Dear Bill and colleagues, The distinction between agents evolving or communications can be made without accepting Luhmann's more far-reaching claims. It enables us to understand why cultural phenomena based on interhuman communications exhibit a dynamic so differently from biological phenomena. For example, a constitution enables us to distinguish how to organize political communication differently from exchange processes on the market (negotiations) or religious communication.
Scientific communication -- discourse -- is part and parcel of this cultural evolution process. The discourse enables us to entertain models at the supra-individual level. Systems which can entertain models can be considered as anticipatory (Rosen, 1985). While the social network among us has one more degree of freedom than we individually, the anticipation can be modeled as hyper-incursive: the strongly anticipatory system not only entertains a model of itself, but it is also able to co-construct its future state because of a potential feedback from the modelling system onto the modeled one (Dubois, 1998). Of course, we (as agents) remain a necessary condition like in the case of structural coupling (Maturana & Varela; Luhmann). However, we are not only structurally coupled as systems (like ants to the antshill), but also in terms of how we communicate, that is, provide meaning to the uncertainty. The communications among us can be reflected by each of us, and each of our utterances and understanding can be reflected at the level of the network in a semiosis. The network can reflect these contributions using codes of communications. These codes of communications are not given (as in nature), but remain culturally constructed and therefore anticipatory, that is, advanced as intentions from the perspective of the present. This model enriches our capacity to understand social and cultural phenomena beyond the biological domain. Questions about how an economy or society can be knowledge-based can be addressed because knowledge cannot only be defined with reference to individual (rational?) actors, but also with reference to interhuman communications which can be more or less informed and meaningful. I hope that this contributes. It is more or less an invitation to entertain a hypothesis. The philosophical source is not Luhmann, but Husserl. Best wishes, Loet ________________________________ Loet Leydesdorff Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR), Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam. Tel.: +31-20- 525 6598; fax: +31-20- 525 3681 l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/ > -----Original Message----- > From: william-h...@bigpond.com [mailto:william-h...@bigpond.com] > Sent: Wednesday, October 14, 2009 3:34 AM > To: l...@leydesdorff.net > Cc: 'fis'; 'Pedro C. Marijuan' > Subject: Re: [Fis] [Fwd: FW: Definition of Knowledge] from Bill Hall > > Loet, > > re your comment that it is "communication" that is evolving, > I have major difficulties of paradigmatic incommensurability > with Luhmann's version of autopoiesis. This appears to place > communications on a plane orthogonal to entities actually > engaged in communication, akin to the imaginary plane of a > complex number, and I assume that it is this kind of > communication your note refers to. > > At least this is what I understand Luhmann to be saying in > his 1991 "System as difference". Organization 13(1), 37-57 > (2006); and in his 1995. The paradox of observing systems. > (in) Rasch, W. (ed.) Theories of Distinction: Redescribing > the Descriptions of Modernity. Stanford University Press, > Stanford (2002), pp. 79-93 [Reprinted from Cultural Critique > 31 (1995): 37-53]). > > In my own understanding of reflexivity and recursion in > autopoietic systems from an evolutionary point of view and in > communications between them, I don't see the same paradoxes > that concerned Maturana and Varela and that Luhmann took to > extremes. I think that Popper's general theory of evolution > that he proposed as a resolution to the matter/mind problem > (e.g., in his 1972 chapter on Clouds and Clocks) also > eliminates the supposed paradoxes of self-reference. > > Maturana and Varela mostly missed the significance of history > and evolution along the time dimension. The recursive > processes of autopoiesis are never instantaneous - the > autopoietic system progresses from one instant to the next > via historically constrained "adjacent possible" states in > the phase space of all possibilities (Kauffman 2000. > Investigations. Oxford Univ. Press). Selection favors the > evolution of recursive processes that preserve autopoiesis, > but the self-reference of semantic closure is always open > along the time axis. In other words, the living entity never > refers to its own existence in the present instance. Animated > slides 11-12, and 14-15 in my presentation "Time value of > knowledge - time based frameworks for valuing knowledge" > (http://tinyurl.com/3y6n4y) - illustrates my understanding of > cognitive processes along the time dimension. Hopefully this > will clarify some of the words. > > From my world view as an evolutionary biologist whose > thinking derives from Popper's evolutionary epistemology, > communication is a disturbance caused by a "sender" that has > the capacity to make a difference to a recipient affected by > the disturbance. The communication may be directly physical > (Popper's W2) or it may be codified (where the encoded > content exists in Popper's W3). > > As a result of selection or self-criticism the generating or > receiving apparatus or the meaning of the intended or > received messages may change through successive cycles of > recursion. However, I cannot see any way that a communication > as a uninterpreted (and thus meaningless) disturbance > propagating through space (as photons, as molecular > vibrations, etc.) can evolve in response to selection. > > Thus, to me the constitutions of the agents are what evolves, > not the communication (or the meaning of its content) as > interpreted by the agents. However, I accept that as a > consequence of misinterpretations within my paradigmatic > world view, I may be misconstruing Loet's comments. > > Bill > > > William P. (Bill) Hall, PhD > Documentation and Knowledge Management Systems Analyst > > Evolutionary Biology of Species and Organizations > PO Box 94 Riddells Creek, Vic. 3431 > Phone: +61 3 5428 6246 > Email: william-h...@bigpond.com > http://www.orgs-evolution-knowledge.net/ > > National Fellow, Australian Centre for Science, Innovation and Society > University of Melbourne > Office: (Mon, Wed, Fri only) > Room 106 Old Engineering, Melbourne School of Engineering > Melbourne 3010 > Phone: +61 3 8344 4000 x 58033 > Email: wh...@unimelb.edu.au > URL: http://www.acsis.unimelb.edu.au/ > > > > > ---- Loet Leydesdorff <l...@leydesdorff.net> wrote: > > Although information is often defined > > in a communications theory context (i.e., Shannon-Weaver) > > information of significance to people and other living > things is better > defined as ?a > > difference that makes a difference? (Bateson) that has little > > connection to the Shannon-Weaver kind. The relationship > between knowledge > > and information > > also needs to be examined in an evolutionary context ? > where the DIKW > > pyramid makes more sense than when looked at in isolation. > > Dear colleagues, > > It seems to me that one has to specify the unit of evolution. > In this case, > the unit of evolution is communication: that is, > communication --and not > agency-- is evolving. > > First, this can be expressed as simply the communication of > differences > (true/false). Shannon-type communication of information is > contained in > probability distributions which can be considered as aggregates of > differences and therefore measured in bits. > > A difference can make a difference for a receiving system. > The first-order > differences --Shannon-type information-- can then be provided > with meaning. > Some information can be considered as meaningful and other > information then > is considered as noise. > > Knowledge can be considered as a meaning which makes a difference. The > communication is then not only positioned (by a receiving > --observing-- > system), but additionally coded over the time axis. Knowledge > codifies both > information and meaning. > > Whether the observing system is an observer or a networked > system does not > yet make a difference at this abstract level of specifying > the recursion of > selections. However, the reflection and therefore > codification operates > differently in human agents from interhuman communications. The latter > cannot "embody" the communications. Tacit knowledge can only > be developed by > agents; discursive knowledge in networks on which agents can reflect. > > Best wishes, > > > Loet > ________________________________ > > Loet Leydesdorff > Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR), > Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam. > Tel.: +31-20- 525 6598; fax: +31-20- 525 3681 > l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/ > _______________________________________________ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
