You may want to tell the client that PCAnywhere's password scheme has been
cracked (fine example of proving that security by obscurity is neither).
Therefore any machine that is controlled via PCAnywhere is vunerable.
On Tuesday, May 23, 2000 6:52 AM, Harry Behrens [SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
wrote:
>
> I have a client requesting me to configure a Linux-based machine
(ipchains)
> to allow Notes (over TCP/IP) traffic as well as pcAnywhere (over TCP/IP).
> Does anyone:
>
> - have specific reasons not to do this
> - pointers to ports etc. used (and which therefore need to be opened)
> - information about special quirks (a.k.a. ftp-like behaviour with
> client/server reversal of roles)?
>
> I have to admit I am new to both protocols (used to 'traditional' TCP/IP'
> based nets (WWW,WMTP/POP etc.))
>
> Regards,
>
> Harry Behrens
>
> -
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