On Friday, August 21, 2015, Scott Morgan <bl...@blueyonder.co.uk> wrote:
> > Q1 : 4, I don't expect NSA defeating crypto[0], but enough to keep > casual eyes away from expensive data. > > Q2 : 5, It's a must. Whether the key is somehow held internal to the > .FDB file (with it's own pswd, no system wide account access, naturally) > or passed in via connection data, isn't an issue[1], but the DB must be > available to the apps depending on it with zero user intervention. > > Scott > > [0] For deployment to sites out of our control, in the end there's no > technical way to truly hide the data, obviously. But we're also not > talking about skilled hackers either, just average users. Hell, XOR > would probably suffice, but something like ChaCha would be preferred. > > [1] Although, would prefer things like GBAK, ISQL, etc. to still be usable. > > ChaCha20 is a stream cipher that generates a pseudo random byte stream that is XORed with the plaintext to form the ciphertext. If the same initial state (<key, nonce>) is used more than once, which is necessary to re-encrypt a changed page, XORing two encrypted page image versions results is the same as the XOR of the two plaintext page images. From that and a knowledge of Firebird page format, and security is blown. This is not a reflection on ChaCha20, but just an example of tge dangers of using a good algorithm inappropriately. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > Firebird-Devel mailing list, web interface at > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/firebird-devel > -- Jim Starkey
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