Friday, June 15, 2007, 12:30:07 PM, Pedro wrote:
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Perhaps we have not achieved a clear demarcation from “mechanics” yet, theoretically speaking. And that may be another serious problem in itself. In what is different the “informational” from the “mechanical”? Or in my own terms: “Distinction from the Adjacent” versus “Force from the Adjacent” ?… |
Can I suggest that the form/substance dichotomy is worth considering in this context? The concept of physical information, well established within physics though still controversial for some, basically corresponds to form. Etymologically, "information" derives from "form". I'd argue that "informational" is synonymous with an important if uncommon sense of "formal".
The distinction between numerical and qualitative identity seems crucial here. Physical entities are numerically distinct, even when qualitatively identical. Forms, on the other hand, are qualities: if two instances are qualitatively identical, then there's just one form. That, to my mind, is the basic feature of information. This concept is purely syntactic, which for many people is a problem, but I believe that the philosophical problem of meaning can and should be clearly distinguished from the question "what is information"? The concept of form is, I think, more fundamental than that of distinction: both distinctions and similarities are formal features. Information concerns similarities as well as differences.
Unfortunately, I don't have the background to present my views formally (to use a different sense of that word), but I'm more than willing to discuss them in such an informal setting as this.
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Robin Faichney
<http://www.robinfaichney.org/>
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