Caro Louis e Cari Tutti, tutta la mia più che cinquantennale ricerca si basa proprio sull'informazione semiotica unita all'informazione naturale o termodinamica, genetica e matematica. Anzi ho incontrato e conosciuto Pedro, se non ricordo male, il 17-22 setmbre 2002 ad Acireale (Catania) si è svolto un convegno sul tema "Energy and information transfer in biological systems", al quale invia "Valore e valutazioni. La scienza dell'economia o l'economia della scienza" (FrancoAngeli, Milano, 1999) che, fra l'altro, comprende uno specifico capitolo. di "Semiotica economica" e l'intera Terza Parte (9 capitoli) dedicati alla teoria del valore intesa come combinazione creativa di energia e informazione. Inoltre il 1 aprile 2016 ho pubblicato "La scienza non può non essere umana, civile, sociale, ECONOMI(C)A, enigmatica, nobile, profetica" in cui la problematica appena rievocata e ripresa nella Fis è affrontata con una certa sistematica ed organica consistenza o dimensione. Per non parlare di "Nuova economia" (Aracne editrice, Roma, 2013) che spiega perché e come ho rivoluzionato la scienza economica. Quindi sono grato a Louis per avere compendiato un introduzione assai utile e significativa, se non si vogliono scambiare lucciole per lanterne o focacce per pane. Grazie ancora. Un abbraccio augurale e ancora pasquale a Tutti, ai quali voglio bene anche se talvolta non ricambiato. Francesco.
2016-04-02 5:46 GMT+02:00 Louis H Kauffman <kauff...@uic.edu>: > Dear Soren and Folks, > I have included some comments inside Soren’s introduction. > Best, > Lou K. > > > Infobiosemiotics > > Søren Brier, CBS > > This discussion aims at contributing to the definition of a universal > concept of information covering objective as well as subjective > experiential and intersubjective meaningful cognition and communication > argued in more length in Brier (2015a). My take on the problem is that > information is not primarily a technological term but a phenomenon that > emerges from intersubjective meaningful sign based cognition and > communication in living systems. The purpose of this discussion is to > discuss a possible philosophical framework for an integral and more > adequate concept of information uniting all isolated disciplines (Brier, > 2010, 2011, 2013a+b+c). > > The attempts to create *objective concepts* of information were good for > technology (Brilliouin 1962) and the development of AI, but not able to > develop theories that could include the *experiential (subjective) aspect* > of informing that leads to meaning in the social setting (Brier 2015b). > The statistical concept of Shannon (Shannon and Weaver 1963/1948) is the > most famous objective concept but it was only a technical invention based > on a mathematical concept of entropy, but never intended to encompass > meaning. Norbert Wiener (*1963) *combined the mathematics statistical > with Boltzmann’s thermodynamically entropy concept and defined information > as neg-entropy. Wiener then saw the statistical information’s entropy as a > representation for mind and the thermodynamically entropy as representing > matter. So he thought he had solved the mind matter problem through his and > Schrödinger’s (1944/2012) definition of information as neg-entropy. > > > The idea was developed further into an evolutionary and ecological > framework by Gregory Bateson (1972, 1979, 19827) resulting in an ecological > cybernetic concept of mind as self-organized differences that made a > difference for a cybernetically conceptualized mind (Brier 2008b). But this > concepts that could not encompass meaning and experience of embodied living > and social systems (Brier 2008a, 2010, 2011). > > [It seems to me that Bateson is well aware of the neccesity of being > meaningful and thoughtful in relation to information and that his > ‘difference that makes a difference’ is often the difference that is > understood by an aware observer. Thus for him it is often the case that > information arises within awareness and is not just > a matter of channel capacities as in the Shannon approach. The whole > reason one is take by Bateson and can find much to think about there is > that he has a sensitive and thoughtful approach to this area of problems. > It is too harsh to just say that “the idea was developed further …”. > > My main point is that from the present material, energetic or > informational ontologies worldview we do not have any idea of how life, > feeling, awareness and qualia could emerge from that foundation. > > [Yes.] > > Ever since Russell and Whitehead’s attempt in Principia Mathematica to > make a unified mathematical language for all sciences and logical > positivism failed (Carnap, 1967 & Cartwright et.al. 1996), > > [Personally, I do not regard the incompleteness results of Godel as an > indication of failure! They show for the first time the true role of > formalism in mathematics and in intellectual endeavor in general. We cannot > rely on formalism only for our search, but it is through examining the > limits of given formalisms that the search can be carried further. I do not > say this is the only way forward, but we are no longer stuck with idea of a > perfect mechanism that can in principle generate all mathematical > truths. This has failed and we are happy at that.] > > the strongest paradigm attempting in a new unification is now the > info-computational formalism based on the mathematic calculus developed by > Gregory Chaitin (2006 and 2007) ). > > [The ‘mathematical calculus’ of Chaitin iis very stimulating and it is > based on the same incompleteness arguments as Goedel. Chaitin defines > ‘random’ relative to a given formal system L. A sequence is random if there > is no algorithm in L simpler than THE SEQUENCE ITSELF that can generate the > sequence. Complexity of algorithms can be examined from this point of view. > What we do not see in Chaitin is that same thing we do not see in Shannon. > We do not see a role for judgement or phenomenolgy. I am interested in your > notion that Chaitin has done more than this. Please say more.] > > > The paradigm is only in its early beginning and is looking for a concept > of natural computing (Dodig-Crnkovic, 2012) going beyond the Turing > concept of computing. But even that still does not encompass the > experiential feeling mind and the meaning orienting aspect of > intersubjective communication wither be only sign or also language based. > > [Here I think you say the same as I just said above. It does not go far > enough.] > > So far there is no conclusive evidence to make us believe that the core of > reality across nature, culture, life and mind is purely absolute > mathematical law as Penrose (2004) seems to suggest > > [Penrose says more. He is a particular sort of Platonist and he speaks of > Three Worlds: World of Mind, Platonic Ideal World, Physical World. > He has a triplicate circular relationship of these three worlds. The > subtle part of Mind is included in the Platonic. The subtle part of the > Platonic is included in the > deep mathematical structure of the physical. The subtle part of the > physical is included in the Mind. These are all proper inclusions. Mind is > greater than the subtle physical. The Platonic is greater than the subtle > mind. The Physical is greater than its subtle mathematical core. You can > find all this in the introduction to Penrose’s > book “The Road to Reality”. ] > > or purely computational. > > [In his books Penrose argues again and again against the notion that we > are purely computational and he does not believe that the Universe is > purely computational.] > > Meaning is a way of making ‘sense’ of things for the individual in the > world perceived. > > [I think it would help to raise (once again) the question of the meaning > of meaning. It is too easy to say that meaning is a ‘making sense of’ or > that it is non-mathematical. The problem with saying non-mathematical is > that one has to raise (once again) the question of what it means (sic) to > be mathematical. > And when all is said and done it will become clear that one has to > differentiate between mathematical meaning calculational and mathematical > meaning > conceptual (the number two is the concept of pair). When one asks how > comes about a concept then one is thrown fully into the relationship of > thought,percept and concept. I say that this is where meaning comes about. > And indeed ‘feeling’ is important in this domain, as feeling is what > intermediates thought,percept and concept. > There is a strong need for very careful and sensitive phenomenological > discussion of this issue.] > > It is a non-mathematical existential feeling aspect of life related to > reflection past, present and future of existence in the surrounding > environment, in humans enhanced by language, writings, pictures, music > through culture. In animals cognition and communication are connected to > survival, procreation and pleasure. In humans beings cognition develops > into consciousness through subjective experiential and meaning based > (self-) reflection of the individual’s role in the external world and > becomes an existential aspect. > > [Here you discuss exacty that arena of though, concept and percept.] > > My conclusion is therefore that a broader foundation is needed in order to > understand the basis for information and communication in living systems. > Therefore we need to include a phenomenological and hermeneutical ground in > order to integrate a theory of interpretative/*subjective*and > intersubjective meaning and signification with a theory of *objective* > information, > which has a physical grounding (see for instance Plamen, Rosen & Gare > 2015). Thus the question is how can we establish an alternative > transdisciplinary model of the sciences and the humanities to the logical > positivist reductionism on one hand and to postmodernist relativist > constructivism on the other in the form of a transdisciplinary concept of > Wissenschaft (i.e. “knowledge creation”, implying both subjectivism and > objectivism)? The body and its meaning-making processes is a complex > multidimensional object of research that necessitates trans-disciplinary > theoretical approaches including biological sciences, primarily > biosemiotics and bio-cybernetics, cognition and communication sciences, > phenomenology, hermeneutics, philosophy of science and philosophical > theology (Harney 2015, Davies & Gregersen 2009). > > Peirce develops his pragmaticism as a way to unite empirical research, > meaning and experience. His ontology is not only materialistic science but > does also include meaning through embodied interaction through *experiential > living* bodies and thereby the social as well as the subjective forms of > cognition, meaning and interpretation. Thereby he goes further than > Popper’s (1978) view of the three worlds. Communication is not only a world > of objective knowledge but is intersubjective meaningful information. > Peirce’s idea of ‘the world’ is much bigger than what science considers > being ‘the world’... > [Thank you for this fine introduction to your thinking!] > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > <FIS Soeren Infobiosemiotics abstract NEW.docx> > _______________________________________________ > Fis mailing list > Fis@listas.unizar.es > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > > > > _______________________________________________ > Fis mailing list > Fis@listas.unizar.es > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > >
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