Replying to Gavin -- I think you make the 'error of misplaced concreteness'. Information theory -- and all theories and laws are modeling tools, not actual phenomena. So, it is also true that when an apple falls it is not being pulled by gravitation. Gravitation is our way of understanding the falling. We all know these things, so it seems to me that there is no need to point this out.
STAN On Sat, Apr 9, 2011 at 11:45 PM, Gavin Ritz <garr...@xtra.co.nz> wrote: > Ted > > > Thank you Mark. This promises to be interesting. > > My view may best be introduced by stating that I believe we are in the > business of creating a new science that will depend on new abstractions. > These abstractions will extend from the notion of "information" as a first > class citizen, as opposed to our default, the "particle." The latter has > qualities that can be measured and in fact the very idea of metrics is > bound > to this notion of thingness. > > GR: I just can't see the evidence that information has anything to do with > living organisms. > > > > Much of the dialog here works with the problem of naming what that it is. > > GR: They look more like logical operators, such as Imperative logic, > declarative logic and interrogative logic. > > > > Having said that... > > > 1. Is it necessary/useful/reasonable to make a strict > distinction between information as a phenomenon and information measures as > quantitative or qualitative characteristics of information? > > I am rather certain that there is a very real distinction, because of how > we > define the problem. After all, we are not asking how do information and > information metrics fit within the confines of rather limited abstractions. > At least I am not. But the distinction does not allow for full > orthogonality > from set theory (the formalism of things), because we want to be able to > model and engineer observable phenomenon in a cleaner way. This should be > the test of any serious proposal, in my view. > > This requirement is why discussion on these matters often moves into > category theory, > > GR: It moves into Category theory and Topos my guess is because it's the > very basic framework of logic. > > > > 2. Are there types or kinds of information that are not > encompassed by the general theory of information (GTI)? > > GR: for one no living organism uses Information theory constructs to > communicate with each other. ie direct languaging. > > GR: Information theory is a construct used by our society to control > machines. > > > > 3. Is it necessary/useful/reasonable to make a distinction > between information and an information carrier? > > GR: Only if we can find direct scientific evidence that organisms use > information theory constructs to communicate directly. So far none has been > found. > > > > Clearly there is a system-level conveyance of information > > GR: It's not so clear. If I can be pointed to one experiment that proves > there is such a thing as information theory constructs within living > organism I will be very excited. > > > that "carries" an organizational imperative. > > > GR: More like DNA is an Imperative logical operator. > > > I am intrigued by the notion introduced here recently that suggests > "intelligence" as inhabiting this new, non-parametrizable space. > > GR: oops. > > Regards > Gavin > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > fis mailing list > fis@listas.unizar.es > https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis >
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