Rafael, Joseph, list members, That is an interesting way of putting it, but I think the answer is yes. C.S. Peirce's pragmatacism is aimed at doing exactly that. Mathematical structures and other structural models have no implication of reality in the sense that reality is contingent, so we need a way to test applications. For Peirce, this is against our expectations of reality, which give meaning to the models in particular applications (pragmatic maxim).
This goes some way to responding to Joseph, who says: When John C. talks about "references crossing ecology, management and political science", what is of interest to me and perhaps others is the 'substance' so to speak of the crossing. To make things difficult (rather than easy for a change), let us assume that this substance includes, but is not limited to common assumptions and common attitudes. (My informational exchanges today are more interdisciplinary because I am paying more attention to the way in which information is processed in the different disciplines.) Peirce's maxim goes a long way towards getting at the substance (you don't need his categories to apply his pragmatic maxim), and should be sufficient, but I would agree that it would be easier if there are shared presuppositions, domain specific (or not so domain specific) paradigms in Kuhn's sense. Because we can't fully express our presuppositions (Polanyi, Quine, Wittgenstein, Barwise and Perry) our ideas can never be made fully clear without their losing anything but tautological sense. So common ground is not always easy to find, and it requires a fair degree of cooperation and willingness to compromise, especially on what seem to be certainties. Joseph also says: The task then becomes to express the 'substance' in informational terms. What informational terms are possible that are not numbers or ad hoc Peircean categories? The first thing I see is that the corresponding logic and category theory must be non-standard or it will miss the interactions and overlaps between disciplines. The next thing might be to change to a process perspective, looking at the way in which the disciplines, considered as informational entities, influence one another, and find some formal but non-mathematical language for referring to this. Are there any suggestions for such a language? I think that "nonstandard" here requires at least that noncomputability is allowed. I have written ab out this in my discussion of an informational view of causal connection (or transfer of causation - a version of Russell's 'at-at' approach) in Information, causation and computation<http://web.ncf.ca/collier/papers/CollierJohn%20formatted.pdf> (2012. Information and Computation:<http://astore.amazon.co.uk/books-books-21/detail/9814295477> Essays on Scientific and Philosophical Understanding of Foundations of Information and Computation, Ed by Gordana Dodig Crnkovic and Mark Burgin, World Scientific). It probably requires more as well, depending on what we mean by 'nonstandard'. I think of nonstandard analysis as an example, but perhaps Joseph has more in mind, or something different. Cheers, John From: Rafael Capurro [mailto:raf...@capurro.de] Sent: May 19, 2015 3:15 AM To: John Collier; Joseph Brenner; PEDRO CLEMENTE MARIJUAN FERNANDEZ; fis@listas.unizar.es Subject: Re: [Fis] RV: THE FOURTH GREAT DOMAIN OF SCIENCE: INFORMATIONAL? (R.Capurro) then the problem is, how can a 'realist' detach theoretical problems from the real problems of the real world. Rafael An earlier version was blocked due to the large set of earlier messages. Usually I delete them if they are not relevant. I have done that this time. Cheers, John Dear fis list, List, Popper is famous for his Three Worlds model, in which ideas sit out there in their own world (the others are material and mental, roughly). The problems approach, I think, is directed at this world. However I think that systems theorists should agree at least that there are general problems that involve many different disciplines (Rosen calls them sometime metaphors, but he means mathematical or structural Formalisms that have wide generality). By solving some of these general problems we can facilitate the generation of solutions to more specific problems, both theoretical and practical. That is what systems theory is about. Popper considered himself a realist, but thought that the object of theory (problem solutions) was verisimilitude. Exactly what that means is still a matter of debate. I agree with Joseph about the usefulness of the bibliometric work. I found it interesting, working in ecology right now, that despite many ecologists accepting that there is a socio-ecological system that requires study to solve ecological problems, that there were few if any references crossing ecology and management and political science. That reflects my reading in the fields. John From: Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Joseph Brenner Sent: May 17, 2015 11:14 AM To: PEDRO CLEMENTE MARIJUAN FERNANDEZ; fis@listas.unizar.es<mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es> Subject: Re: [Fis] RV: THE FOURTH GREAT DOMAIN OF SCIENCE: INFORMATIONAL? (R.Capurro) Dear All, I agree with Rafael that there is an anti-realist flavor to Popper's concept of problems. However, it indicates to me an intiution that there is something important going on between disciplines. This is a dynamic aspect which I feel is not captured by diagrams such as Loet's :-) in which the connections between disciplines are represented by sets of lines. I would not be so hard as Dino on bibliometrics as such, but I think that once classifications and maps have been established, it is important to talk about where to go next. Best wishes, Joseph ----- Original Message ----- From: PEDRO CLEMENTE MARIJUAN FERNANDEZ<mailto:pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es> To: fis@listas.unizar.es<mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es> Sent: Sunday, May 17, 2015 1:17 PM Subject: [Fis] RV: THE FOURTH GREAT DOMAIN OF SCIENCE: INFORMATIONAL? (R.Capurro) ________________________________ De: Rafael Capurro [raf...@capurro.de<mailto:raf...@capurro.de>] Enviado el: sábado, 16 de mayo de 2015 9:34 Para: PEDRO CLEMENTE MARIJUAN FERNANDEZ Asunto: Re: [Fis] THE FOURTH GREAT DOMAIN OF SCIENCE: INFORMATIONAL? Karl Popper once suggested (Conjectures and Refutations, p. 67) that we should not think in terms or "subject matter(s)" or "disciplines" but in terms of "problems". Problems do not arise within a fixed definition of a discipline ("essentialism") but within a tradition where a theory is being discussed. In this sense, theories are in some sense "disciplines" or can be conceived as "loose clusters" of theories. But Popper speaks about a "world of problems in themselves" which is a kind of Platonism not only because it separates such "problems in themselves" from their connection to the world _as_ perceived (ie. interpreted) by humans, but also because it creates a knowledge hierarchy by giving theoretical knowledge a higher status than practical knowledge. Thirty years ago (sic) I wrote some thoughts on this issue. See: http://www.capurro.de/trita.htm Rafael _______________________________________________ Fis mailing list Fis@listas.unizar.es<mailto:Fis@listas.unizar.es> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis -- Prof.em. Dr. Rafael Capurro Hochschule der Medien (HdM), Stuttgart, Germany Capurro Fiek Foundation for Information Ethics (http://www.capurro-fiek-foundation.org) Distinguished Researcher at the African Centre of Excellence for Information Ethics (ACEIE), Department of Information Science, University of Pretoria, South Africa. Chair, International Center for Information Ethics (ICIE) (http://icie.zkm.de) Editor in Chief, International Review of Information Ethics (IRIE) (http://www.i-r-i-e.net) Postal Address: Redtenbacherstr. 9, 76133 Karlsruhe, Germany E-Mail: raf...@capurro.de<mailto:raf...@capurro.de> Voice: + 49 - 721 - 98 22 9 - 22 (Fax: -21) Homepage: www.capurro.de<http://www.capurro.de>
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