Guy writes:
> ...
>1 - Your motor vehicle is an extension of your home. As such, your private
>property rights at home transfer to your motor vehicle and, therefore, are
>exactly equal to the property rights of the person upon whose land you park
>that motor vehicle, despite the fact that there is at least some kind of
>implicit grant of permission or licence to park there. The rights being
>equal, the prohibition is stalemated and must fail because the right to
>possess/carry the firearm at home either trumps a workplace situation or
>maybe it occurs first - the right starts inside the house before the worker
>gets to the parking lot so he simply carries it with him (no pun intended).
>Being first, it wins.
>
>I'm not convinced on this approach.
I'm a bit more convinced - as long as we distinguish between your
right *in* the motor vehicle, and your right's as soon as you exit the
motor vehicle.
In the motor vehicle, you can have a continuous posession of a firearm
from your home onwards. Denying posession in the motor vehicle then
denies possession on the entire travel, to and from. Clearly the
property owner has zero right to regulate the rest of the travel.
But as soon as you exit the motor vehicle, then you are entirely on
the other's property and that property owner's requirement holds. (I'm
assuming that you have been informed of that requirement.)
>Let's assume for the moment the
>destination is not a workplace, but another person's home. Is the right of
>this homeowner secondary? If Maggie doesn't like guns, and doesn't want John
>to bring his gun onto her property, she can keep him from doing so.
I'd give the same interpretation as above, and say that the gun in the
car isn't really on Maggie's property.
>Ignoring for the moment the lacking of individual standing that a
>corporation has, why would their property rights have a secondary status?
My interpretation puts both of them on the same basis.
>Taking this one step further: Public parking lots are just that --
>available to the public by an implied invitation ("Please come shop and the
>Mega Mall of Memphis!"). A corporate parking lot is by specific invitation,
>and indeed by employment contract. Property and contract rights would have
>a superior standing (this gets messy when we also consider that corporations
>invite a subset of the non-employee public onto corporate grounds for
>visiting -- vendors, potential employees, customer representatives, etc.).
As far as employment, or other, contract - I'd agree that it has
superior standing. If my employment contract says that I won't bring
guns or cats onto the employer's property, even inside my motor vehicle,
then I've bound my self with that restriction. Visitors to that
property aren't bound by an employement, or other, contract and so
haven't given up the right to keep (legal) stuff in their car.
(Possibly a sign outside the parking lot saying XYZ Prohibited on These
Premises, would have the same effect as a contract?)
So if you enter into a contract with Maggie which says that you won't
bring motor vehicles with guns or cats onto her property - then that
governs what you can do.
Overall, I'm distinguishing between the limits of a property owner's
rights - and what you can agree to in a contract.
--henry schaffer
P.S. IANAL.
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