?

Tara Kelly



Ali, Saqib ha scritto:
    * even though you sent them the pass phrase
    
That is the key thing. With host-proof hosting,  you never send the
pass phrase to the hosting server. Your pass phrase remains on your
client computer.

Maybe Ms. Kelly (whom I have copied on this email) can elaborate more
on the topic of host-proof hosting pattern. Her company
(www.passpack.com) has successfully implemented this pattern.



On 3/20/08, Crispin Cowan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
  
Ali, Saqib wrote:
 > Wells Fargo to Personal Online Safe for storing electronic copies of
 > important materials, such as financial statements, loan and tax
 > documents, wills, passports, and birth, marriage and death
 > certificates:
 > https://www.wellsfargo.com/press/2008/20080319_Online_Safe
 >

Ok, that sounds like a bad idea.


 > Note: The only way I will feel safe about this service is that Wells
 > Fargo uses Host-Proof Hosting patterns[1], and PROVE (i.e. get
 > certified) that host-proof hosting pattern is implemented properly and
 > securely. Until then I will store these documents on a encrypted drive
 > that I have control over.
 >
 > 1. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Host-proof_hosting
 >

This *also* sounds like a really bad idea. You trust the host to:

    * not persist the clear text data
    * not persist the passphrase
    * not persist the decryption key
    * even though you sent them the pass phrase

 Never mind that lots of web sites have been caught trousers down
 retaining the extra 3-digit security codes from credit cards, never mind
 that they aren't supposed to retain that either.

 Crispin
    

  
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