Stan, Joseph, I don’t see any general advantage of a process philosophy over a philosophy of things, though Every Thing Must Go argues that things are misleading in modern physics, and aren’t needed anyway. We argue that in many cases processes work better, bu7t we don’ argue solely in favour of processes, either, since they have their own problems. Instead we argue for the more inclusive idea of structures, which are definitionally relational. They are more accessible than things, but don’t rule out entire metaphysics that includes things, qualia and much else. Structuralism merely imposes some discipline on the chaos. It does not propose oppositions (though many are constructed in its name) Processes come in subsets, but only as types. This follows fro9m the definition of set. Interlinking of processes spatiotemporally produces networks.
Retaining two-valued logic in some cases at least seems me to be an advantage. Logic is an apparatus, a tool, and to predefine which tools are to be useful is as fallacious on one side as on the other. Especially when the subject matter appears to be confused. It becomes much too easy to give in too quickly. In particular, applying logic to itself seems to require a two-valued approach to avoid degenerating into Babaylonic nihilism (Zi’inovev). The most appropriate application of two valued logic is to logic itself. It illuminates logic an a way that nothing else is able to. Two valued logic give birther to a myriad of logics. I am not a big fan of pluralism, preferring simplicity if it can be effectrive, but sometimes it is the best we can do, given our mental limitations and the inherent complexity of some of the things we study (see both Bill Wimsatt’s methods for finite minds and Paul Cilliers’ positive postmodernism here. There is room for, nay need for, at least four basic foundational but complexly inter-related metaphysical attitudes going back at least to the Greeks, and found in many other cultures as well. (See William Irwin Thomson’s excellent, At the Edge of History and/or Cosmography in the Review of Metaphysics starting in the mid-50s.) John Collier Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate University of KwaZulu-Natal http://web.ncf.ca/collier From: Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Stanley N Salthe Sent: Sunday, 08 May 2016 4:13 PM To: Joseph Brenner <joe.bren...@bluewin.ch>; fis <fis@listas.unizar.es> Subject: Re: [Fis] Fw: Clarifying Posting. Speculative Realism Joseph -- Regarding: ?As it turns out, however, Speculative Realism possesses its own set of weaknesses which can be ascribed in a general way to its retention of concepts embodying classical binary, truth-functional logic. These include an ontology of 'things' rather than processes as the furniture of the world, a logic of non-contradiction and a ground of existence that has reason and value, but excludes the possibility of a ground of existence which includes incoherence and contradiction. S: Well, why cannot processes be described by subsetting? As in: {energy dissipation {work {building a box}}} and {energy dissipation {finds quickest route around an obstruction {fails to win the race}}} STAN On Fri, May 6, 2016 at 9:32 PM, Joseph Brenner <joe.bren...@bluewin.ch<mailto:joe.bren...@bluewin.ch>> wrote: Dear Friends and Colleagues, The last couple of postings have opened the discussion in a direction their authors may not have intended. Bob's felt personal plea for a phenomenological approach to biology, and hence to other sciences, and as the foundation of a philosophy, begs the question of non-phenomenological approaches which may be equally or more valid. We all agree the mind is capable of phenomenal experience and is not a machine, but the (correct) arguments being made seem to me expressions, in various styles, of the non-fundamentality of matter and energy. Unless I am wrong, this is at least a still open question. Further, Terry's (again correct) statements about the importance of the Liar and Goedel paradoxes perhaps overlooks one aspect of them: they (the paradoxes) themselves are only relatively simple binary cases that can be considered reduced versions of some more fundamental, underlying princple governing relationships in the real, physical world. These relationships are crucial to an understanding of the non-binary properties of information. A recent book by Tom Sparrow is entitled "The End of Phenomenology". It proposes a new science-free doctrine, Speculative Realism, to provide a link between phenomena and reality which in my opinion also fails, but may be of interest to some of you. I wrote about this doctrine: As it turns out, however, Speculative Realism possesses its own set of weaknesses which can be ascribed in a general way to its retention of concepts embodying classical binary, truth-functional logic. These include an ontology of 'things' rather than processes as the furniture of the world, a logic of non-contradiction and a ground of existence that has reason and value, but excludes the possibility of a ground of existence which includes incoherence and contradiction. All for now, for various reasons, Best wishes, Joseph ----- Original Message ----- From: "Robert E. Ulanowicz" <u...@umces.edu<mailto:u...@umces.edu>> To: "Stanley N Salthe" <ssal...@binghamton.edu<mailto:ssal...@binghamton.edu>> Cc: "fis" <fis@listas.unizar.es<mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es>> Sent: Friday, May 06, 2016 7:36 AM Subject: Re: [Fis] Clarifying Posting Dear Pedro, Most of the discussion has centered about phenomenology in the sense of Husserl. The topic is broader, however, and remains the foundation of the engineering philosophy that has guided my career. I have long advocated a phenomenological approach to biology as the only way forward. I have devoted years to the phenomenological study of ecosystems trophic exchange networks and have shown how hypothesis falsification can be possible in abstraction of eliciting causes <https://www.ctr4process.org/whitehead2015/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/PhilPrax.pdf>. I have gone so far as to propose an alternative metaphysics to conventional mechanical/reductionist theory that followed from phenomenological premises. <http://people.clas.ufl.edu/ulan/publications/philosophy/3rdwindow/> So I would submit that phenomenology is alive and well as a practical and even quantitative tool in science. It's just that, as an engineer, I find Husserl tough going. :) Warm regards, Bob _______________________________________________ Fis mailing list Fis@listas.unizar.es<mailto:Fis@listas.unizar.es> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis _______________________________________________ Fis mailing list Fis@listas.unizar.es<mailto:Fis@listas.unizar.es> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
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