Dear John, Pedro, Jerry and All,
Fortunately or unfortunately, I am convinced that for further progress in
information, let alone other matters, some recognition of the limitations of
Peirce may have to be recognized. John's statement that "pragmatics means
action" can be applicable to real processes only if the pragmatics in question
includes ontological (scientific) principles and not only epistemological
classifications.
As Queiroz, Emmeche and El Hani write: "In a Peircean model, Sign, Object and
Interpretant are triadically coupled in a dynamically irreducible process. In
other words, 'information' requires a triadic pattern of determinative
relationships involving the Sign, Object and Interpretant." Information, in
this view, has a "processual nature".
In my view, this simply displaces the problem further, since the Peircean
categories themselves are derivative, epistemological constructions which
'mirror', literally and figuratively, the underlying dynamic structure of the
universe as Peirce saw it. The processes referred to by Q, E and EH are indeed
interpreter-dependent objective processes, but they admit that they cannot be
dissociated from the notion of a situated agent. Here, we have gone outside
Peirce, since the discussion of the "agent" and his/her interactions requires a
physical dialectics and logic that is absent in Peirce. To try to restate my
interpretation, to say that for effective information, or effective semiosis to
take place by having a Sign effectively communicate, by mediating the relation
between Object and Interpretant, a form from the object to Interpretant by
changing the state of the interpreter (emphasis mine) says no more than that
information is something that changes the state of an agent. In the statement
that an effective Sign, by being actualized (sic), has an actual effect on an
interpreter (NOT interpretant), Sign is simply a placeholder for an undefined
real process, since a "Sign defined as a medium for the communication of a
form" is, again, simply an analytic mirror for some reality that operates
according to as yet undefined rules.
The Peircean processual approach to information seeks to acquire additional
dynamics by distinguishing it from some structure considered as a totally
static phenomenon. What has been missed are the actual and potential dynamic
aspects of structure and form themselves - a sequence of nucleotides, for
example, not in abstracto, but in a real cell. The consequences for an
augmented theory of information, in which Peirce's work shares the theoretical
space with non-epistemic approaches, follow. To paraphrase Antonio Salieri's
famous "Prima la musica, dopo le parole", I say "first reality, then the signs".
Thank you and best wishes,
Joseph
----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----
Von: colli...@ukzn.ac.za
Datum: 20.03.2011 23:02
An: "Pedro C. Marijuan"<pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es>, <fis@listas.unizar.es>
Betreff: Re: [Fis] Hannam's Contentious Postulate
At 06:09 PM 2011/03/17, Pedro C. Marijuan wrote:
Dear
FISers,
Thanks to Loet for his modest proposal "Foundations of the Science
of (DIS) Order"... (when managing the list I really
agree!).
The comments by Jerry are much appreciated, indeed: I am eagerly waiting
for opinions and criticisms on the "knowledge recombination"
theme. However, criticisms obliged, his whole approach to science and
knowledge looks to me very interesting though rather biased.
Rhetorically, for our foundations of info & knowledge we cannot rely
on particular philosophical positions (Peircean philosophy---sorry to
disagree with John too) but on scientific-disciplinary "facts"
or theories. When Jerry talks about "new interpretations of signs
from nature" he is cavalierly forgetting the action side, the
practice: "In the beginning was the deed!" (Faustian motto
emphasized by neuroscientist Alain Berthoz in his "The Brain's Sense
of Movement", 2000---- the "fact" and not the
"concept"). In neuroscience, in ecological psychology & the
motor approach to consciousness, the perceptual cycle of
action-perception cannot be reduced to any of the two branches alone. In
cognitive terms, theory has always to accompany practice, and viceversa.
Methologies, measurements, etc., are a crucial ingredient of knowledge,
that refer to our own actions ---not just to "signs" of
nature.
Sorry, Pedro, but I fail to understand your distinction between a
Peircean view and the one you are advocating. Peirce based his views on
pragmatics, which means action. There is something severely wrong
here.
Regards,
John
Professor John Collier, Acting HoS and Acting Deputy HoS
colli...@ukzn.ac.za
Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South
Africa
T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292 F:
+27 (31) 260 3031
http://collier.ukzn.ac.za/
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