Hi Alex,

    I am reviewing FIS posts from the last months – earlier, I was
traveling. I was also at the TSC conference, so it is a shame we did not
meet and chat (I presented a workshop with the guys from Google on Quantum
Computing and AI). It was also nice to see Søren there. On your note to

> Your claim that information is SPECIES SPECIFIC [differs from] the
> presented in my 3 week session that . . . used the same encoding of
gestalt . . . <
• First, I see the concept of weltarm was raised in your session. In fact,
Rafael gave a nice (quasi-poetic even) note on this concept. But then I see
no reply from you on this concept. Why is that, did I overlook it?

• I read Pedro's note on species specific in that same sense of Heidegger's
weltarm. I would further say, in a plain phenomenological manner weltarm is
bounded by the sensorium and physiology of any given agent – how we know a
"bat" is a bat, and not a fish, and how I know Marcus is Marcus, and not
Alex. I tired to retrieve your paper, but the posted MSWord doc gave me
gibberish, so I could not see the EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE you refer to. Also, in
paper #2 (for this session) I reference three types of meaning – which you
can take as "information" – that contradict(?) your posited notion. So I
would ask that you speak to this contradiction.

• Still, the notion that they "used the same encoding of gestalt" has some
appeal. What might be seen as similarities in "encoding gestalt" is framed
in paper #4 as natural multi-state computing. I would also appreciate your
reactions to this concept.

Thanks for sharing your thoughts.

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