Hmm.. Can someone give an example of how a "compromise" that opens the
internal network to the attacker could work, if the proxy server is passing
only HTTP traffic on port 80 between the internal server and the Internet
client?
Brian
----- Original Message -----
From: "Paul Cardon" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Kelly Slavens" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Friday, February 02, 2001 11:55 AM
Subject: Re: Configuration Arguments... In House...
> Kelly Slavens wrote:
> >
> > I have a situation where I have a Server, which will host web
> > content from "Internal" Data to the external world. This Server Needs
only
> > have web services accessible to the outside world beyond our network.
Our
> > current configuration is a Cisco Hardware Nat/Router Packet filter
directly
> > connected to the Internet connection. Connected to that is our MSProx2.0
> > (Being replaced with ISA Server soon)... One individual wishes to place
this
> > new web server directly behind the NAT alongside the Prox, With a so
called
> > "one way" push only network connection to the internal network. This
seems
> > like a bad idea to me. My suggestion was Place the Web server behind the
> > prox and use Reverse prox to redirect all web traffic to only this
single
> > internal Web server. This to me seems to be more secure than a second
> > machine sitting in the DMZ with a connection to the internal network.
>
> With the web server behind the Proxy, if the web server is compromised
> (eg. IIS Unicode vulnerability) then the entire internal network is open
> to the attacker. The other configuration is better but it isn't the
> only solution.
>
> -paul
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