Dear colleagues,
I see "informational processes" as essentially being proto-scientific – how is
any "science" not an informational process?
The sciences, in my opinion, are different in terms of what is communicated. As
Maturana noted, the communication of molecules generates a biology. Similarly,
the communication of atoms generates a chemistry, etc. The communication of
words and sentences generates the interhuman domain of communication. One can
also communicate in terms of symbolic media such as money. This can be
reflected by economics.
Thus, the sciences are different. The formal perspective (of the mathematical
theory of communication) provides us with tools to move metaphors heuristically
from one domain to another. The assumption that the mathematics is general is
over-stated, in my opinion. One has to carefully check and elaborate after each
translation from one domain to another. In this sense, I agree with
“proto-scientific”.
Best,
Loet
First, I think this places me in the camp of Peirce's view. Second, I am unsure
of how to regard the focus on "higher-order" interdisciplinary discussions when
a much more essential view of lower-order roles (i.e., What are science and
information?) has not been first established.
From my "naive" view I find myself wondering how "informational process" is
not the ONE overarching discipline from which all other disciplines are born
(is this too "psychological" of a framework?). As such, I argue for one great
discipline . . . and thus wouldn't try to frame my view in terms of "science,"
mostly because I am unclear on how the term "science" is being formally used
here. Thoughts?
Marcus Abundis
about.me/marcus.abundis
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