Caro Louis e Cari Tutti,
tutta la mia più che cinquantennale ricerca si basa proprio
sull'informazione semiotica unita all'informazione naturale o
termodinamica, genetica e matematica. Anzi ho incontrato e conosciuto
Pedro, se non ricordo male, il 17-22 setmbre 2002 ad Acireale (Catania) si
è svolto un convegno sul tema "Energy and information transfer in
biological systems", al quale invia "Valore e valutazioni. La scienza
dell'economia o l'economia della scienza" (FrancoAngeli, Milano, 1999) che,
fra l'altro, comprende uno specifico capitolo. di "Semiotica economica" e
l'intera Terza Parte (9 capitoli) dedicati alla teoria del valore intesa
come combinazione creativa di energia e informazione. Inoltre il 1 aprile
2016 ho pubblicato "La scienza non può non essere umana, civile, sociale,
ECONOMI(C)A, enigmatica, nobile, profetica" in cui la problematica appena
rievocata e  ripresa nella  Fis è affrontata con una certa sistematica ed
organica consistenza o dimensione. Per non parlare di "Nuova economia"
(Aracne editrice, Roma, 2013) che spiega perché e come ho rivoluzionato la
scienza economica.
Quindi sono grato a Louis per avere compendiato un introduzione assai utile
e significativa, se non si vogliono scambiare lucciole per lanterne o
focacce per pane.
Grazie ancora.
Un abbraccio augurale e ancora pasquale a Tutti, ai quali voglio bene anche
se talvolta non ricambiato.

2016-04-02 5:46 GMT+02:00 Louis H Kauffman <>:

> Dear Soren and Folks,
> I have included some comments inside Soren’s introduction.
> Best,
> Lou K.
> Infobiosemiotics
> Søren Brier, CBS
> This discussion aims at contributing to the definition of a universal
> concept of information covering objective as well as subjective
> experiential and intersubjective meaningful cognition and communication
> argued in more length in Brier (2015a). My take on the problem is that
> information is not primarily a technological term but a phenomenon that
> emerges from intersubjective meaningful sign based cognition and
> communication in living systems. The purpose of this discussion is to
> discuss a possible philosophical framework for an integral and more
> adequate concept of information uniting all isolated disciplines (Brier,
> 2010, 2011, 2013a+b+c).
> The attempts to create *objective concepts* of information were good for
> technology (Brilliouin 1962) and the development of AI, but not able to
> develop theories that could include the *experiential (subjective) aspect*
>  of informing that leads to meaning in the social setting (Brier 2015b).
> The statistical concept of Shannon (Shannon and Weaver 1963/1948) is the
> most famous objective concept but it was only a technical invention based
> on a mathematical concept of entropy, but never intended to encompass
> meaning.  Norbert Wiener (*1963) *combined the mathematics statistical
> with Boltzmann’s thermodynamically entropy concept and defined information
> as neg-entropy. Wiener then saw the statistical information’s entropy as a
> representation for mind and the thermodynamically entropy as representing
> matter. So he thought he had solved the mind matter problem through his and
> Schrödinger’s (1944/2012) definition of information as neg-entropy.
> The idea was developed further into an evolutionary and ecological
> framework by Gregory Bateson (1972, 1979, 19827) resulting in an ecological
> cybernetic concept of mind as self-organized differences that made a
> difference for a cybernetically conceptualized mind (Brier 2008b). But this
> concepts that could not encompass meaning and experience of embodied living
> and social systems (Brier 2008a, 2010, 2011).
> [It seems to me that Bateson is well aware of the neccesity of being
> meaningful and thoughtful in relation to information and that his
> ‘difference that makes a difference’ is often the difference that is
> understood by an aware observer. Thus for him it is often the case that
> information arises within awareness and is not just
> a matter of channel capacities as in the Shannon approach. The whole
> reason one is take by Bateson and can find much to think about there is
> that he has a sensitive and thoughtful approach to this area of problems.
> It is too harsh to just say that “the idea was developed further …”.
> My main point is that from the present material, energetic or
> informational ontologies worldview we do not have any idea of how life,
> feeling, awareness and qualia could emerge from that foundation.
> [Yes.]
> Ever since Russell and Whitehead’s attempt in Principia Mathematica to
> make a unified mathematical language for all sciences and logical
> positivism failed (Carnap, 1967 & Cartwright 1996),
> [Personally, I do not regard the incompleteness results of Godel as an
> indication of failure! They show for the first time the true role of
> formalism in mathematics and in intellectual endeavor in general. We cannot
> rely on formalism only for our search, but it is through examining the
> limits of given formalisms that the search can be carried further. I do not
> say this is the only way forward, but we are no longer stuck with idea of a
> perfect mechanism that can in principle generate all mathematical
> truths. This has failed and we are happy at that.]
> the strongest paradigm attempting in a new unification is now the
> info-computational formalism based on the mathematic calculus developed by
> Gregory Chaitin (2006 and 2007) ).
> [The ‘mathematical calculus’ of Chaitin iis very stimulating and it is
> based on the same incompleteness arguments as Goedel. Chaitin defines
> ‘random’ relative to a given formal system L. A sequence is random if there
> is no algorithm in L simpler than THE SEQUENCE ITSELF that can generate the
> sequence. Complexity of algorithms can be examined from this point of view.
> What we do not see in Chaitin is that same thing we do not see in Shannon.
> We do not see a role for judgement or phenomenolgy. I am interested in your
> notion that Chaitin has done more than this. Please say more.]
> The paradigm is only in its early beginning and is looking for a concept
> of natural computing (Dodig-Crnkovic, 2012) going beyond the Turing
> concept of computing. But even that still does not encompass the
> experiential feeling mind and the meaning orienting aspect of
> intersubjective communication wither be only sign or also language based.
> [Here I think you say the same as I just said above. It does not go far
> enough.]
> So far there is no conclusive evidence to make us believe that the core of
> reality across nature, culture, life and mind is purely absolute
> mathematical law as Penrose (2004) seems to suggest
> [Penrose says more. He is a particular sort of Platonist and he speaks of
> Three Worlds: World of Mind, Platonic Ideal World, Physical World.
> He has a triplicate circular relationship of these three worlds. The
> subtle part of Mind is included in the Platonic. The subtle part of the
> Platonic is included in the
> deep mathematical structure of the physical. The subtle part of the
> physical is included in the Mind. These are all proper inclusions. Mind is
> greater than the subtle physical. The Platonic is greater than the subtle
> mind. The Physical is greater than its subtle mathematical core. You can
> find all this in the introduction to Penrose’s
> book “The Road to Reality”. ]
> or purely computational.
> [In his books Penrose argues again and again against the notion that we
> are purely computational and he does not believe that the Universe is
> purely computational.]
> Meaning is a way of making ‘sense’ of things for the individual in the
> world perceived.
> [I think it would help to raise (once again) the question of the meaning
> of meaning. It is too easy to say that meaning is a ‘making sense of’ or
> that it is non-mathematical. The problem with saying non-mathematical is
> that one has to raise (once again) the question of what it means (sic) to
> be mathematical.
> And when all is said and done it will become clear that one has to
> differentiate between mathematical meaning calculational and mathematical
> meaning
> conceptual (the number two is the concept of pair). When one asks how
> comes about a concept then one is thrown fully into the relationship of
> thought,percept and concept. I say that this is where meaning comes about.
> And indeed ‘feeling’ is important in this domain, as feeling is what
> intermediates thought,percept and concept.
> There is a strong need for very careful and sensitive phenomenological
> discussion of this issue.]
> It is a non-mathematical existential feeling aspect of life related to
> reflection past, present and future of existence in the surrounding
> environment, in humans enhanced by language, writings, pictures, music
> through culture. In animals cognition and communication are connected to
> survival, procreation and pleasure. In humans beings cognition develops
> into consciousness through subjective experiential and meaning based
> (self-) reflection of the individual’s role in the external world and
> becomes an existential aspect.
> [Here you discuss exacty that arena of though, concept and percept.]
> My conclusion is therefore that a broader foundation is needed in order to
> understand the basis for information and communication in living systems.
> Therefore we need to include a phenomenological and hermeneutical ground in
> order to integrate a theory of interpretative/*subjective*and
> intersubjective meaning and signification with a theory of *objective* 
> information,
> which has a physical grounding (see for instance Plamen, Rosen & Gare
> 2015). Thus the question is how can we establish an alternative
> transdisciplinary model of the sciences and the humanities to the logical
> positivist reductionism on one hand and to postmodernist relativist
> constructivism on the other in the form of a transdisciplinary concept of
> Wissenschaft (i.e. “knowledge creation”, implying both subjectivism and
> objectivism)? The body and its meaning-making processes is a complex
> multidimensional object of research that necessitates trans-disciplinary
> theoretical approaches including biological sciences, primarily
> biosemiotics and bio-cybernetics, cognition and communication sciences,
> phenomenology, hermeneutics, philosophy of science and philosophical
> theology (Harney 2015, Davies & Gregersen 2009).
> Peirce develops his pragmaticism as a way to unite empirical research,
> meaning and experience. His ontology is not only materialistic science but
> does also include meaning through embodied interaction through *experiential
> living* bodies and thereby the social as well as the subjective forms of
> cognition, meaning and interpretation. Thereby he goes further than
> Popper’s (1978) view of the three worlds. Communication is not only a world
> of objective knowledge but is intersubjective meaningful information.
> Peirce’s idea of ‘the world’ is much bigger than what science considers
> being ‘the world’...
> [Thank you for this fine introduction to your thinking!]
> -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> <FIS Soeren Infobiosemiotics abstract NEW.docx>
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