Terry, list --
Terry wrote:
We should not expect such a quip to be a sufficient explanation of
information in all its complexity. It is merely a useful mnemonic (coined
also by MacKay as a "distinction that makes a difference") that captures
both Shannon's logic and Bateson's cybernetic implications. But this is not
all. If one wants to try to force this phrase to carry more of the weight
of completely characterizing information it should be further interpreted.
Notice that it is also an appropriate quip to describe the concept of
physical work— a gradient (or difference of potential) that is reduced in a
constrained way so that it generates an increase in a gradient or
difference in potential or pushes a system further from equilibrium.
S: We might also note that it stands for the existence of any material
objects, in that they are energy gradients temporarily differentiated from
the condition of equilibrium implied by the universal tendency to even out
all such gradients. These ‘make a difference’ from that ultimate condition.
The particular forms of such gradients are where the information is located
when any observer interacts with one.
STAN
On Mon, Jun 29, 2015 at 4:48 PM, Terrence W. DEACON <dea...@berkeley.edu>
wrote:
> On Bateson's "difference that makes a difference."
>
> We should not expect such a quip to be a sufficient explanation of
> information in all its complexity. It is merely a useful mnemonic (coined
> also by MacKay as a "distinction that makes a difference") that captures
> both Shannon's logic and Bateson's cybernetic implications. But this is not
> all. If one wants to try to force this phrase to carry more of the weight
> of completely characterizing information it should be further interpreted.
> Notice that it is also an appropriate quip to describe the concept of
> physical work— a gradient (or difference of potential) that is reduced in a
> constrained way so that it generates an increase in a gradient or
> difference in potntial or pushes a system further from equilibrium.
>
> This double applicability is not merely a terminological coincidence,
> though I don't think that Gregory realized this, since he used this quip to
> argue for an energy/information dichotomy. I have instead argued (most
> recently in my January FIS essay) that both the referential and normative
> properties of information are intimately entangled with the concept of
> physical work.
>
> Also, in English parlance the phrase to "make a difference" is an idiom
> that means "to matter" or to be significant or of value. I believe that
> this double entendre was intended in order to implicate the normative and
> goal directed aspects of information. Explicating either the aboutness or
> the normative consequence in terms of "bits" therefore inevitably results
> in reductionistic oversimplication. Bits are a relevant measure of
> intrinsic logical properties of the communication medium, but of minimal
> value in assessing the extrinsic relational properties that are implicated
> in the larger concept of information. I think that measuring work (though
> in ways that are more complex than mere physical work) can lead to a more
> useful incorporation of the referential and normative properties that are
> implied by "information."
>
> Another problem is introduced by the use of the concept of "meaning" in
> these discussions. The term ambiguously connotes both reference and
> significance, and while it is applicable to symbolic and linguistic
> information, it only metaphorically applies to iconic and indexical forms
> of communication. Thus we discern that a sneeze indicates (provides
> potential information about) an allergic response, but doesn't "mean"
> allergy or nasal irritation. Seeing the imprint of a person's face on a
> coin doesn't "mean" that person. I would not want to exclude these semiotic
> forms of conveying information from our consideration of the concept.
>
> Clearly, we need to carefully distinguish the intrinsic logical properties
> of a signal medium (Shannon's usage) from information "about" something not
> intrinsic to that medium, from the "informative value" or normative /
> significant / useful consequence that is the point of interpreting
> something to be about something else.
>
> To fail to make these distinctions and instead flatten our discussions to
> the Shannonian usage is to loose track of the challenge. Let me conclude by
> noting that this troublesome flattening of the meaning of "information" was
> recognized by Shannon and many others, in the formative years of the field.
> In the words of a major figure in the field:
>
> *“I didn’t like the term Information Theory. Claude didn’t like it either.
> You see, the term ‘information theory’ suggests that it is a theory about
> information – but it’s not. It’s the transmission of information, not
> information. Lots of people just didn’t understand this... I coined the
> term ‘mutual information’ to avoid such nonsense: making the point that
> information is always about something. It is information provided** by
> something, about something.*” [Interview with R. Fano, 2001]
>
> ... and I would add "for something."
>
> — Terry
>
> On Mon, Jun 29, 2015 at 1:48 AM, Joseph Brenner <joe.bren...@bluewin.ch>
> wrote:
>
>> Dear Terry,
>>
>> I agree with the distinction you make between the two types of properties
>> indicated, but I wish you had stated your point positively. I hope we are
>> all not so lazy as not to be able to use modifers such as 'meaningful' with
>> information,as Loet suggests. If one does not, does that mean that one will
>> be in a position to establish a single monolithic interpretation for
>> information? In the exchange below, there is thus a faint perfume of
>> reductionism that floats around the focus on properties of informational
>> entities without reference to the necessary energetic processes of their
>> production, transmission and reception. But your post was less than four
>> full lines . . .
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Joseph
>>
>>
>> ----- Original Message -----
>> *From:* Terrence W. DEACON <dea...@berkeley.edu>
>> *To:* Marcus Abundis <55m...@gmail.com>
>> *Cc:* fis <fis@listas.unizar.es>
>> *Sent:* Friday, June 26, 2015 9:17 PM
>> *Subject:* Re: [Fis] It-from-Bit and information interpretation of QM
>>
>> Dear Marcus,
>>
>> Thank you for this simple and absolutely essential intervention. Allowing
>> ourselves the freedom to use the same term—'information' which is the
>> defining term for this entire enterprise—for such different relationships
>> as intrinsic signal properties and extrinsic referential and normative
>> properties is a recipe for irrelevance.
>>
>> — Terry
>>
>> On Fri, Jun 26, 2015 at 10:33 AM, Loet Leydesdorff <l...@leydesdorff.net>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Dear Marcus and colleagues,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Katherine Hayles (1990, pp. 59f.) compared this discussion about the
>>> definition of “information” with asking whether a glass is half empty or
>>> half full. Shannon-type information is a measure of the variation or
>>> uncertainty, whereas Bateson’s “difference which makes a difference”
>>> presumes a system of reference for which the information can make a
>>> difference and thus be meaningful.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> In my opinion, the advantage of measuring uncertainty in bits cannot be
>>> underestimated, since the operationalization and the measurement provide
>>> avenues to hypothesis testing and thus control of speculation (Theil,
>>> 1972). However, the semantic confusion can also be solved by using the
>>> words “uncertainty” or “probabilistic entropy” when Shannon-type
>>> information is meant.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I note that “a difference which makes a difference” cannot so easily be
>>> measured. J I agree that it is more precise to speak of “meaningful
>>> information” in that case. The meaning has to be specified in the system of
>>> reference (e.g., physics and/or biology).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Best,
>>>
>>> Loet
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> References:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Hayles, N. K. (1990). *Chaos Bound; Orderly Disorder in Contemporary
>>> Literature and Science *Ithaca, etc.: Cornell University.
>>>
>>> Theil, H. (1972). *Statistical Decomposition Analysis*. Amsterdam/
>>> London: North-Holland.
>>>
>>>
>>> ------------------------------
>>>
>>> Loet Leydesdorff
>>>
>>> *Emeritus* University of Amsterdam
>>> Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR)
>>>
>>> l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/
>>> Honorary Professor, SPRU, <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/>University of
>>> Sussex;
>>>
>>> Guest Professor Zhejiang Univ. <http://www.zju.edu.cn/english/>,
>>> Hangzhou; Visiting Professor, ISTIC,
>>> <http://www.istic.ac.cn/Eng/brief_en.html>Beijing;
>>>
>>> Visiting Professor, Birkbeck <http://www.bbk.ac.uk/>, University of
>>> London;
>>>
>>> http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYAAAAJ&hl=en
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *From:* Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] *On Behalf Of *Marcus
>>> Abundis
>>> *Sent:* Friday, June 26, 2015 7:02 PM
>>> *To:* fis@listas.unizar.es
>>> *Subject:* [Fis] It-from-Bit and information interpretation of QM
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Dear Andrei,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I would ask for clarification on whether you speak of "information"
>>> in your examples as something that has innate "meaning" or something that
>>> is innately "meaningless" . . . which has been a core issue in earlier
>>> exchanges. If this issue of "meaning" versus "meaningless" in the use of
>>> the term "information" is not resolved (for the group?) it seems hard (to
>>> me) to have truly meaningful exchanges . . . without having to put a
>>> "meaningful" or "meaningless" qualifier in front of "information" every
>>> time it is use.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Thanks.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *Marcus Abundis*
>>>
>>> about.me/marcus.abundis
>>>
>>> [image: http://d13pix9kaak6wt.cloudfront.net/signature/colorbar.png]
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Fis mailing list
>>> Fis@listas.unizar.es
>>> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Professor Terrence W. Deacon
>> University of California, Berkeley
>>
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>>
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>>
>>
>
>
> --
> Professor Terrence W. Deacon
> University of California, Berkeley
>
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