Cari Tutti, nei miei numerosi libri, a partire da "Economia del patrimonio architettonico-ambientale" (1983), ho sostenuto che la triade semiotica significazione, informazione e comunicazione attraversa il mondo biologico, fisico e sociale e viceversa il mondo biologico, fisico e sociale attraversa la triade semiotica significazione, informazione e comunicazione. Quindi non ha senso pensare che il mondo informativo sia separato dagli altri mondi (cfr. Maturana e Varela). A seconda i processi o modelli dei suddetti mondi che si considerano si possono usare alcune o tutte le categorie di informazioni possibili: genetica (genealogica), termodinamica o naturale (entropico/neg-entropica), matematica (entropico-cibernetica) e semantica (storico-culturale o significato-significante). Le stesse unità autopoietiche possono allentare o ridurre la loro auto-referenzialità mediante l'informazione-comunicazione che supera la rigidezza o la chiusura dei loro codici. Per questo in "Valore e valutazioni" (1999) mi sono posto in una situazione intermedia tra Maturana-Varela e Niklas Luhmann. Per comprendere meglio il mio approccio è necessario: assegnare all'economia il ruolo di "scienza delle scienze" che le conferiva anche Ernst Mach; considerare l'informazione la "legge delle leggi" di tutte le scienze dell'uomo e della natura.l Un abbraccio affettuoso a Tutti, da un poverino esponenziale, quale sono. Francesco Rizzo.
2015-01-19 20:37 GMT+01:00 Joshua Augustus Bacigalupi < bacigalupiwo...@gmail.com>: > Josh Bacigalupi here, fellow pirate. Thank you all for this thoughtful > discussion. > > Work is a fundamental focus of Terry's project. We can all agree that the > creation of entropy is necessary to do work; such degradation of a gradient > is a necessary precondition of work potential, but not just any work. The > specific kind of work that some self-entailed proto-cell does in its > environment must be such that it increases the chances that such nascent > agency will have increased the chances of its own propagation in that open > system. Terry calls this teleodynamic work. > > But this isn't even the most stringent requirement we place on ourselves. > Not only must this work be relevant to its own persistence, *the > constraints necessary to enact this specific dynamic must be able to > persist for some finite time in the absence of any gradient what-so-ever.* > In other words, Terry's hypothesized "autogen" is specifically conceived to > retain the capacity to do self-efficacious work even after local chemical > equalibrium has been attained. > > Once a gradient is again available, any viable autogen must be able to > restart the very specific co-constraints of auto-catalysis and > self-organized containment, a process that we suggest must be able to both > self-repair and create new sets of co-constraint in wholly novel > substrates. This, in effect, spans the ontological gap from the vast > majority of physico-chemical dynamics to the first distinct dynamic of a > measurable medium of informational significance, whose benchmark of > significance is the persistence of autogenic constraints. > > Although intriguing, we are skeptical when speculating about vastly more > complex and likely intentional agents, like bacterium, or clearly > intentional agents, like humans. We suggest that focus on a priori > intentional agency skips the distinct logical step from ubiquitous > self-organizing dynamics, where rate of entropy production is increased > (dissipating not only the external gradient but the internal organization > itself), to the relatively rare "teleodynamics", where rate of entropy and > work production are mitigated by the autogen's normative relation to its > surroundings. > > Cheers, > Josh > > > > On Sun, Jan 18, 2015 at 8:51 PM, Terrence W. DEACON <dea...@berkeley.edu> > wrote: > >> Hi Joseph, >> >> Glad to have you join in. My goal is (paraphrasing Einstein) to >> develop a model system that is as simple as possible but not too >> simple to provide a foundation for formalizing the concepts of >> reference and significance. If too simple, it would be helpful to know >> what is specifically missing. >> >> In considering more complex model systems the critical constraint is >> to avoid cryptically assuming a homuncular perspective that sneaks in >> some undescribed mentality (often an external observational >> perspective) to do the interpretive work and to define what >> constitutes reference and significance. I am unwilling to use a >> bacterium as my model, because we implicitly assume their end-directed >> and sensing capacities without explaining them. Nor am I willing to >> assume that nucleic acids are intrinsically informational or that >> information is just pattern replication, as has become a common >> assumption in many evolutionary theories. >> >> As I have said a number of times, my goal is not to deal with all >> aspects of the information concept, and certainly not at the level of >> human thought. I merely propose to dissolve the implicit dualism in >> our current concepts at the most basic level, so that for example it >> will be possible to develop a scientifically grounded theory of >> molecular biosemiotics. >> >> As to the point that we need to consider quantum effects, I worry that >> it also allows another black box to stand in for an explanation. >> Quantum effects are definitely real, and though well described, their >> interpretation is even less approachable than the concepts of >> reference and significance in information. I worry that we risk trying >> to explain one mystery by invoking an even greater mystery. I suspect >> that there are aspects of quantum theory that are problematic >> precisely because we lack a clear understanding of the referential >> aspect of information. So the reanalysis of information that I am >> suggesting may actually contribute to a better understanding of the >> information provided by quantum experiments, rather than the other way >> around. The key link is to the concept of physical work (which I argue >> is essential for defining reference and significance). In this >> submicroscopic domain where the concept of physical work requires a >> different framing (though what this is is not obvious), the very >> nature of reference must also be reframed. This is an implication of >> this analysis that I would love to see developed. >> >> — Terry >> >> On 1/18/15, joe.bren...@bluewin.ch <joe.bren...@bluewin.ch> wrote: >> > Dear Pedro, Terry, Bob L., Bob U., Loet, Gordana and All, >> > I have been in transit from Switzerland to California and only now have >> a >> > moment to even start to comment on what has become for me one of the >> most >> > interesting and useful exchanges on the list. >> > I would like to try to summarize my position as follows: I agree with >> > Terry's mechanism and I disagree with his model. As others have said >> much >> > better than I, Terry has made a major contribution to information >> science >> > (and philosophy) with his description of orthodynamic, morphodynamic and >> > teleodynamic processes. It can and should form the basis of all claims >> that >> > informational processes can have reference and display significance. >> > On the other hand, for reasons that I cannot completely express, the >> > autogenic model system does not, as they say here in the U.S. "work" >> for me. >> > It is stated to be simple, the simplest model, and the possibility >> exists >> > that it is too simple. We are by now all in agreement about the >> shortcomings >> > of autopoesis. But in a similar vein, in my paper in Information on >> Terry's >> > book, Incomplete Nature, I suggested that the discussion of >> 'information as >> > absence', a profound concept introduced by Terry, needed to be >> supplemented >> > by maintenance, in part, of 'information as presence'. Reciprocal >> > autocatalysis, also, is by no means a concept that does not still retain >> > many assumptions, for example, how is reciprocity achieved, what are its >> > implications and what is the meaning of 'auto'. Essential aspects of the >> > evolutionary dynamics of information may be inexpressible in the current >> > autogenic model due to what appear to me to be a lack of sufficiently >> deep >> > roots in quantum mechanics. >> > I thus see a very valuable ontological (pace Jeremy) critique of Terry's >> > work in progress from at least five or six perspectives, including my >> own. >> > Thank you and best wishes for 2015, >> > Joseph >> > ----Message d'origine---- >> > De : dea...@berkeley.edu >> > Date : 18/01/2015 - 13:22 (PST) >> > À : gordana.dodig-crnko...@mdh.se >> > Cc : fis@listas.unizar.es >> > Objet : Re: [Fis] THE NEW YEAR ESSAY AND FOUR GREAT SCIENTIFIC DOMAINS >> Fis >> > Digest, Vol 10, Issue 11 >> > Typo in line 7 (correction) >> > experimentally determine whether or not it "works" as proposed. >> > On Sun, Jan 18, 2015 at 1:20 PM, Terrence W. DEACON < >> dea...@berkeley.edu> >> > wrote: >> > Gordana's response provides a wonderful opening for digging into some >> of the >> > most challenging and subtle issues lurking behind this essay. >> > For now I will respond to the comparison between autopoiesis and >> autogenesis >> > and what can and cannot be learned from each. In many ways this >> comparison >> > is at the center of the conceptual challenge I offer. >> > First, autopoiesis is a philosophical concept. Though various model >> systems >> > have been proposed that purport to embody its logic, it is not an >> > empirically testable hypothesis that would allow one to experimentally >> > determine whether or n to it "works" as proposed. >> > Here is the definition that Maturana and Varela provided in 1980: >> > [an autopoietic system as one that] "constitutes itself ... as a >> concrete >> > unity ... by specifying the topological domain of its realization ..." >> "So >> > an “autopoietic machine” is one that collectively produces its material >> > components as well as the network of relations between them that >> constitutes >> > their unity in a discrete physical location." >> > These latter properties are not attributed to any separate and >> distinctive >> > mechanism over and above the closed co-production of components and yet >> are >> > essential defining attributes. Indeed, this organization is described >> as the >> > "fundamental variable which it maintains constant" (p. 79). >> > In simple terms, autopoiesis is a highly abstract account of what must >> be >> > the case for something to be a living organism. In this respect I >> consider >> > it to be an updated restatement of Kant's concept of the >> self-organization >> > that constitutes an organism, with the added stipulation that it also >> > somehow [how?] determines systemic unity and coherence. >> > Here is Kant in 1790: >> > “An organized being is then not a mere machine, for that has merely >> motive >> > power, but it possesses in itself formative power of a self-propagating >> kind >> > which it communicates to its materials though they have it not of >> > themselves.” (p. 558) and “... every part ... is there for the sake of >> the >> > other (reciprocally as end, and at the same time, means).” (p. 557) >> > Kant concludes that this isn't sufficient to determine intrinsic >> teleology >> > (and by implication insufficient to determine that the concepts of >> function >> > and adaptation, much less information). And that these are not intrinsic >> > attributes of organisms. I believe that that he is right to concludes >> that >> > these attributes alone only provide justification for assuming that >> > teleological attribute are descriptive glosses, not intrinsic to >> > organisms—assigned from a sort of extrinsic transcendental perspective. >> > In a striking parallel, the evolutionary biologist J. B. S. Haldane >> gave the >> > following definition of life in 1929: “A simple organism must consist of >> > parts A, B, C, D, and so on, each of which can multiply only in the >> presence >> > of all, or almost all, of the others.” (p. 245) >> > The fundamental problem is that the autopoiesis description requires—but >> > does not provide—an explanation for how organizational unity is >> generated >> > and maintained. Like Kant and Haldan M & V merely assume the presence of >> > some means of maintaining this co-productive unity of interdependent >> > components. And yet, it is individuation of a self (a beneficiary) that >> > "acts on its own behalf" (to quote Stu Kauffman's definition of >> autonomous >> > agency) that is the critical feature that enables us to locate >> intrinsic >> > teleological organization. >> > I argue that autogenesis is, in contrast, is an empirically testable >> model >> > system, whose attributes can be verified or falsified. That among these >> > attributes are those that constitute autonomous agency, self-repair, >> > reproduction, and even evolvability in a limited sense. And finally, >> that >> > this is what allows us to precisely identify the intrinsic presence of >> an >> > interpretive dynamic for which reference and significance (i.e. the >> > assignment of value) to a discrete physical individuated system. Not >> > surprisingly, M & V argue that autopoiesis is a separate phenomenon from >> > reproductive, evolutionary, and representational processes (and they >> deny >> > the reality of representation, which is a central attribute being >> explained >> > in my proposal). >> > Where we are in agreement, however, is that the dynamic that constitutes >> > living should also be the dynamic that constitutes mentality. But given >> the >> > differences listed above and described in my essay, to confuse these two >> > concepts is to miss the very essence of my argument. Moreover, as I >> > indicated at the conclusion of my essay, the analysis of reference and >> > significance that can be formalized using this approach still is a long >> ways >> > from an account of the phenomenology of human subjective experience. In >> > Incomplete Nature I argue that mental experience is at least a second >> order >> > variant of the dynamics that characterizes autogenesis. >> > So although some have claimed that autogenesis provides an empirically >> > realizable exemplar of a process that could be characterized as >> autopoietic, >> > I think that this misses the crucial point. Autopoiesis theory fails to >> even >> > describe what is most essential: the nature of the dynamic that >> generates >> > the coherent individuation of an autonomous agent. Not surprisingly, it >> has >> > nothing constructive to say about information theory and how it might be >> > possible to formalize a theory of reference and significance. Indeed, >> as M & >> > V claim, these don't really exist as physical phenomena but are rather >> > givens in some sort of solipsistic embodied idealism. >> > As for studying the problem at many levels from bacterial communication >> to >> > social organization, it should be clear that I believe that the >> conceptual >> > challenge demands that we work at many levels of information science >> (in the >> > broad sense) at once, recognizing that the ultimate goal is to get >> beyond >> > our current methodological dualism. As I noted, my goal in this essay is >> > only to work at the very bottom of the problem in recognition of the >> fact >> > that without this most basic foundation the larger goals will remain >> out of >> > reach. >> > It is the possibility of legitimizing reference and significance as >> > scientific concepts with solid empirical foundation that makes it >> reasonable >> > to imagine such a larger vision, as Pedro has intimated. I believe that >> > succeeding at this lowest level project could provide a new perspective >> for >> > understanding subjective and social phenomena, and possibly even help to >> > identify and implement a novel approach to "computing." >> > — Terry >> > On Sun, Jan 18, 2015 at 12:34 AM, Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic >> > <gordana.dodig-crnko...@mdh.se> wrote: >> > Dear colleagues, >> > Even though I agree with all Jeremy writes in his new post, I would >> still >> > return back to the opposite side (where Pedro’s previous post left us) >> and >> > try to think about the big picture. >> > I am sure there will be many FISers who will take the challenge of >> > discussing the details of construction of an autogen as a bridge between >> > meaning and mechanism. >> > In his first post, Jeremy wrote: >> > “Terry and the Pirates have a long standing rule: One cannot employ as >> > explanation that which hasn't yet been explained. Failing to hold this >> > standard opens researchers up to merely taxonomical work, positing >> forces, >> > properties >> > and capacities defined solely by their consequences, in effect >> mistaking >> > questions as answers. Hence, our focus on exploring reference at its >> > earliest possible emergence, and explaining exactly how that emergence >> > occurs, since emergence is also a question, >> > not an answer, an explanandum not an explanans.” >> > “We Pirates do what we can to stay on the epistemological methodist >> side of >> > things.” >> > Epistemological methodism is explained as the opposite of >> epistemological >> > particularism, which is the belief that one can know something without >> > knowing how one knows that thing. So according to epistemological >> > Methodists, >> > for me to know implies not only that I know that I know but even that I >> > know >> > how I know. It is a very strong assumption. >> > It seems to me to exclude constructive approaches to knowledge >> generation. >> > When we construct, we simply use elements that suit the purpose of >> > construction. There is no very hard requirement to understand bricks. >> How do >> > we >> > conceptualize knowledge and knowing? What does it mean “to know” and >> “to >> > know that we know”? How detailed, precise and formal knowledge should >> be for >> > me to claim “I know”? >> > For example I can say: we know that the universe consists of >> matter/energy >> > in space/time. But how much indeed do we know about it? Only a small >> > fraction (<5%?) of the content of the universe seems to be made of >> > matter/energy >> > while the majority of the universe is made of dark matter/dark energy >> and >> > at the moment we do not know what they are. This sounds like a very >> > pessimistic view of our present knowledge. However I strongly believe >> that >> > this state must be temporary and that a >> > new break-through will come soon. It may happen in the similar way as >> in >> > the time of Planck, who solved the problem of the ultraviolet >> catastrophe, >> > (a prediction of late 19th century/early 20th century classical physics >> that >> > an ideal black body at thermal >> > equilibrium will emit radiation with infinite power). Some assumptions >> > (something that we believe we know and we probably even believe that we >> know >> > why we know) are simply wrong. >> > Knowledge is a dynamic, nonlinear, adaptive, learning system. >> > That is why the suggestion to study information not only on the level of >> > physics and chemistry in a well-defined simplified system, but on many >> > different levels of abstraction is relevant. Some people (Alexej Kurakin >> > for >> > example, (Kurakin, 2011)) see fractal structures that govern >> generation of >> > information, from atoms to human societies, and one can learn about the >> > properties of one level from the observed patterns on some other levels. >> > The >> > reason to look at the fuzzy “big picture” at the same time as we >> construct >> > much more coherent, crispy and convincing detailed aspects of it is that >> > they are inseparably connected. The role of unexplained pieces in the >> > theoretical framework is as placeholders. >> > Like in lazy evaluation, we do not do anything about it until we learn >> more >> > at some point. >> > (In programming language theory, lazy evaluation, or call-by-need[1] is >> an >> > evaluation strategy which delays the evaluation of an expression until >> its >> > value is needed (non-strict evaluation) and which also avoids repeated >> > evaluations (sharing).[2][3] The sharing can reduce the running time of >> > certain functions by an exponential factor over other non-strict >> evaluation >> > strategies, such as call-by-name. >> > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lazy_evaluation) >> > This is not meant as a critique of Terry’s approach, which is >> fascinating >> > elegant, and refreshing among many fuzzy discussions about the nature of >> > reference and significance. However, connections and integration with >> other >> > levels and perspectives on information might be instructive and >> worthwhile, >> > especially from Terry who has done so much research on higher levels. >> Such >> > as e.g. in Harrington et al. (2001). “Science, culture, meaning, >> values: a >> > dialogue” Annals of the New York >> > Academy of Sciences. and of course even more in Deacon T. (2012) the >> > Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. Norton & Company >> > What might be interesting on the synthetic side (as the opposite side >> of the >> > analytic one as presented in the New Year’s Essay) would be integration >> of >> > levels that Terry has in the Incomplete Nature, based on the dynamics >> > of information, where information has different meaning on different >> levels >> > of abstraction/organisation. In the similar way as an autogen, as a >> > self-organizing unit that preserves itself >> > dynamically and grows via a combination of autocatalysis and >> self-assembly, >> > our knowledge grows dynamically and the meaning of pieces changes >> > accordingly. In other words, it is not only self-organizing but also >> > self-generating. Different scientific domains >> > support and regulate each other; different “domain-specific” (or >> > “science-specific”) models can help better construction or generation of >> > knowledge of the whole as well as of the details. Specifically, it >> might be >> > useful to connect to computing (as information >> > dynamics), as Pedro suggests. >> > Computing (Rosenbloom, “The Fourth Great Scientific Domain”) seen as >> > information dynamics, goes together with the physical, the biological, >> and >> > the social. The project of naturalization proceeds by connecting all >> four >> > domains. >> > (Dodig-Crnkovic, 2014) The attractiveness of the project as Terry’s (as >> > presented in the Incomplete Nature) is in its contribution to the >> > naturalization of reference and significance – concepts that still are >> > highly mystified in the eyes of many. >> > At the end, I have two questions. >> > First the particular one. I would like to know what exactly is the >> > difference between autogenesis and autopoiesis? It seems to me that >> > autogenesis as it looks like from Terry’s Opening Essay is a step >> before the >> > whole system >> > can be integrated and said to be alive. On the other hand autopoiesis >> is >> > the process of life of an organism such as cell with all properties of a >> > living organism. Autogen seems to me as a chemical automaton while >> > autopoetic system is alive. The theory >> > of autopoiesis is descriptive and qualitative. It does not make the >> > insights made by Maturana and Varela less important. Understanding >> > autopoiesis as cognition makes a vital connection between mind and >> matter. >> > Like Pedro, I also believe that study of the behavior of prokaryotic >> cells >> > such as bacteria is useful as it can reveal a lot about information >> > processing as social cognition (Ben-Jacob, >> > Becker, & Shapira, 2004; Ben-Jacob, Shapira, & Tauber, 2006, 2011; >> > Ben-Jacob, 2008, 2009a, 2009b) (Ng & Bassler, 2009; Waters & Bassler, >> 2005). >> > >> > There is a lot we don't know about such complex systems as bacteria but >> we >> > can learn relevant things even if we apply “lazy evaluation” strategy >> for >> > many parts in the model. In other words, it should be possible and >> > reasonable >> > to build knowledge even though we do not know (enough) about parts we >> build >> > from and their mutual interactions. >> > My second question, the general one, goes back to Pedro’s post: how >> the New >> > Year’s Essay connects to the big picture with four great scientific >> > domains? >> > With best regards, >> > Gordana >> > References >> > Ben-Jacob, E. (2008). Social behavior of bacteria: from physics to >> complex >> > organization. The European Physical Journal B, 65(3), 315–322. >> > Ben-Jacob, E. (2009a). Bacterial Complexity: More Is Different on All >> > Levels. In S. Nakanishi, R. Kageyama, & D. Watanabe (Eds.), Systems >> Biology- >> > The Challenge of Complexity (pp. 25–35). Tokyo Berlin Heidelberg New >> York: >> > Springer. >> > Ben-Jacob, E. (2009b). Learning from Bacteria about Natural Information >> > Processing. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1178, 78–90. >> > Ben-Jacob, E., Becker, I., & Shapira, Y. (2004). Bacteria Linguistic >> > Communication and Social Intelligence. Trends in Microbiology, 12(8), >> > 366–372. >> > Ben-Jacob, E., Shapira, Y., & Tauber, A. I. (2006). Seeking the >> Foundations >> > of Cognition in Bacteria. Physica A, 359, 495–524. >> > Ben-Jacob, E., Shapira, Y., & Tauber, A. I. (2011). Smart Bacteria. In >> L. >> > Margulis, C. A. Asikainen, & W. E. Krumbein (Eds.), Chimera and >> > Consciousness. Evolution of the Sensory Self. Cambridge Boston: MIT >> Press. >> > Dodig-Crnkovic, G. (2014). Modeling Life as Cognitive Info-Computation. >> In >> > A. Beckmann, E. Csuhaj-Varjú, & K. Meer (Eds.), Computability in Europe >> > 2014. LNCS (pp. 153–162). Berlin Heidelberg: Springer. >> > Kurakin, A. (2011). The self-organizing fractal theory as a universal >> > discovery method: the phenomenon of life. Theoretical Biology and >> Medical >> > Modelling, 8(4). Retrieved from http://www.tbiomed.com/content/8/1/4 >> > Ng, W.-L., & Bassler, B. L. (2009). Bacterial quorum-sensing network >> > architectures. Annual Review of Genetics, 43, 197–222. >> > Waters, C. M., & Bassler, B. L. (2005). Quorum Sensing: Cell-to-Cell >> > Communication in Bacteria. Annual Review of Cell and Developmental >> Biology, >> > 21, 319–346. >> > http://www.ait.gu.se/kontaktaoss/personal/gordana-dodig-crnkovic >> > http://www.mrtc.mdh.se/~gdc/ >> > From: Jeremy Sherman <mindreadersdiction...@gmail.com> >> > Date: Sunday 18 January 2015 03:41 >> > To: fis <fis@listas.unizar.es> >> > Subject: Re: [Fis] Fis Digest, Vol 10, Issue 11 >> > It would be satisfying perhaps to think of our collective work as at the >> > forefront of the development of what will become A Grand Domain of >> Science, >> > but I would say the better trend in current science is toward careful >> > integration between domains rather than toward established grand >> divisions, >> > which seems a more a classical approach. Doesn't information play out >> in the >> > biological and the social domains? Isn't our most ambitious goal here to >> > explain scientifically the relationship >> > between information and the physical domain? >> > Whether modest or foolhardy as Terry suggests or of some other stature, >> > Terry's approach addresses the source of the great schism in all >> academic >> > and intellectual circles: Physical scientists are appropriately barred >> from >> > explaining >> > behavior in terms of the value of information for some end-directed >> self >> > about, or representative of anything. But biological and social >> scientists >> > can't help but explain behavior in those terms. Focusing, precisely on >> > possible transitions from the physical >> > domain to the living and social domains is exactly what a scientific >> > approach demands. >> > Lacking an explanation for the transition from mechanism to end-directed >> > behavior (which is inescapably teleological down to its roots in >> function or >> > adaptation--behaviors of value to a self about its environment), >> science is >> > stuck, >> > siloed into isolated domains without a rationale. >> > To my mind, this makes the implications of meticulous work at the very >> > border between mechanism and end-directed behavior anything but modest >> in >> > its possible implications. In this I agree with Pedro. With what we now >> know >> > about self-organization-- >> > how it is footing on the physical side for a bridge from mechanism to >> > end-directed behavior but does not itself provide the bridge, we are >> > perfectly poised to build the bridge itself, through an integrated >> science >> > that explains the ontology of epistemology, >> > providing solid scientific ground over the absolutely huge gaping hole >> in >> > the middle of the broadest reaches of scientific and philosophical >> > endeavor. >> > Whether Terry's work or someone else's work bridges that gap, I predict >> > that, at long last, the gap can and will be finally filled, probably >> within >> > the next decade. As ambitious researchers this would be a lousy time >> for any >> > of us, >> > Terry included, to stick to our guns in the face of substantial >> critique >> > revealing how a theory we embrace merely provides a new, more clever >> way way >> > to hide or smear over the gap pretending it isn't there, which is why I >> > would love to see this discussion >> > refocus on the article's detailed content. Though the implications of >> this >> > research at the borderline may be grand, the research, in the doing, is >> as >> > Terry implies as modest any careful scientific work. >> > Jeremy Sherman >> > On Sat, Jan 17, 2015 at 5:06 AM, Moisés André Nisenbaum >> > <moises.nisenb...@ifrj.edu.br> wrote: >> > Hi, Pedro. >> > I didnt receive th image (Figure 1. The Four Great Domains of Science) >> > Would you please send it again? >> > Thank you. >> > Moises >> > 2015-01-17 9:00 GMT-02:00 <fis-requ...@listas.unizar.es>: >> > Send Fis mailing list submissions to >> > fis@listas.unizar.es >> > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit >> > >> > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis >> > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to >> > fis-requ...@listas.unizar.es >> > You can reach the person managing the list at >> > fis-ow...@listas.unizar.es >> > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific >> > than "Re: Contents of Fis digest..." >> > Today's Topics: >> > 1. Re: Beginnings and ends---Steps to a theory of reference & >> > significance (Pedro C. Marijuan) >> > ---------- Mensagem encaminhada ---------- >> > From: "Pedro C. Marijuan" <pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es> >> > To: "'fis'" <fis@listas.unizar.es> >> > Cc: >> > Date: Fri, 16 Jan 2015 12:43:40 +0100 >> > Subject: Re: [Fis] Beginnings and ends---Steps to a theory of reference >> & >> > significance >> > Dear Terry and FIS colleagues---and pirates, >> > Just a brief reflection on the below. >> > (From Terry's last message)... >> > So my goal in this case is quite modest, and yet perhaps also a bit >> > foolhardy. I want to suggest a simplest possible model system to use >> > as the basis for formalizing the link between physical processes and >> > semiotic processes. Perhaps someday after considerably elaborating >> > this analysis it could contribute to issues of the psychology of human >> > interactions. I hope to recruit some interest into pursuing this goal. >> > In my view, any research endeavor is also accompanied by some "ultimate" >> > goals or ends that go beyond the quite explicit disciplinary ones. In >> this >> > case, say, about the destiny of the constructs that would surround the >> > information concept (or the possibility >> > of framing an informational perspective, or a renewed information >> science, >> > or whatever), wouldn't it be interesting discussing in extenso what >> could >> > that ultimate vision? >> > I mean, most of us may agree in quite many points related to the >> > microphysical (& thermodynamic) underpinning of information, as it >> > transpires in the exchanges we are having--but where do we want to >> arrive >> > finally with the construction activity? >> > I tend to disagree with localist aims, even though at the time being >> they >> > may look more prudent and parsimonious. Putting it in brief, too >> briefly!, >> > and borrowing from Rosenbloom (P.S. 2013. On Computing: The Fourth >> Great >> > Scientific Domain) the idea is that information science, properly >> developed >> > and linked with computer science and mathematics, should constitute one >> of >> > the Great Domains of contemporary >> > science. The informational would go together with the physical, the >> > biological, and the social: constituting the four great domains of >> science. >> > See Figure below. Rather than attempting the construction of another >> average >> > or standard discipline, information >> > science is about the making out of one of the “great scientific >> domains” of >> > contemporary knowledge. >> > More cogent arguments could be elaborated on how to cover >> sceintifically the >> > whole "information world" (human societies, behaving individuals, brain >> > organization, cellular processes, biomolecules) and the problem of >> > interlocking--crisscrossing a myriad of information >> > flows at all levels. But the point is, "ends", although unassailable, >> may >> > be as much important as "beginnings". >> > Thanks in advance for the patience! >> > ---Pedro >> > >> > Figure 1. The Four Great Domains of Science. >> > The graphic shows the network of contemporary disciplines in the >> > background; >> > while the superimposed “four-leaf clover” represents the four great >> > scientific domains. >> > -- >> > ------------------------------------------------- >> > Pedro C. Marijuán >> > Grupo de Bioinformación / Bioinformation Group >> > Instituto Aragonés de Ciencias de la Salud >> > Centro de Investigación Biomédica de Aragón (CIBA) >> > Avda. San Juan Bosco, 13, planta X >> > 50009 Zaragoza, Spain >> > Tfno. +34 976 71 3526 (& 6818) >> > pcmarijuan.iacs@aragon.eshttp://sites.google.com/site/pedrocmarijuan/ >> > ------------------------------------------------- >> > _______________________________________________ >> > Fis mailing list >> > Fis@listas.unizar.es >> > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis >> > -- >> > Moisés André Nisenbaum >> > Doutorando IBICT/UFRJ. Professor. Msc. >> > Instituto Federal do Rio de Janeiro - IFRJ >> > Campus Maracanã >> > moises.nisenb...@ifrj.edu.br >> > _______________________________________________ >> > Fis mailing list >> > Fis@listas.unizar.es >> > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis >> > -- >> > Professor Terrence W. Deacon >> > University of California, Berkeley >> > -- >> > Professor Terrence W. Deacon >> > University of California, Berkeley >> > >> >> >> -- >> Professor Terrence W. Deacon >> University of California, Berkeley >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Fis mailing list >> Fis@listas.unizar.es >> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis >> > > > _______________________________________________ > Fis mailing list > Fis@listas.unizar.es > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > >
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