How might this affect the Fedora kernel?
---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2009 08:07:39 -0600
From: Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>
To: lkml <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected], Andrew Morgan <[email protected]>,
Steve Grubb <[email protected]>, Kees Cook <[email protected]>,
Andreas Gruenbacher <[email protected]>,
Michael Kerrisk <[email protected]>,
George Wilson <[email protected]>
Subject: drop SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES?
Hey,
Just a probe to see what people think. I've seen two cases
in about the last month where software was confounded by
an assumption that prctl(PR_CAPBSET_DROP, CAP_SOMETHING)
would succeed if privileged, but not handling the fact
that SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=n means you can't do that.
Are we at the point yet where we feel we can get rid of
the SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=n case?
Note that there is a boot arg no_file_caps which prevents
file capabilities from being used if SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=y.
I think that's the case most users will care about, whereas the
remaining differences between CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=y
and =n are that with CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=y :
(1) certain security hooks (task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, and
task_setnice) do capability set comparisions,
(2) it is possible to drop capabilities from the bounding set,
(3) it is possible to set per-task securelevels,
(4) and it is possible to add any capability to your inheritable
set if you have CAP_SETPCAP.
Does anyone know of cases where CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=n
is still perceived as useful?
thanks,
-serge
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