On Information Please allow me to respectfully disagree with many of you. The term 'information' can well be defined by stringent logical-mathematical methods. It will, however, need agreement on the calssification of the kinds of information.
In preparation to an answer to the questions formulated by Pedro I prepared a short summary. As this deals with the same concept, I'd like to include it here. On recognising the properties of matter and of the intellect itself. This subject has been worked through by Thomas Aquinas in the Summa Theologiae. In today’s terminology, one may restate the following: We recognize the patterns of our perceptions. These show that different kinds of matter exist. The inner differences that we make among our impressions depend on one hand on the properties of the matter “outside”, on the other hand on the fineness of differentiation of one’s own intellect “inside”. We deduct the outside world by means of our insight into the patterns of our impressions. Since Thomas the following has been added: We have an instinctive and an intellectual set of rules of the brain. These are interdependent. The intellectual set of rules can be codified and results in formal logical sentences in formal logical languages. In this, made-up, idealized world, every sentence is related to every other sentence by means of made-up rules. A coherent system of thoughts is in itself conclusive and well-explained, and may of course be near to, or far from Reality, if Reality means that from what the system of idealized sentences has been idealized away. The set of rules may in itself be beautiful and elaborate, and this is completely disconnected to the question, whether anyone obeys them. Within the set of rules, it can not be decided, whether they have any outside consequences, therefore this question cannot be discussed and one should keep his silence about it. Recently, some have addressed the problem of inner contradictions within a well-constructed closed logical system and have come up with the following: The rules have been derived by observing something that happens regularly. Therefore, there is something what is continuously irregular. Relative to that background of perception we rejoice in recognizing that what is invariably somehow, and are proud of predicting its next occurrence. The next occurrence we distinguish re the place and the properties. We try to understand the interplay between the place and the properties of the next occurrence, because that is already a task exciting our intellectum, in the sense of perceptive organs. The thing catches our attention by its predictability. Therefore, there exists a background, less predictable, less ordered, which we use to recognize the foreground before it. Now within a closed logical system – like the human intellect is one – there cannot be unregulated processes which one uses dependably, and be it that one uses them as backgrounds. So there is a minor and a maior degree of order and the perception uses the maior degree of order to perceive before the background of the minor degree of order. This concept has been demonstrated on our traditional and other ways of dealing with the most simple logical statement there is, namely a+b=c. We have at all times a presently relevant order in existence and can relate to previous and future states of the world, and this before a multitude of aspects which are presently irrelevant. The irrelevant aspects provide a multitude of different orders which are by magnitudes more pervasive than the order, and can therefore well be used as background. Restating Thomas: the intellect knows that it is well-ordered. It can deduct, and recognize by its shortcomings, that a higher, better, (in his terms: divine) order exists. By today’s methods it is possible to relate that what is the case to that what is not the case. The order prevailing in the background is not a disorder but an order based on aspects that are irrelevant. There are always many more irrelevant aspects to a logical statement than relevant ones, so there is always a background before which we can recognize the relevance of some aspects. Information now can be understood to relate to the alternatives within the maior order, and again as relating to the properties of the maior order within (connected to, contrasted to) the minor order. This method allows very well exact and usable definitions of information. So, the vote is not unanimous. There are solid, step-by-step deictic methods of definition for the term 'information' using a+b=c. Karl 2010/12/21 Pedro C. Marijuan <pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es> > An interesting message from Qiao Tian-qing > > Note: attachments are not much welcome by the host server of this list. > --P. > > -------- Mensaje original -------- Asunto: I agree with you Fecha: Sat, > 18 Dec 2010 10:52:38 +0800 De: whhbs...@sina.com Para: > pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es > > Dear Pedro > > You said: ‘*Factually, information becomes undefinable,’ *I agree with > you.* *Claude E. Shannon also issued a statement: > > “It is almost impossible to count on a sole concept about information being > satisfactorily responsible for every possible application in general fields > ”. (Peter F. Drucker. Knowledge Work and Knowledge Society: The social > Transformations of this Century. Quoted from [Gang, L. 2007]) > > In this email’s attachment, a paper expresses my viewpoint. This paper > puts forward a definition, and its mathematical expressions, of what is > *customarily > named information*, hoping it will be helpful to end the philosophical > exploration for the concept of information. > > best regards > ---Qiao Tian-qing > > -------------------------------- > QTQ > > -- > > > _______________________________________________ > fis mailing list > fis@listas.unizar.es > https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > >
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