--> Dear FIS Colleagues, In the Special Issue of triple-C, on information 2009 7(2), an outstanding review of the "state-of-the-art", Wolfgang Hofkirchner calls for a "a unified theory of information (UTI) based on a concrete-universal concept of information rather than an abstract one." He wishes to avoid reliance on a "formal-logical figure of necessary and sufficient conditions" and use a "way of thinking that integrates as well as differentiates the particular and universal." I could not agree more with this approach. My concern, however is that Hofkirchner seeks support for it in Edgar Morin's concepts of complexity involving "unity-in-diversity, diversity-in-unity and diversity-through-unity." This is supposed to establish identity in line with difference, integration of difference to yield unity and differentiation of identity to yield diversity. "The unity-through-diversity principle is itself a kind of dialectical sublation of unification and dissociation, of reductivism and projectivism and disjunctivism." The problem is that Morin has never given the proper scientific grounding to these concepts. They have substantial humanistic value, but they cannot be used as such in a theory of anything. His 'dialogic' simply restates these principles, without giving any basis for their instantiation in reality other than reference to well-known concepts of autopoiësis, which themselves are less than adequately grounded. It is an unfortunate historical fact that Morin has continually failed to incorporate any of the complex Lupascian principles into his (easily accessible) work, nor give Lupasco credit for deep and original logical and metaphysical insight. Morin, I am afraid, in being sub-scientific, promotes yet another kind of reductionism. The dialectical logical system of Stéphane Lupasco, on the other hand, is grounded in the fundamental physical dualities of the universe, and provides principled basis for the contradictorial relations of identity and diversity, internal and external, etc. in real emergent physical processes at biological, cognitive and social levels of reality. These constitute no longer the standard formal-logical figures that Wolfgang correctly critiques, but a dynamic logic of information-with-meaning that could support a UTI. In my humble opinion, there will be continued difficulties in agreement on how the elements of information-as-process interact until something like the Lupasco dialectics (incorporated in my 'logic in reality') are introduced. If this is done, the construction of both a UTI of the Hofkirchner variety or Pedro"s conception of an Information Cluster may become a little less of a struggle. Thank you and best regards, Joseph
_______________________________________________ fis mailing list [email protected] https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
