Dear Guy, Mark and FIS colleagues,
This misunderstanding may be solved with simple step - if we will accept
definition of information as a kind of reflection, which is internal
structure in the "thing" but not the whole "thing" .
Friendly regards
Krassimir
-----Original Message-----
From: Guy A Hoelzer
Sent: Wednesday, June 08, 2011 7:08 PM
To: Foundations of Information Science Information Science
Cc: Mark Burgin
Subject: Re: [Fis] ON INFORMATION THEORY--Mark Burgin, Colophon
Hi Mark,
The only part that I take exception to is at the end of your colophon.
Specifically, I disagree with the statement “it is evident that to consider
that everything IS information is unreasonable and contradicts principles of
science.” I see contrast, or difference, as fundamental to the concept of
information. All ‘things’ must be bounded such that there is a distinction
between the inside and outside of the thing; therefore I don’t see how it is
possible or reasonable for anything not to be information.
Regards,
Guy
On 6/7/11 6:34 PM, "Mark Burgin" <mbur...@math.ucla.edu> wrote:
Discussion colophon
Dear all participants of the discussion (active and passive),
I would like to express my gratitude to Pedro for asking me to start a
discussion about basic problems of information theory and methodology, in
which many qualified researchers have participated. I also appreciate
efforts of all active participants of the discussion, who shared their
interesting ideas related to information theory and practice, and especially
to Joseph Brenner, who expertly distilled communication of different
participants separating more or less direct answer to the suggested
questions. As these questions have quintessential importance for information
theory and methodology, I would like to suggest tentative answers to these
questions, giving arguments in support of this approach.
Question 1. Is it necessary/useful/reasonable to make a strict distinction
between information as a phenomenon and information measures as quantitative
or qualitative characteristics of information?
All educated people understand that a person and her/his measure, for
example height, are essentially different entities. It’s impossible to
reduce a person to one measure. The same is true for subatomic particles and
other physical, chemical and biological objects. However, when it comes to
information, even qualified researchers don’t feel a necessity to make a
strict distinction between information as a phenomenon and information
measures, although there are infinitely many information measures. We can
often hear and read such expressions as “Shannon information” or “Fisher
information”.
Question 2. Are there types or kinds of information that are not encompassed
by the general theory of information (GTI)?
A grounded answer to this question depends what we understand when we
say/write “types or kinds of information”, that is, on information
definitions. If we take intrinsic information definitions, then the answer
is YES as it is demonstrated in the book (Burgin, 2010).
At the same time, if we take all information definitions suggested by
different people, then the answer is NO because some of those definitions
define not information but something else, e.g., information measure or
knowledge or data. There are also other “definitions” that actually define
nothing. Naturally, these definitions and related concepts (if there are
any) are not encompassed by the GTI. However, GTI organizes all existing
knowledge on information and information processes in one unified system,
allowing one to discern information from other phenomena.
Question 3. Is it necessary/useful/reasonable to make a distinction between
information and an information carrier?
In the mundane life, it is possible not to make a distinction between
information and an information carrier. For instance, we do not make
distinctions between an envelope with a letter and the letter itself,
calling both things “a letter”, or between a book with a novel and the novel
itself, calling both things “a novel”.
At the same time, a proper theory of information demands to make a
distinction between information and an information carrier, especially,
because any thing contains information and thus, is an information carrier,
but it is evident that to consider that everything IS information is
unreasonable and contradicts principles of science.
I would appreciate any feedback to the ideas from this e-mail.
Sincerely,
Mark
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