Dear List,
I must disagree with the notion that there is any real separation of
nature and culture. There are things that can be known that do not
exist - as a general category that includes culture - but culture
does not stand alone - it's right up there with irrational numbers
and televisions.
The force of natural ethics (inevitable behaviors) is mediated by
convention and manifest in the behavior of individuals - culture is
merely one such convention.
With respect,
Steven
--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://iase.info
On Feb 5, 2007, at 11:37 PM, Loet Leydesdorff wrote:
Dear colleagues,
I agree with most of what is said, but it does not apply to social
systems because these -- and to a lesser extent also psychological
ones -- operate differently from the hierarchical formations that
are generated "naturally". That is why we oppose "nature" to
"culture" in the semantics: cultural (and social) systems enable us
to model the systems under study and this changes the hierarchical
order. I understand that Maturana et al. argue that the next-order
systems always model the lower-order ones, but then the word
"model" is used metaphorically. The model (e.g., the biological)
model enables us to reconstruct the system(s) under study to such
an extent that we are able to intervene in these systems, e.g. by
using a technology. This inverts the hierarchy.
Thus, let me write in Stan's notation: biological {psychological
{social}} -- or is this precisely the opposite order, Stan? -- then
our scientific models enable us to change nature, for example, by
building dykes like in Holland and thus we get: social {biological}
since the ecological changes can also be planned in advance.
While lower-order systems are able to entertain a model of the next-
lower ones -- and even have to entertain a model -- human language
enables us not only to exchange these models, but also to study
them and to further codify them. The further codification sharpens
the knife with which we can cut into the lower-level ones. We are
not constrained to the next-order lower level, but we can freely
move through the hierarchy and develop different specialties
accordingly (chemistry, biology, etc.). Scientists are able to
adjust the focus of the lense. This is a cultural achievement which
was generated naturally, but once in place also had the possibility
to distinguish between genesis and validity. No lower-level systems
can raise and begin to answer this question. And doubling reality
into a semantic domain that can operate relatively independently of
the underlying (represented) layer increases the complexity which
can be absorbed with an order of magnitude.
The issue is heavily related to the issue of modernity as a
specific form of social organization. While tribes ("small groups")
can still be considered using the "natural" metaphor, and high
cultures were still organized hierarchically (with the emperor or
the pope at the top), modern social systems set science "free" to
pursue this reconstruction in a techno-economic evolution. "All
that is solid, will melt into air" (Marx). Because of our
biological body, we are part of nature, but our minds are entrained
in a cultural dynamics at the supra-individual level ("culture")
which feeds back and at some places is able increasingly to invert
the hierarchy.
With best wishes,
Loet
Loet Leydesdorff
Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR)
Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam
Tel.: +31-20- 525 6598; fax: +31-20- 525 3681
[EMAIL PROTECTED] ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/
Now available: The Knowledge-Based Economy: Modeled, Measured,
Simulated. 385 pp.; US$ 18.95
The Self-Organization of the Knowledge-Based Society; The Challenge
of Scientometrics
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:fis-
[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of John Collier
Sent: Monday, February 05, 2007 5:18 PM
To: Jerry LR Chandler; [email protected]
Subject: Re: [Fis] Re: fis Digest, Vol 501, Issue 5
Hi folks,
I'll take a few minutes from my moving and dealing with academic
emergencies at UKZN to make a comment here.
Jerry brings up a point that keeps arising in the literature one
constraints and information. Recall that Shannon said that they are
the same thing. That is a clue.
Loet and I dealt with this issue previously on this list about a
year ago when he claimed that social communications channels open
up new possibilities (analogous to Jerry's position here), and I
asked him why this was so, since any further structure must reduce
the possibilities, not increase them. We each promoted out view for
a while, and then stopped, as it wasn't going anywhere. The reason
is that there is nowhere to go with this issue. Both positions are
correct, and they do not contradict each other; they are merely
incompatible perspectives, much like Cartesian versus polar
coordinates. The positions are not logically incompatible, but
pragmatically incompatible, in that they cannot both be adopted
at the same time. This is a fairly common phenomenon in science. In
fact I wrote my dissertation on it. There is a paper of mine,
Pragmatic Incommensurability, in the Proceedings of the Philosophy
of Science Association 1984 (PSA 1984) that goes into the issue in
more detail, but not as much as in my thesis. I am kind of bored
with the issue at the issue at this point, but it keeps coming up,
so I'll say a bit more.
Stan's bracket formulation is a logical restriction (constraint),
with the outer bracketed items logically restricting the inner
ones. It is a neat formulation for a system developed by W.E.
Johnson in his book Logic, in which he called the inner elements
determinates and the outer ones determinables. The idea is a basic
one in the Philosophy business, and these are the technical terms
used there, although they are somewhat awkward, being relative
terms, and also not words used with their English meaning. Jerry's
problem is that if the chemical opens up a huge range of
possibilities not available to the physical, how can we call the
physical a constraint on the chemical. I once asked Stan a similar
question, and he gave me an answer that satisfied me enough not to
pursue the issue. The answer requires a distinction concerning
constraints (which, recall, is logically equivalent to information
-- any connotative difference being irrelevant to my point here).
My colleagues and coauthors Wayne Christensen and Cliff Hooker once
referred to the difference between restricting and enabling
constraints. The former restrict possibilities, while the latter
are required in order to make things possible -- mush produces
nothing. But there is no essential difference -- context, if
anything, makes the difference. I say 'if anything' because in many
cases constraints (indistinguishable from information by logic
alone) do both: restrict and enable. There is no paradox here --
they are two sides of the same coin. A Taoist like me sees them as
Yin and Yang -- the Yang element is the defined and restrictive,
active, controlling part, while the Yin is the open, receptive and
enabling part. We cannot view the same thing as both Yin and Yang
at the same time (we can talk about it in the abstract, in the same
way that we can talk about Cartesian and polar coordinates
together, and even transform them on in to the other), but the
thing itself is both, and the transformations between Yin and Yang
have a logical form that is predictable and determinate. Just so
with restricting and enabling constraints -- we can learn to
transform one into the other, both in thought and in practice.
I will now demonstrate this with Jerry's cases (though the ideas
are hardly peculiar to Jerry's cases)
At 05:16 PM 05/02/2007, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
To: Igor / Ted / Stan
First, Igor.
I found your perspective here to be 180 degrees off from mine!
On Feb 5, 2007, at 6:01 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Reply to Steven and Ted
By "genetic constraints" I assume you simply mean that we have
certain capacities and are not omnipotent. Is not conflict and
war an indicator of our individual failure to manage social
complexity? Or would you argue that war is social complexity
management?
I was referring to the hypothesis that we have the propensity to
function in relatively small groups bind by strong cultural bonds.
From my perspective, enriched by chemical relations,
genetic system serve as fundamentally creative activities.
Genetic networks are not an amalgam of soft concepts, rather a
genetic network is a discrete interdependent network of chemical
relations.
The enumeration of the creative genetic network is complete for
some organisms, some species.
In Aristotelian logical terms, the position of the species is
between the individual "point" and the "genus".
It is the chemical capacity to create species that I find to be
absent from your narrative.
Thus, I would re-phrase your hypothesis generating sentence:
From:
I was referring to the hypothesis that we have the propensity to
function in relatively small groups bind by strong cultural bonds.
To:
"I was referring to the hypothesis that genetic networks have the
creative capacity to function in very large associations that are
linked together by very weak bonds."
There is no difference between the two statements -- the scope in
the 'from' case is the Yang side of things, but in the 'to' case it
is the Yin side. One pays attention to the Yang aspects, and the
other to the Yin aspects. Both propensities are there, and the
stronger the Yang propensity the more it transforms into the Yin,
and vice versa. Given a finite information capacity, these are the
only two possible dynamics, and they trade off against each other.
Now, if we have an expanding information capacity (phase space), as
Kaufman, Brooks and Wiley, Layzer, Landserg, Frautschi, Davies and
other notables have seen, we can get both together, though they
still trade off one against the other.
Ted's comment seems to be based on a some recent innovations in
the mathematics of hierarchies. The issue of how we select the
meaning for our symbols of representations of the world can be a
very complicated one. The profound limitations that linear and
quasi - linear mathematics places on the symbolic carrying
capacity of signs may be relevant to Ted's statement. But, I am
not certain of the origins of his views.
Jerry, I think the way this is worded is not quite consistent with
the perspective you are promoting. We don't "select" the meaning of
our symbols, except perhaps in fairly formal contexts. If we did it
would be very hard to be usefully creative, I am sure you agree --
we could only select what we already have a template for -- see
my Dealing with the Unexpected from the CASYS meetings examples.
Stan's comment deserves to be attended to.
"The many
complexities facing us as society can be parsed as follows, using a
specification hierarcy:
{physical constraints (material/chemical constraints {biological
constraints {sociocultural constraints}}}}."
As I search for the substance in this comment, I focus on what
might be the potentially misleading usage of the term "parsed."
Nor, do I understand why brackets, signifiers of separations, are
used in this context.
I have no idea what it would mean to "parse" a "material /
chemical constraint" in this context.
See note on W.E. Johnson above. That is the standard source for the
logic here, and it is universally accepted among those who know it.
Indeed, chemical logic functions in exactly the opposite direction.
The creative relations grow with the complexity of the system. Is
this not what we mean by evolution?
But so do the constraints or restrictions, as Stan has been arguing
for years now. There is no inconsistency in both happening.
On a personal note to Stan: We have been discussing similar
concepts since the inception of WESS more than 20 years ago and it
does not appear that we are converging! :-) :-) :-) Unless
you choose to embrace the creative capacities of chemical logic, I
fear your mind is doomed to the purgatory of unending chaotic
cycles, searching for a few elusive or perhaps imaginary "fixed
points." ;-) :-) :-( !!!
And there is no convergence. There are fixed points -- there have
to be or all we can have is mush -- but they are not where the
action is. On the other hand, the 'action' occurs only because of
receptivity to being worked on or guided by constraints that must
relatively fixed. The divergence is there in reality, and the place
where there is convergence is beyond our ability to grasp with an
argument. I am sure that Stan knows this.
John
Professor John Collier
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041
South Africa
T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292 F: +27 (31) 260 3031
http://www.ukzn.ac.za/undphil/collier/index.html
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