Cari Tutti,
nei miei numerosi libri, a partire da "Economia del patrimonio
architettonico-ambientale" (1983), ho sostenuto che la triade semiotica
significazione, informazione e comunicazione attraversa il mondo biologico,
fisico e sociale e viceversa il mondo biologico, fisico e sociale
attraversa la triade semiotica significazione, informazione e
comunicazione. Quindi non ha senso pensare che il mondo informativo sia
separato dagli altri mondi (cfr. Maturana e Varela). A seconda i processi
 o modelli dei suddetti mondi che si considerano si possono usare alcune o
tutte le categorie di informazioni possibili: genetica (genealogica),
termodinamica o naturale (entropico/neg-entropica), matematica
(entropico-cibernetica)  e semantica (storico-culturale o
significato-significante). Le stesse unità autopoietiche possono allentare
o ridurre la loro auto-referenzialità mediante l'informazione-comunicazione
che supera la rigidezza o la chiusura dei loro codici. Per questo in
"Valore e valutazioni" (1999) mi sono posto in una situazione intermedia
tra Maturana-Varela e Niklas Luhmann. Per comprendere meglio il mio
approccio è necessario: assegnare all'economia il ruolo di "scienza delle
scienze" che le conferiva  anche Ernst Mach; considerare l'informazione la
"legge delle leggi" di tutte le scienze dell'uomo e della natura.l
Un abbraccio affettuoso a Tutti, da un poverino esponenziale, quale sono.
Francesco Rizzo.

2015-01-19 20:37 GMT+01:00 Joshua Augustus Bacigalupi <
bacigalupiwo...@gmail.com>:

> Josh Bacigalupi here, fellow pirate.  Thank you all for this thoughtful
> discussion.
>
> Work is a fundamental focus of Terry's project.  We can all agree that the
> creation of entropy is necessary to do work; such degradation of a gradient
> is a necessary precondition of work potential, but not just any work.  The
> specific kind of work that some self-entailed proto-cell does in its
> environment must be such that it increases the chances that such nascent
> agency will have increased the chances of its own propagation in that open
> system.  Terry calls this teleodynamic work.
>
> But this isn't even the most stringent requirement we place on ourselves.
> Not only must this work be relevant to its own persistence, *the
> constraints necessary to enact this specific dynamic must be able to
> persist for some finite time in the absence of any gradient what-so-ever.*
> In other words, Terry's hypothesized "autogen" is specifically conceived to
> retain the capacity to do self-efficacious work even after local chemical
> equalibrium has been attained.
>
> Once a gradient is again available, any viable autogen must be able to
> restart the very specific co-constraints of auto-catalysis and
> self-organized containment, a process that we suggest must be able to both
> self-repair and create new sets of co-constraint in wholly novel
> substrates.  This, in effect, spans the ontological gap from the vast
> majority of physico-chemical dynamics to the first distinct dynamic of a
> measurable medium of informational significance, whose benchmark of
> significance is the persistence of autogenic constraints.
>
> Although intriguing, we are skeptical when speculating about vastly more
> complex and likely intentional agents, like bacterium, or clearly
> intentional agents, like humans.  We suggest that focus on a priori
> intentional agency skips the distinct logical step from ubiquitous
> self-organizing dynamics, where rate of entropy production is increased
> (dissipating not only the external gradient but the internal organization
> itself), to the relatively rare "teleodynamics", where rate of entropy and
> work production are mitigated by the autogen's normative relation to its
> surroundings.
>
> Cheers,
> Josh
>
>
>
> On Sun, Jan 18, 2015 at 8:51 PM, Terrence W. DEACON <dea...@berkeley.edu>
> wrote:
>
>> Hi Joseph,
>>
>> Glad to have you join in. My goal is (paraphrasing Einstein) to
>> develop a model system that is as simple as possible but not too
>> simple to provide a foundation for formalizing the concepts of
>> reference and significance. If too simple, it would be helpful to know
>> what is specifically missing.
>>
>> In considering more complex model systems the critical constraint is
>> to avoid cryptically assuming a homuncular perspective that sneaks in
>> some undescribed mentality (often an external observational
>> perspective) to do the interpretive work and to define what
>> constitutes reference and significance. I am unwilling to use a
>> bacterium as my model, because we implicitly assume their end-directed
>> and sensing capacities without explaining them. Nor am I willing to
>> assume that nucleic acids are intrinsically informational or that
>> information is just pattern replication, as has become a common
>> assumption in many evolutionary theories.
>>
>> As I have said a number of times, my goal is not to deal with all
>> aspects of the information concept, and certainly not at the level of
>> human thought. I merely propose to dissolve the implicit dualism in
>> our current concepts at the most basic level, so that for example it
>> will be possible to develop a scientifically grounded theory of
>> molecular biosemiotics.
>>
>> As to the point that we need to consider quantum effects, I worry that
>> it also allows another black box to stand in for an explanation.
>> Quantum effects are definitely real, and though well described, their
>> interpretation is even less approachable than the concepts of
>> reference and significance in information. I worry that we risk trying
>> to explain one mystery by invoking an even greater mystery. I suspect
>> that there are aspects of quantum theory that are problematic
>> precisely because we lack a clear understanding of the referential
>> aspect of information. So the reanalysis of information that I am
>> suggesting may actually contribute to a better understanding of the
>> information provided by quantum experiments, rather than the other way
>> around. The key link is to the concept of physical work (which I argue
>> is essential for defining reference and significance). In this
>> submicroscopic domain where the concept of physical work requires a
>> different framing (though what this is is not obvious), the very
>> nature of reference must also be reframed. This is an implication of
>> this analysis that I would love to see developed.
>>
>> — Terry
>>
>> On 1/18/15, joe.bren...@bluewin.ch <joe.bren...@bluewin.ch> wrote:
>> > Dear Pedro, Terry, Bob L., Bob U., Loet, Gordana and All,
>> > I have been in transit from Switzerland to California and only now have
>> a
>> > moment to even start to comment on what has become for me one of the
>> most
>> > interesting and useful exchanges on the list.
>> > I would like to try to summarize my position as follows: I agree with
>> > Terry's mechanism and I disagree with his model. As others have said
>> much
>> > better than I, Terry has made a major contribution to information
>> science
>> > (and philosophy) with his description of orthodynamic, morphodynamic and
>> > teleodynamic processes. It can and should form the basis of all claims
>> that
>> > informational processes can have reference and display significance.
>> > On the other hand, for reasons that I cannot completely express, the
>> > autogenic model system does not, as they say here in the U.S. "work"
>> for me.
>> > It is stated to be simple, the simplest model, and the possibility
>> exists
>> > that it is too simple. We are by now all in agreement about the
>> shortcomings
>> > of autopoesis. But in a similar vein, in my paper in Information on
>> Terry's
>> > book, Incomplete Nature, I suggested that the discussion of
>> 'information as
>> > absence', a profound concept introduced by Terry, needed to be
>> supplemented
>> > by maintenance, in part, of 'information as presence'. Reciprocal
>> > autocatalysis, also, is by no means a concept that does not still retain
>> > many assumptions, for example, how is reciprocity achieved, what are its
>> > implications and what is the meaning of 'auto'. Essential aspects of the
>> > evolutionary dynamics of information may be inexpressible in the current
>> > autogenic model due to what appear to me to be a lack of sufficiently
>> deep
>> > roots in quantum mechanics.
>> > I thus see a very valuable ontological (pace Jeremy) critique of Terry's
>> > work in progress from at least five or six perspectives, including my
>> own.
>> > Thank you and best wishes for 2015,
>> > Joseph
>> > ----Message d'origine----
>> > De : dea...@berkeley.edu
>> > Date : 18/01/2015 - 13:22 (PST)
>> > À : gordana.dodig-crnko...@mdh.se
>> > Cc : fis@listas.unizar.es
>> > Objet : Re: [Fis] THE NEW YEAR ESSAY AND FOUR GREAT SCIENTIFIC DOMAINS
>> Fis
>> > Digest, Vol 10, Issue 11
>> > Typo in line 7 (correction)
>> > experimentally determine whether or not it "works" as proposed.
>> > On Sun, Jan 18, 2015 at 1:20 PM, Terrence W. DEACON <
>> dea...@berkeley.edu>
>> > wrote:
>> > Gordana's response provides a wonderful opening for digging into some
>> of the
>> > most challenging and subtle issues lurking behind this essay.
>> > For now I will respond to the comparison between autopoiesis and
>> autogenesis
>> > and what can and cannot be learned from each. In many ways this
>> comparison
>> > is at the center of the conceptual challenge I offer.
>> > First, autopoiesis is a philosophical concept. Though various model
>> systems
>> > have been proposed that purport to embody its logic, it is not an
>> > empirically testable hypothesis that would allow one to experimentally
>> > determine whether or n to it "works" as proposed.
>> > Here is the definition that Maturana and Varela provided in 1980:
>> > [an autopoietic system as one that] "constitutes itself ... as a
>> concrete
>> > unity ... by specifying the topological domain of its realization ..."
>> "So
>> > an “autopoietic machine” is one that collectively produces its material
>> > components as well as the network of relations between them that
>> constitutes
>> > their unity in a discrete physical location."
>> > These latter properties are not attributed to any separate and
>> distinctive
>> > mechanism over and above the closed co-production of components and yet
>> are
>> > essential defining attributes. Indeed, this organization is described
>> as the
>> > "fundamental variable which it maintains constant"  (p. 79).
>> > In simple terms, autopoiesis is a highly abstract account  of what must
>> be
>> > the case for something to be a living organism. In this respect I
>> consider
>> > it to be an updated restatement of Kant's concept of the
>> self-organization
>> > that constitutes an organism, with the added stipulation that it also
>> > somehow [how?] determines systemic unity and coherence.
>> > Here is Kant in 1790:
>> > “An organized being is then not a mere machine, for that has merely
>> motive
>> > power, but it possesses in itself formative power of a self-propagating
>> kind
>> > which it communicates to its materials though they have it not of
>> > themselves.” (p. 558) and “... every part ... is there for the sake of
>> the
>> > other (reciprocally as end, and at the same time, means).” (p. 557)
>> > Kant concludes that this isn't sufficient to determine intrinsic
>> teleology
>> > (and by implication insufficient to determine that the concepts of
>> function
>> > and adaptation, much less information). And that these are not intrinsic
>> > attributes of organisms. I believe that that he is right to concludes
>> that
>> > these attributes alone only provide justification for assuming that
>> > teleological attribute are descriptive glosses, not intrinsic to
>> > organisms—assigned from a sort of extrinsic transcendental perspective.
>> > In a striking parallel, the evolutionary biologist J. B. S. Haldane
>> gave the
>> > following definition of life in 1929: “A simple organism must consist of
>> > parts A, B, C, D, and so on, each of which can multiply only in the
>> presence
>> > of all, or almost all, of the others.” (p. 245)
>> > The fundamental problem is that the autopoiesis description requires—but
>> > does not provide—an explanation for how organizational unity is
>> generated
>> > and maintained. Like Kant and Haldan M & V merely assume the presence of
>> > some means of maintaining this co-productive unity of interdependent
>> > components. And yet, it is individuation of a self (a beneficiary) that
>> > "acts on its own behalf" (to quote Stu Kauffman's definition of
>> autonomous
>> > agency) that is the critical  feature that enables us to locate
>> intrinsic
>> > teleological organization.
>> > I argue that autogenesis is, in contrast, is an empirically testable
>> model
>> > system, whose attributes can be verified or falsified. That among these
>> > attributes are those that constitute autonomous agency, self-repair,
>> > reproduction, and even evolvability in a limited sense. And finally,
>> that
>> > this is what allows us to precisely identify the intrinsic presence of
>> an
>> > interpretive dynamic for which reference and significance (i.e. the
>> > assignment of value) to a discrete physical individuated system. Not
>> > surprisingly, M & V argue that autopoiesis is a separate phenomenon from
>> > reproductive, evolutionary, and representational processes (and they
>> deny
>> > the reality of representation, which is a central attribute being
>> explained
>> > in my proposal).
>> > Where we are in agreement, however, is that the dynamic that constitutes
>> > living should also be the dynamic that constitutes mentality. But given
>> the
>> > differences listed above and described in my essay, to confuse these two
>> > concepts is to miss the very essence of my argument. Moreover, as I
>> > indicated at the conclusion of my essay, the analysis of reference and
>> > significance that can be formalized using this approach still is a long
>> ways
>> > from an account of the phenomenology of human subjective experience. In
>> > Incomplete Nature I argue that mental experience is at least a second
>> order
>> > variant of the dynamics that characterizes autogenesis.
>> > So although some have claimed that autogenesis provides an empirically
>> > realizable exemplar of a process that could be characterized as
>> autopoietic,
>> > I think that this misses the crucial point. Autopoiesis theory fails to
>> even
>> > describe what is most essential: the nature of the dynamic that
>> generates
>> > the coherent individuation of an autonomous agent. Not surprisingly, it
>> has
>> > nothing constructive to say about information theory and how it might be
>> > possible to formalize a theory of reference and significance. Indeed,
>> as M &
>> > V claim, these don't really exist as physical phenomena but are rather
>> > givens in some sort of solipsistic embodied idealism.
>> > As for studying the problem at many levels from bacterial communication
>> to
>> > social organization, it should be clear that I believe that the
>> conceptual
>> > challenge demands that we work at many levels of information science
>> (in the
>> > broad sense) at once, recognizing that the ultimate goal is to get
>> beyond
>> > our current methodological dualism. As I noted, my goal in this essay is
>> > only to work at the very bottom of the problem in recognition of the
>> fact
>> > that without this most basic foundation the larger goals will remain
>> out of
>> > reach.
>> > It is the possibility of legitimizing reference and significance as
>> > scientific concepts with solid empirical foundation that makes it
>> reasonable
>> > to imagine such a larger vision, as Pedro has intimated. I believe that
>> > succeeding at this lowest level project could provide a new perspective
>> for
>> > understanding subjective and social phenomena, and possibly even help to
>> > identify and implement a novel approach to "computing."
>> > — Terry
>> > On Sun, Jan 18, 2015 at 12:34 AM, Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic
>> > <gordana.dodig-crnko...@mdh.se> wrote:
>> > Dear colleagues,
>> > Even though I agree with all Jeremy writes in his new post, I would
>> still
>> > return back to the opposite side (where Pedro’s previous post left us)
>> and
>> > try to think about the big picture.
>> > I am sure there will be many FISers who will take the challenge of
>> > discussing the details of construction of an autogen as a bridge between
>> > meaning and mechanism.
>> > In his first post, Jeremy wrote:
>> > “Terry and the Pirates have a long standing rule: One cannot employ as
>> > explanation that which hasn't yet been explained. Failing to hold this
>> > standard opens researchers up to merely taxonomical work, positing
>> forces,
>> > properties
>> >  and capacities defined solely by their consequences, in effect
>> mistaking
>> > questions as answers. Hence, our focus on exploring reference at its
>> > earliest possible emergence, and explaining exactly how that emergence
>> > occurs, since emergence is also a question,
>> >  not an answer, an explanandum not an explanans.”
>> > “We Pirates do what we can to stay on the epistemological methodist
>> side of
>> > things.”
>> > Epistemological methodism is explained as the opposite of
>> epistemological
>> > particularism, which is the belief that one can know something without
>> > knowing how one knows that thing. So according to epistemological
>> > Methodists,
>> >  for me to know implies not only that I know that I know but even that I
>> > know
>> > how I know. It is a very strong assumption.
>> > It seems to me to exclude constructive approaches to knowledge
>> generation.
>> > When we construct, we simply use elements that suit the purpose of
>> > construction. There is no very hard requirement to understand bricks.
>> How do
>> > we
>> >  conceptualize knowledge and knowing? What does it mean “to know” and
>> “to
>> > know that we know”? How detailed, precise and formal knowledge should
>> be for
>> > me to claim “I know”?
>> > For example I can say: we know that the universe consists of
>> matter/energy
>> > in space/time. But how much indeed do we know about it? Only a small
>> > fraction (<5%?) of the content of the universe seems to be made of
>> > matter/energy
>> >  while the majority of the universe is made of dark matter/dark energy
>> and
>> > at the moment we do not know what they are. This sounds like a very
>> > pessimistic view of our present knowledge. However I strongly believe
>> that
>> > this state must be temporary and that a
>> >  new break-through will come soon. It may happen in the similar way as
>> in
>> > the time of Planck, who solved the problem of the ultraviolet
>> catastrophe,
>> > (a prediction of late 19th century/early 20th century classical physics
>> that
>> > an ideal black body at thermal
>> >  equilibrium will emit radiation with infinite power). Some assumptions
>> > (something that we believe we know and we probably even believe that we
>> know
>> > why we know) are simply wrong.
>> > Knowledge is a dynamic, nonlinear, adaptive, learning system.
>> > That is why the suggestion to study information not only on the level of
>> > physics and chemistry in a well-defined simplified system, but on many
>> > different levels of abstraction is relevant. Some people (Alexej Kurakin
>> > for
>> >  example, (Kurakin, 2011)) see fractal structures that govern
>> generation of
>> > information, from atoms to human societies, and one can learn about the
>> > properties of one level from the observed patterns on some other levels.
>> > The
>> >  reason to look at the fuzzy “big picture” at the same time as we
>> construct
>> > much more coherent, crispy and convincing detailed aspects of it is that
>> > they are inseparably connected. The role of unexplained pieces in the
>> > theoretical framework is as placeholders.
>> >  Like in lazy evaluation, we do not do anything about it until we learn
>> more
>> > at some point.
>> > (In programming language theory, lazy evaluation, or call-by-need[1] is
>> an
>> > evaluation strategy which delays the evaluation of an expression until
>> its
>> > value is needed (non-strict evaluation) and which also avoids repeated
>> >  evaluations (sharing).[2][3] The sharing can reduce the running time of
>> > certain functions by an exponential factor over other non-strict
>> evaluation
>> > strategies, such as call-by-name.
>> > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lazy_evaluation)
>> > This is not meant as a critique of Terry’s approach, which is
>> fascinating
>> > elegant, and refreshing among many fuzzy discussions about the nature of
>> > reference and significance. However, connections and integration with
>> other
>> >  levels and perspectives on information might be instructive and
>> worthwhile,
>> > especially from Terry who has done so much research on higher levels.
>> Such
>> > as e.g. in Harrington et al. (2001). “Science, culture, meaning,
>> values: a
>> > dialogue” Annals of the New York
>> >  Academy of Sciences. and of course even more in Deacon T. (2012) the
>> > Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. Norton & Company
>> > What might be interesting on the synthetic side (as the opposite side
>> of the
>> > analytic one as presented in the New Year’s Essay) would be integration
>> of
>> > levels that Terry has in the Incomplete Nature, based on the dynamics
>> >  of information, where information has different meaning on different
>> levels
>> > of abstraction/organisation. In the similar way as an autogen, as a
>> > self-organizing unit that preserves itself
>> > dynamically and grows via a combination of autocatalysis and
>> self-assembly,
>> > our knowledge grows dynamically and the meaning of pieces changes
>> > accordingly. In other words, it is not only self-organizing but also
>> > self-generating. Different scientific domains
>> >  support and regulate each other; different “domain-specific” (or
>> > “science-specific”) models can help better construction or generation of
>> > knowledge of the whole as well as of the details. Specifically, it
>> might be
>> > useful to connect to computing (as information
>> >  dynamics), as Pedro suggests.
>> > Computing (Rosenbloom, “The Fourth Great Scientific Domain”) seen as
>> > information dynamics, goes together with the physical, the biological,
>> and
>> > the social. The project of naturalization proceeds by connecting all
>> four
>> > domains.
>> >  (Dodig-Crnkovic, 2014) The attractiveness of the project as Terry’s (as
>> > presented in the Incomplete Nature) is in its contribution to the
>> > naturalization of reference and significance – concepts that still are
>> > highly mystified in the eyes of many.
>> > At the end, I have two questions.
>> > First the particular one. I would like to know what exactly is the
>> > difference between autogenesis and autopoiesis? It seems to me that
>> > autogenesis as it looks like from Terry’s Opening Essay is a step
>> before the
>> > whole system
>> >  can be integrated and said to be alive. On the other hand autopoiesis
>> is
>> > the process of life of an organism such as cell with all properties of a
>> > living organism. Autogen seems to me as a chemical automaton while
>> > autopoetic system is alive. The theory
>> >  of autopoiesis is descriptive and qualitative. It does not make the
>> > insights made by Maturana and Varela less important. Understanding
>> > autopoiesis as cognition makes a vital connection between mind and
>> matter.
>> > Like Pedro, I also believe that study of the behavior of prokaryotic
>> cells
>> > such as bacteria is useful as it can reveal a lot about information
>> > processing as social cognition (Ben-Jacob,
>> >  Becker, & Shapira, 2004; Ben-Jacob, Shapira, & Tauber, 2006, 2011;
>> > Ben-Jacob, 2008, 2009a, 2009b) (Ng & Bassler, 2009; Waters & Bassler,
>> 2005).
>> >
>> > There is a lot we don't know about such complex systems as bacteria but
>> we
>> > can learn relevant things even if we apply “lazy evaluation” strategy
>> for
>> > many parts in the model. In other words, it should be possible and
>> > reasonable
>> >  to build knowledge even though we do not know (enough) about parts we
>> build
>> > from and their mutual interactions.
>> > My second question, the general one, goes back to Pedro’s post:  how
>> the New
>> > Year’s Essay connects to the big picture with four great scientific
>> > domains?
>> > With best regards,
>> > Gordana
>> > References
>> > Ben-Jacob, E. (2008). Social behavior of bacteria: from physics to
>> complex
>> > organization. The European Physical Journal B, 65(3), 315–322.
>> > Ben-Jacob, E. (2009a). Bacterial Complexity: More Is Different on All
>> > Levels. In S. Nakanishi, R. Kageyama, & D. Watanabe (Eds.), Systems
>> Biology-
>> > The Challenge of Complexity (pp. 25–35). Tokyo Berlin Heidelberg New
>> York:
>> >  Springer.
>> > Ben-Jacob, E. (2009b). Learning from Bacteria about Natural Information
>> > Processing. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1178, 78–90.
>> > Ben-Jacob, E., Becker, I., & Shapira, Y. (2004). Bacteria Linguistic
>> > Communication and Social Intelligence. Trends in Microbiology, 12(8),
>> > 366–372.
>> > Ben-Jacob, E., Shapira, Y., & Tauber, A. I. (2006). Seeking the
>> Foundations
>> > of Cognition in Bacteria. Physica A, 359, 495–524.
>> > Ben-Jacob, E., Shapira, Y., & Tauber, A. I. (2011). Smart Bacteria. In
>> L.
>> > Margulis, C. A. Asikainen, & W. E. Krumbein (Eds.), Chimera and
>> > Consciousness. Evolution of the Sensory Self. Cambridge Boston: MIT
>> Press.
>> > Dodig-Crnkovic, G. (2014). Modeling Life as Cognitive Info-Computation.
>> In
>> > A. Beckmann, E. Csuhaj-Varjú, & K. Meer (Eds.), Computability in Europe
>> > 2014. LNCS (pp. 153–162). Berlin Heidelberg: Springer.
>> > Kurakin, A. (2011). The self-organizing fractal theory as a universal
>> > discovery method: the phenomenon of life. Theoretical Biology and
>> Medical
>> > Modelling, 8(4). Retrieved from http://www.tbiomed.com/content/8/1/4
>> > Ng, W.-L., & Bassler, B. L. (2009). Bacterial quorum-sensing network
>> > architectures. Annual Review of Genetics, 43, 197–222.
>> > Waters, C. M., & Bassler, B. L. (2005). Quorum Sensing: Cell-to-Cell
>> > Communication in Bacteria. Annual Review of Cell and Developmental
>> Biology,
>> > 21, 319–346.
>> > http://www.ait.gu.se/kontaktaoss/personal/gordana-dodig-crnkovic
>> > http://www.mrtc.mdh.se/~gdc/
>> > From: Jeremy Sherman <mindreadersdiction...@gmail.com>
>> > Date: Sunday 18 January 2015 03:41
>> > To: fis <fis@listas.unizar.es>
>> > Subject: Re: [Fis] Fis Digest, Vol 10, Issue 11
>> > It would be satisfying perhaps to think of our collective work as at the
>> > forefront of the development of what will become A Grand Domain of
>> Science,
>> > but I would say the better trend in current science is toward careful
>> >  integration between domains rather than toward established grand
>> divisions,
>> > which seems a more a classical approach. Doesn't information play out
>> in the
>> > biological and the social domains? Isn't our most ambitious goal here to
>> > explain scientifically the relationship
>> >  between information and the physical domain?
>> > Whether modest or foolhardy as Terry suggests or of some other stature,
>> > Terry's approach addresses the source of the great schism in all
>> academic
>> > and intellectual circles: Physical scientists are appropriately barred
>> from
>> > explaining
>> >  behavior in terms of the value of information for some end-directed
>> self
>> > about, or representative of anything. But biological and social
>> scientists
>> > can't help but explain behavior in those terms. Focusing, precisely on
>> > possible transitions from the physical
>> >  domain to the living and social domains is exactly what a scientific
>> > approach demands.
>> > Lacking an explanation for the transition from mechanism to end-directed
>> > behavior (which is inescapably teleological down to its roots in
>> function or
>> > adaptation--behaviors of value to a self about its environment),
>> science is
>> > stuck,
>> >  siloed into isolated domains without a rationale.
>> > To my mind, this makes the implications of meticulous work at the very
>> > border between mechanism and end-directed behavior anything but modest
>> in
>> > its possible implications. In this I agree with Pedro. With what we now
>> know
>> > about self-organization--
>> >  how it is footing on the physical side for a bridge from mechanism to
>> > end-directed behavior but does not itself provide the bridge,  we are
>> > perfectly poised to build the bridge itself, through an integrated
>> science
>> > that explains the ontology of epistemology,
>> >  providing solid scientific ground over the absolutely huge gaping hole
>> in
>> > the middle of the broadest reaches of scientific and philosophical
>> > endeavor.
>> > Whether Terry's work or someone else's work bridges that gap, I predict
>> > that, at long last, the gap can and will be finally filled, probably
>> within
>> > the next decade. As ambitious researchers this would be a lousy time
>> for any
>> > of us,
>> >  Terry included, to stick to our guns in the face of substantial
>> critique
>> > revealing how a theory we embrace merely provides a new, more clever
>> way way
>> > to hide or smear over the gap pretending it isn't there, which is why I
>> > would love to see this discussion
>> >  refocus on the article's detailed content. Though the implications of
>> this
>> > research at the borderline may be grand, the research, in the doing, is
>> as
>> > Terry implies as modest any careful scientific work.
>> > Jeremy Sherman
>> > On Sat, Jan 17, 2015 at 5:06 AM, Moisés André Nisenbaum
>> > <moises.nisenb...@ifrj.edu.br> wrote:
>> > Hi, Pedro.
>> > I didnt receive th image (Figure 1. The Four Great Domains of Science)
>> > Would you please send it again?
>> > Thank you.
>> > Moises
>> > 2015-01-17 9:00 GMT-02:00 <fis-requ...@listas.unizar.es>:
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>> > Today's Topics:
>> >    1. Re: Beginnings and ends---Steps to a theory of reference &
>> >       significance (Pedro C. Marijuan)
>> > ---------- Mensagem encaminhada ----------
>> > From: "Pedro C. Marijuan" <pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es>
>> > To: "'fis'" <fis@listas.unizar.es>
>> > Cc:
>> > Date: Fri, 16 Jan 2015 12:43:40 +0100
>> > Subject: Re: [Fis] Beginnings and ends---Steps to a theory of reference
>> &
>> > significance
>> > Dear Terry and FIS colleagues---and pirates,
>> > Just a brief reflection on the below.
>> > (From Terry's last message)...
>> > So my goal in this case is quite modest, and yet perhaps also a bit
>> > foolhardy. I want to suggest a simplest possible model system to use
>> > as the basis for formalizing the link between physical processes and
>> > semiotic processes. Perhaps someday after considerably elaborating
>> > this analysis it could contribute to issues of the psychology of human
>> > interactions. I hope to recruit some interest into pursuing this goal.
>> > In my view, any research endeavor is also accompanied by some "ultimate"
>> > goals or ends that go beyond the quite explicit disciplinary ones. In
>> this
>> > case, say, about the destiny of the constructs that would surround the
>> > information concept (or the possibility
>> >  of framing an informational perspective, or a renewed information
>> science,
>> > or whatever), wouldn't it be interesting discussing in extenso what
>> could
>> > that ultimate vision?
>> > I mean, most of us may agree in quite many points related to the
>> > microphysical (& thermodynamic) underpinning of information, as it
>> > transpires in the exchanges we are having--but where do we want to
>> arrive
>> > finally with the construction activity?
>> > I tend to disagree with localist aims, even though at the time being
>> they
>> > may look more prudent and parsimonious. Putting it in brief, too
>> briefly!,
>> >  and borrowing from Rosenbloom (P.S. 2013. On Computing: The Fourth
>> Great
>> > Scientific Domain) the idea is that information science, properly
>> developed
>> > and linked with computer science and mathematics, should constitute one
>> of
>> > the Great Domains of contemporary
>> >  science. The informational would go together with the physical, the
>> > biological, and the social: constituting the four great domains of
>> science.
>> > See Figure below. Rather than attempting the construction of another
>> average
>> > or standard discipline, information
>> >  science is about the making out of one of the “great scientific
>> domains” of
>> > contemporary knowledge.
>> > More cogent arguments could be elaborated on how to cover
>> sceintifically the
>> > whole "information world" (human societies, behaving individuals, brain
>> > organization, cellular processes, biomolecules) and the problem of
>> > interlocking--crisscrossing a myriad of information
>> >  flows at all levels. But the point is, "ends", although unassailable,
>> may
>> > be as much important as "beginnings".
>> > Thanks in advance for the patience!
>> > ---Pedro
>> >
>> > Figure 1. The Four Great Domains of Science.
>> >  The graphic shows the network of contemporary disciplines in the
>> > background;
>> > while the superimposed “four-leaf clover” represents the four great
>> > scientific domains.
>> > --
>> > -------------------------------------------------
>> > Pedro C. Marijuán
>> > Grupo de Bioinformación / Bioinformation Group
>> > Instituto Aragonés de Ciencias de la Salud
>> > Centro de Investigación Biomédica de Aragón (CIBA)
>> > Avda. San Juan Bosco, 13, planta X
>> > 50009 Zaragoza, Spain
>> > Tfno. +34 976 71 3526 (& 6818)
>> > pcmarijuan.iacs@aragon.eshttp://sites.google.com/site/pedrocmarijuan/
>> > -------------------------------------------------
>> > _______________________________________________
>> > Fis mailing list
>> > Fis@listas.unizar.es
>> > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
>> > --
>> > Moisés André Nisenbaum
>> > Doutorando IBICT/UFRJ. Professor. Msc.
>> > Instituto Federal do Rio de Janeiro - IFRJ
>> > Campus Maracanã
>> > moises.nisenb...@ifrj.edu.br
>> > _______________________________________________
>> > Fis mailing list
>> > Fis@listas.unizar.es
>> > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
>> > --
>> > Professor Terrence W. Deacon
>> > University of California, Berkeley
>> > --
>> > Professor Terrence W. Deacon
>> > University of California, Berkeley
>> >
>>
>>
>> --
>> Professor Terrence W. Deacon
>> University of California, Berkeley
>>
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