Hi Alex,

On 02 May 2016, at 08:30, Alex Hankey wrote:

RE Bruno Marchal: It is easier to explain the illusion of matter to something conscious than to explain the illusion of consciousness to something material.

ME: At the Consciousness Conference I found it extraordinary that at least one plenary presentation was centered round treating the wave function as a real entity in the (strongly) objective sense.

I was under the impression that Bernard D'Espagnat's work for which he received the Templeton Prize had definitively shown that nothing is 'objectively real' in the strongly objective sense. The definite existence of quantum correlations destroys all that.

Is that not self-defeating? How could the quantum correlations existence be definite if nothing is objective? With Digital Mechanism we need to accept that the existence of the universal machine and the computations is as real/true as the facts of elementary arithmetic, on which everyone agree(*). Then we can explain why machines develop a belief in a physical reality, and why that beliefs can last and can be sharable among many individuals, like with the quanta, and why some part of those beliefs are not sharable, yet undoubtable, like the qualia.

(*) I like to define Arithmetical Realism by the action of not withdrawing your kids from school when they learn the table of addition and multiplication. It is mainly the belief that 2+2=5 is not correct.

Once this is accepted, the enquirer is faced with the question of what to accept as fundamental. I have always considered 'information' in the sense of the process or flow that connects the observed to the observer as a satisfactory alternative. The process of information flow creates the observer-observed relationship and (the illusion of??) their separation.

I can be OK with this. In arithmetic, it is more like a consciousness flow, and actually a differentiating consciousness flow, from which the laws of physics evolve.

Sequences of information production made possible by lack of equilibrium, both mechanical and thermodynamic, create pictures of particle tracks at the microscopic level, and pictures of objects at the macroscopic level.

This already seem to presuppose a physical reality. As I am interested in understanding what that could be and where it comes from, I prefer to not assume it. I gave an argument why such an assumption is not quite compatible with the digital mechanist assumption (not in physics, but in cognitive science).

Everything is made consistent by the existence of quantum correlations in mathematical ways use by Everett in the book on the Many Worlds interpretation by Bryce De Witt (note that I use the mathematics, but do not concur with the interpretation).

Everett did not talk about a new interpretation. He just gave a new Quantum Mechanics formulation, which is basically the old one (Copenhagen) but without the assumption of a wave collapse. I tend to agree with David Deutsch on this: the "many-world" is just literal quantum mechanics, where we apply the wave or matrix equation to the observed and the observer as well.

In my approach, the universe continuously makes choices, and selects among its own futures. I had a lengthy conversation with Henry Stapp two days ago at the conference after his talk, and checked that he still approves of this approach.

The only problem with Everett theory, is that he used digital mechanism, and what I did show, is that this should force him to extend the embedding of the physicist in the wave to the embedding of the mathematician in arithmetic (a dormant notion, alas). The ultimate equation of physics might be only arithmetic (or anything Turing equivalent). All the rest becomes internal phenomenologies, at least assuming digital mechanism. This makes also digital mechanism testable, by comparing the physical phenomenology with the actual observation. Up to now, it fits: the quantum weirdness of the universal wave (the multiverse) seem to match well the digital mechanist arithmetical weirdness of arithmetic (intuitively and formally). The only trouble is that such a top down approach leads to complex unsolved problem in mathematics, which is normal, given the depth and complexity of the subject. I am not a defender of digital mechanism, I use it only because the philosophical and theological questions becomes mathematical problem. I search the key only under the lamp of mathematics.



P.S. Thanks to all for making this such a rich and interesting discussion.

Alex Hankey M.A. (Cantab.) PhD (M.I.T.)
Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science,
SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle
Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India
Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195
Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789

2015 JPBMB Special Issue on Integral Biomathics: Life Sciences, Mathematics and Phenomenological Philosophy
Fis mailing list


Fis mailing list

Reply via email to